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This dissertation investigates the role of contemporary state- and institution-level policies in 
public higher education in the United States. In Chapter 1, I examine the effect of earning college 
credit in a statewide dual credit course on student postsecondary enrollment and early performance 
outcomes. I find that banking college credit in high school increases the probability that a student 
enrolls in college within a year of high school graduation by approximately 5 percentage points. This 
effect is driven by the boost in the likelihood of postsecondary enrollment at public two-year 
institutions for passers of career-related, technical courses (e.g., Plant Science). However, I find little 
evidence that banking college credit improves measures of early college performance along the 
dimensions of credit accumulation, GPA, or remediation.  
Chapter 2 utilizes student-level data from four public four-year institutions in North 
Carolina to characterize which students tend to be most impacted by tuition surcharge policies. 
Moreover, I observe how more intermediate early college behaviors and performance measures (e.g., 
major choice, credit accumulation, etc.) influence the likelihood a student may eventually be assessed 
the surcharge. I find that compared to their otherwise similar peers, black and Hispanic males with 
lower measures of pre-college achievement are more likely to be assessed the surcharge. Students 
who eventually hit the surcharge are also much more likely to major in a STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering, & Math) field, particularly engineering, and are more likely to formally 




Last, in Chapter 3, I examine how the share of nonresident (i.e., foreign-born and out-of-
state) students on public, in-state campuses affects institutional spending priorities. I employ an 
instrumental variables approach to isolate exogenous variation in nonresident enrollment. I find that 
the practical, economic effect that nonresident students have on public university spending behavior 
is extremely small, and often negligible. I find no effect of nonresident enrollment on total spending 
per FTE, suggesting that many public institutions are in fact using the additional revenues generated 
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 This dissertation investigates the role of contemporary state- and institution-level policies in 
public higher education in the United States. Across three chapters, each focused on a specific policy 
and context, this dissertation broadly explores the effects that these policies have on college 
enrollment and performance in the modern era. In the context of this body of work, contemporary 
refers to secular trends occurring post 2000, and especially after the Great Recession (2007-2009). 
This contemporary postsecondary era is characterized by declining state appropriations, rising 
tuition costs and student debt, flat-lining college completion rates, and increased time-to-degree 
(Kane, Orszag, Apostolov, Inman, & Reschovsky, 2005; Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2012). 
Public institutions and the state agencies that run them have worked to cope with and ameliorate 
these challenges in a multitude of ways, while also trying to ensure a college education remains 
accessible and attainable for an increasingly diverse set of college enrollees.  
In Chapter 1, I examine the effect of earning college credit in a statewide dual credit course 
on student postsecondary enrollment and early performance outcomes. Dual credit programs deliver 
college-level content within a high school setting and provide the potential for students to earn both 
high school and college credit in a single course instance. Proponents argue that exposure to 
rigorous college-level content and the opportunity to earn college credits before setting foot on a 
college campus help smooth the transition from the secondary to postsecondary realm. While past 
work has largely explored the total effect of participating in a dual-credit course on college 
enrollment and choice, no studies have explicitly isolated the effect of earning college credit on 
postsecondary outcomes. I use an ambitious rollout of an array of dual-credit courses across the 
state of Tennessee beginning in Fall 2013 to examine the effect of this key element of dual-credit 
 2 
programs on a range of early postsecondary outcomes. I employ a regression discontinuity design 
that exploits exam cut score criteria, whereby dual-credit participants who score at or above a certain 
score percentage “bank,” or retain, three college credits that can be transcripted at any public 
Tennessee postsecondary institution upon enrollment.  
I find that banking college credit in high school increases the probability that a student 
enrolls in college within a year of high school graduation by approximately 5 percentage points. This 
effect is driven by the boost in the likelihood of postsecondary enrollment at public two-year 
institutions for passers of career-related, technical courses (e.g., Plant Science). However, I find little 
evidence that banking college credit improves measures of early college performance along the 
dimensions of credit accumulation, GPA, or remediation. In fact, I find that barely passers of math 
subject exams (e.g., College Algebra) both attempt and earn fewer credits than their barely failing 
peers, rising to a gap of roughly 3 earned credits within two years of expected high school 
graduation. Math exam passers are also more likely to earn lower cumulative GPAs and obtain 
remedial credit hours than their otherwise similar peers who fail to bank college credit. Taken 
altogether, the findings of this chapter highlight the potential for unintended consequences for 
earning college credit while in high school, such as reduced credit loads and underperformance once 
in college. They also raise important questions about the appropriate placement of cut scores used to 
certify college credit, as well as questions about the steps that students must take in order to ensure 
that their banked college credits are officially transcribed once setting foot on a college campus.  
In Chapter 2, I shift my focus away from Tennessee towards North Carolina to investigate 
which students appear to be most likely to pay a tuition surcharge. Surcharge, or excess credit hour 
(ECH), policies have arisen in response to the steadily increasing time-to-degree, a trend that has 
occurred predominately at public colleges and universities and particularly less selective institutions 
equipped with fewer resources. These policies operate by assessing a tuition surcharge fee (anywhere 
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from 20% to 100% of tuition) for credits taken beyond a predetermined cutoff, ranging from 
between 110 and 150 percent of a degree’s usual required credits. Prior work using institution-level 
data (Kramer, Holcomb, & Kelchen, 2018) found that these policies failed to bolster degree 
attainment or curtail time-to-degree; however, but increased median student debt, shifting the costs 
of education from the state to the college attendee. This paper complements the work of Kramer 
and colleagues by utilizing student-level data from four public four-year institutions in North 
Carolina to characterize which students tend to be most impacted by tuition surcharge policies. 
Moreover, I observe how more intermediate early college behaviors and performance measures (e.g., 
major choice, credit accumulation, etc.) influence the likelihood a student may eventually be assessed 
the surcharge.  
I find that compared to their otherwise similar peers, black and Hispanic males with lower 
measures of pre-college achievement (e.g., high school GPA, SAT score) are more likely to be 
assessed the surcharge. Students who eventually hit the surcharge are also much more likely to major 
in a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, & Math) field, particularly engineering, and are more 
likely to formally commit to a degree path at later point in college. Still, whether in a STEM major or 
not, surcharge students attempt fewer per-term credit hours and fail to earn credits at the rate of 
their peers, even with a comparatively lower course load each term. Meanwhile, they are much more 
likely to finance their education with federal grant aid, an indication that they may be economically 
more disadvantaged than many of their peers. In many ways, the types of students 
disproportionately affected by UNC’s surcharge policy resemble the kinds of students that 
institutions, governments, and federal agencies like the National Science Foundation and the 
National Institutes of Health are simultaneously working hard to support with respect to college 
completion and timely degree (Arcidiacono, Aucejo, & Hotz ,2016). In deliberating the place and 
purpose of North Carolina’s surcharge policy in future years, stakeholders should reconsider 
 4 
whether the policy is working as intended, especially with respect to the types of students that the 
surcharge is most likely to affect.  
Finally, in Chapter 3, I expand my focus beyond the singular state level to focus on trends 
affecting four-year public colleges and universities across the US. I examine how the share of 
nonresident (i.e., foreign-born and out-of-state) students on public, in-state campuses affects 
institutional spending priorities.  The growth in nonresident enrollment at public institutions has 
coincided with the substantial decline in state appropriations over this same period of time, 
especially after the recessions of 2001 and 2008 (Baum, Ma, Bell, & Elliott, 2014). An emerging 
concern, documented mostly in the popular press, is that the growing presence of nonresident 
students on public campuses shifts the funding priorities of public institutions away from education- 
and access-focused efforts towards ancillary amenities (e.g., lazy rivers, world-class dining) meant to 
attract and retain these higher-paying, out-of-state students. Due to issues of simultaneity and 
reverse causality embedded in the relationship between nonresident enrollment and institution 
expenditure behavior, I employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to isolate exogenous 
variation in nonresident enrollment. Using data from the Integrated Education Postsecondary 
Database System (IPEDS) between 2002 and 2015, I examine the effect of the growing share of 
nonresident students at research-focused public four-year institutions on institutional spending 
behavior.  
Altogether, I find that the practical, economic effect that nonresident students have on 
public university spending behavior is extremely small, and often negligible. Of note, I find no effect 
of nonresident enrollment on total spending per FTE, suggesting that many public institutions are in 
fact using the additional revenues generated from nonresident tuition and fees to fill in revenue 
shortfalls resulting from diminished state appropriations. I do find some evidence that institutions 
increase the share of total spending they devote towards institutional support and instruction while 
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decreasing the share of spending they put towards spending on research activities and scholarships 
and fellowships. Nevertheless, despite the statistical significance of some of the effects, the practical 
effect of nonresident enrollment on institutional spending patterns is extremely small financially. I 
also fail to detect a relationship between the share of nonresidents and spending patterns on student 
services and auxiliary enterprises, often considered “consumption amenities” in prior literature. 
These findings suggest the anecdotes conveyed in the popular press and by concerned in-state 
constituents may be overhyped. It still remains an important calling for future research to look at the 
levers responsible for shifting institutional spending; however, the residency status of public 


































CHAPTER 1: BANKING ON DUAL CREDIT: EARNING COLLEGE CREDIT IN 
HIGH SCHOOL AND EARLY POSTSECONDARY PERFORMANCE 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite college aspirations and enrollment rates increasing steadily over the last several 
decades, college completion rates have plateaued and median time-to-degree has lengthened over 
this same period (Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009; Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2010). Over 
three quarters of high school students expect to achieve a four-year degree or higher, yet only about 
a third are successful in attaining one (Goyette, 2008). For many students, the hurdles separating 
their degree ambitions from their attainment begin as soon as they enter college.  
Remedial coursework is common, with nearly 50 percent of students required to take 
remedial classes (with nearly 70 percent at community colleges). Even among those who’ve taken 
the recommended college preparatory high school courses, remediation rates are around 40 percent 
(NCES, 2012). In addition, attrition remains relatively high. Roughly 30 percent of students who 
begin school will not return after the first year (Schneider, 2010). These statistics suggest that many 
high school students are not adequately prepared for the academic rigor of college. 
Concerns about early college performance have led a variety of stakeholders, from 
researchers to policymakers and practitioners, to devise initiatives that help bridge the curricular 
divide between secondary and postsecondary institutions. These initiatives are in contrast to 
remedial coursework interventions, which have historically been the primary method that 
postsecondary institutions have attempted to ameliorate perceived deficiencies in academic 
preparedness. Yet, most large-scale studies on the effects of remedial and developmental courses on 
student success, persistence, and degree completion find null or negative or effects for college 
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students at the margin of passing out of remediation (Calcagno & Long, 2008; Boatman & Long, 
2011; Martorell & McFarlin, 2011; Scott-Clayton & Rodriguez, 2015). A reasonable explanation for 
these discouraging findings is that college is too late to address issues of under-preparedness. 
As an alternate approach, policy efforts have shifted towards engaging students much earlier, 
especially while still in high school, as a way to ease the scholastic disjuncture between high school 
and college (Kirst & Venezia, 2004; Venezia, Kirst, & Antonio, 2003). Though taking different 
forms, these initiatives serve a common purpose of aligning standards, objectives, and information 
between the K-12 and postsecondary realms.  As the most robust example, some states have 
adopted K-16 or pre-K-20 reforms that explicitly coordinate educational aims between education 
sectors – though these aims and their scope vary widely between states (Venezia et al., 2005).  
Credit-based transition programs1 are another enterprise meant to expose students to 
college-level material and expectations in high school as preparation for the next academic stage 
(Bailey & Karp, 2003). Advanced Placement (AP) and dual credit2 initiatives represent well-known 
examples of these programs, which allow students to participate in rigorous, college-level courses 
while in high school, earning high school credit and potentially college credit as well. These 
programs continue to expand in number across the US, with 69 percent of public high schools 
offering AP courses and 82 percent offering dual credit courses in the 2010-11 year (NCES, 2013). 
In that year, around 3.5 million students enrolled in AP courses and over 1 million in dual credit.  
Dual credit programs, in particular, have been billed by advocates as a promising way to 
bridge the high school-to-college divide for a broader set of students, including those traditionally 
                                               
1 The programs also go by the name “accelerated learning options” (Hoffman, Vargas, & Santos, 2009) and “secondary-
postsecondary learning options” (Lerner & Brand, 2006).  
 
2 Dual credit is often distinct from dual enrollment. Whereas dual credit refers to instances where students stand to 
receive both high school- and college-level credit from the same single course, dual enrollment usually refers to 
situations where students are simultaneously enrolled in courses at the high school and college levels (Borden et al., 
2013; Hoffman, Vargas, & Santos, 2009). 
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underrepresented in higher education. Proponents hypothesize that dual credit can improve 
students’ postsecondary enrollment and success through several avenues. They argue that dual credit 
can improve students’ academic preparedness for college work as well as partially alleviate their cost 
burden. Moreover, exposure to dual credit can provide students with tangible information about the 
college experience; this knowledge may improve student expectations of – and perhaps motivation 
to pursue – postsecondary work (Bailey & Karp, 2003; Borden et al., 2013).  
Yet, despite the continued expansion of dual credit and its proposed merits, there is sparse 
evidence establishing a clear relationship between dual credit policies and student postsecondary 
outcomes. Critics also point to the challenges of policing course quality. Moreover, prior literature 
has not investigated the nuances of student dual credit experiences – namely, whether effects vary 
between those dual credit participants who only obtain high school credit and those participants 
who obtain both high school and college credit. As an exception, Smith, Hurwitz, & Avery (2017) do 
investigate the effect of accruing college credits through AP exam performance. However, dual 
credit programs – the focus of this paper – often target or attract different types of students. 
Considering that the mechanisms through which dual credit theoretically influence postsecondary 
outcomes – academic readiness, motivation, and financial savings – may relate to college credit 
accrual, the distinction between participants who earn college credit and those who do not may be 
meaningful. 
This paper explores the effect of earning transferable college credit on early postsecondary 
enrollment and performance by focusing on a specific dual credit initiative implemented by the state 
of Tennessee in 2012. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach that exploits exam cut score 
criteria, I estimate the effect of passing a dual credit challenge exam on college enrollment and 
academic performance within one and two years of expected high school graduation. Although both 
passers and failers of the exam are participants in a dual credit course, and are therefore equally 
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exposed to any theoretical treatment effects gained by exposure to college-level material, only exam 
passers earn three college credits that they “bank”, or retain, until they enroll in college where this 
credit is formally transcripted. This paper focuses on this credit-bearing dimension of dual credit, 
probing how it shapes the early postsecondary experiences of dual credit participants.  
I examine the effects of banking credit within a pooled sample of exam records that includes 
scores across seven different dual credit courses, as well as in a couple of key subject and course 
subgroups separately (e.g., Math courses, career and technical education (CTE) courses). I find that 
passing a challenge exam boosts college enrollment within one year of a student’s expected high 
school graduation by about 5 percentage points. This full sample effect is primarily due to the fact 
that passers of CTE exams – and especially Plant Science – are more likely enroll in college than 
their barely failing peers, and especially at in-state, public two-year institutions. Passing a challenge 
exam boosts Plant Science student enrollment in Tennessee two-years by 16-18 percentage points. 
Meanwhile, there is some evidence that Math students who miss banking college credit by 1-6 
percentage points are discouraged from enrolling in a postsecondary institution within the year 
following high school graduation. 
The effects of passing a challenge exam continue to differ for Math and CTE students when 
it comes to students’ early postsecondary performance. While CTE exam passers do not appear to 
experience a meaningful difference in credits attempted, credits earned, or grade point average 
(GPA) compared to their barely failing peers, Math passers appear to underperform along these 
measures relative to their peers. These discontinuities in Math at the passing margin largely persist 
two years after a student’s expected high school graduation. Even though Math passers enter college 
with a nest egg of three college credits, they fall behind their barely failing peers by roughly this same 
amount by the end of year two. They also are more likely to earn remedial credit and earn lower 
GPAs than their peers.  
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The findings for Math, in particular, highlight the potential unintended consequences of 
Tennessee’s statewide dual credit policy that awards college credit based on cut score criteria. Right 
around the passing threshold, barely failers and barely passers in Math were equally likely to shift 
their enrollment away from in-state, public two-year colleges to in-state, public four-year colleges 
instead. At these more academically demanding institutions, passers may have been able to capitalize 
on their banked credit in ways their barely failing peers were not – either by applying this credit 
towards college graduation requirements or responding to the positive signal of passing by tackling 
more challenging coursework. Either way, the fact that passers earn fewer credits and lower GPAs 
than their barely failing peers suggests that whatever behavioral changes they made in response to 
banking college credit culminated with them being academically behind their barely failing peers, 
who scored slightly lower on the challenge exam and did not merit credit.   
The findings of this paper also underscore the importance of considering dual credit not as 
one singular policy, but as a collection of course offerings that not only teach different content, but 
attract different participants, and therefore may affect the postsecondary performance of passers in 
disparate ways. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses relevant 
background literature, while Section three provides contextual details of Tennessee’s statewide dual 
credit policy. Section four describes how I generated my analytic sample, and Section five addresses 
the internal validity of my RD empirical approach. Section six presents findings, Section seven 
discusses additional analyses, and Section eight discusses the implications of the findings.  
2. Background literature 
2.1 Theoretical rationale of credit-based transition programs 
As policies for expanding credit-based transition programs have gained traction, state 
policymakers have been encouraged by the potential of these programs to help high school students 
progress to college. Proponents argue that these programs facilitate a smoother transition for 
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students by addressing academic preparedness, informational, and financial and barriers (Borden at 
al., 2013). Scholastically, these courses reflect the challenging content and high expectations of 
college a classroom, giving a student advantageous experience with rigorous coursework before 
entering college. This exposure is valuable considering that intensity of a student’s high school 
curriculum is predictive of college enrollment (Long, Conger, & Iatarola, 2012) and remains one of 
the strongest predictors of bachelor degree attainment (Adelman 1999; 2006).  
Engaging with rigorous course material and assignments can bolster preparedness by 
informing students of their academic abilities and how they may expect to fare in a college 
classroom (Bailey & Karp, 2003). Having this information prior to enrolling in college allows 
students to make changes to their college preparatory behavior in ways that may prove beneficial 
later. For example, dual credit students may add (or subtract) additional advanced courses in their 
schedules, register for college entrance exams like the SAT or ACT, or seek tutoring or mentoring 
assistance in response to their dual credit course experience. These actions may reduce the likelihood 
of requiring remediation and may help build a strong academic foundation for postsecondary study.  
Early credit-based postsecondary experiences can also cultivate college momentum by 
providing accurate, actionable information to high school students about the college experience. 
Beyond gauging their academic preparedness, students may also gain more broad-based knowledge 
about how college works from the formal structure of the course as well as from the way college 
credits are accrued and transcripted in a postsecondary setting. This may be especially important for 
students traditionally underrepresented in college including those of minority, first generation, rural, 
or low socioeconomic (SES) status. Not only are these students less likely to attend high schools that 
expose them to rigorous course content generally (Attewell & Domina, 2008), but their schools are 
often inadequately supplied with key resources – well-informed guidance counselors, college alumni 
networks, or college search and application assistance measures – that are pivotal in providing 
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transparent, quality information about the postsecondary landscape (Venezia, Kirst, & Antonio, 
2003; Hoxby & Avery, 2013; Avery, Howell, & Page, 2014).  
Finally, these programs may also benefit students from a financial standpoint by allowing 
them to earn college credit while still in high school. Early credit accumulation may shorten overall 
time-to-degree and potentially reduce the cost of education. Accruing college credits earlier may also 
increase the likelihood a student graduates from college, making the financial commitment to pursue 
a degree worthwhile. Adelman (1999; 2006) finds that meaningful credit accumulation (at least 20) 
by the end of the first year significantly improves the likelihood a student graduates from college. 
These credits may serve as a “nest egg”, helping provide academic and psychological momentum to 
continue progressing towards a degree (Swanson, 2008; An, 2013).  
2.2 Dual credit, dual enrollment, and postsecondary outcomes  
Despite the recent expansion of dual credit programs, little causal evidence exists that 
delineates a clear relationship between participation in dual credit and later postsecondary outcomes. 
Several studies have examined how participation in dual enrollment courses impacts postsecondary 
outcomes. Unlike dual credit, dual enrollment courses typically represent instances where a high 
school student is concurrently enrolled in high school and a postsecondary institution, and where 
that student takes a college course delivered by a college faculty member at the latter. Non-
experimental studies find that, controlling for observable differences, dual enrollment participation 
is correlated with a host of positive outcomes including: an increased likelihood of enrolling in 
college and persisting early on; a lower probability of taking remedial college courses; higher GPA 
and greater number of credits accrued in the first-year; a greater likelihood of college completion; 
and shorter time-to-degree (Karp et al., 2007; Swanson, 2008; Allen & Dadger, 2012; Community 
College Research Center, 2012; Bautsch, 2014).  
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However, the relationships noted above are often drawn from correlational studies or 
regression analyses that control for key observable characteristics, but are unable to adequately 
account for the issue of selection bias. Selection bias can arise as academically motivated students 
selecting into taking early postsecondary courses like dual enrollment (or dual credit). These students 
may differ from non-participants in ways unobservable to researchers. Selection is also a problem if 
students with already high college ambitions and preparedness see dual enrollment as an opportunity 
to get a head start (i.e., a nest egg) for college. The decision to honor college credit earned in high 
school is most often determined by the postsecondary institution a student matriculates at; and 
college-bound students may be more likely to attend institutions accepting of credit. In any case, 
selection appears as a spurious, positive correlation between participation and postsecondary 
outcomes. On a final note, though the evidence from these studies suggests dual enrollment has a 
non-negligible impact on the extensive margin of college-going (whether students are more likely to 
enroll), the evidence that it improves outcomes along the intensive margin (how they perform in 
college in terms of GPA, credit accumulation, or completion) is much weaker (What Works 
Clearinghouse, 2017). 
In one of few quasi-experimental studies conducted, Speroni (2011b) exploits eligibility 
criteria cutoffs for dual enrollment in Florida. Using a RD design that examines student outcomes 
around the 3.0 GPA cutoff, she does not find evidence that simply taking dual enrollment 
significantly affects a student’s high school graduation, college enrollment, or college success. 
However, when she looks specifically at college algebra, a dual enrollment course requiring 
minimum proficiency on a college placement test, she finds that dual enrollment participation 
increases the likelihood a student will enroll in college by 16 percentage points and of obtaining a 
college degree by 23 percentage points. This study sheds light on the importance of considering the 
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impact of dual enrollment and dual credit courses separately by subject because effects may vary 
depending on the difficulty, content, and standards of a course. 
Like Speroni, An (2013) also examines the impact of dual enrollment – as opposed to dual 
credit – on a postsecondary outcomes. Using propensity score matching, he compares college 
students who did and did not take dual enrollment courses, controlling for observable differences 
between groups. He finds a positive effect of dual enrollment on bachelor’s (BA) degree attainment, 
and especially large effects for low-income students. Still, these estimates are likely biased upwards 
due to positive selection of students into dual enrollment who differ from non-enrollees on a 
number of non-observable attributes that also predict postsecondary performance (and propensity 
score matching cannot account for). An does conduct a simulation exercise to test the sensitivity of 
his estimates to the presence unobserved confounders, though this additional analysis still makes 
important assumptions about the relationship of potential confounders to the college outcomes of 
interest. Further limiting is the fact that An’s analytic sample contains initial college enrollees. Thus, 
he is unable to examine the influence of dual enrollment on college enrollment or college choice – 
both factors that influence the composition of college enrollees and their subsequent progress in 
college.  
Both Speroni and An focus on the effect of participating in dual enrollment for all students, 
not distinguishing between those students who earn college credits and those who do not in the 
process of course-taking. Arguably, some benefits of dual credit lie in its ability to confer both high 
school and college credit in a single course instance. To my knowledge, no prior work has parsed 
apart the experiences of dual enrollment or dual credit participants in this manner. However, some 




2.3 Advanced Placement versus Dual Credit 
The extent to which credit-based transition programs are successful in reducing barriers to 
college depends upon the features of each program and the students they serve. In these ways, AP 
and dual credit tend to differ, and are thus often regarded as distinct curricular acceleration strategies 
with the potential to differentially benefit particular groups of students (Karp, 2015; An, 2013; 
Speroni, 2011a). Administered nationally by the College Board, AP courses are taught by high school 
teachers who are specially trained to deliver standardized curriculum in a particular course intended 
to be college-level in intensity. In order to receive college credit, an AP student must take the 
optional exam at the end of the course and receive a passing score, which is typically a 3 or above 
out of 5 points maximum (Smith, Hurwitz, & Avery, 2017). Even so, the minimum score required 
for college credit varies by AP exam subject and by the postsecondary institution accepting credit. 
Historically, AP enrollment and test participation rates have been low among minority and low-SES 
students (Klopfenstein, 2003), and so to address this criticism, the College Board has worked to 
waive exam fees and encourage schools to expand access to AP course opportunities for 
underrepresented students (College Board, 2014). Between 2003 and 2013 the number of students 
who took an AP exam roughly doubled, from 514,000 to over 1 million. 
In comparison to the standardized nature of AP, dual credit programs vary widely in their 
course curricula, structure, and college credit criteria across – and even within – states, depending on 
the local preferences and objectives of stakeholders (Karp et al., 2007; Borden et al., 2013; Taylor, 
Borden, & Park, 2015). Courses range from being college-preparatory in nature to focusing more on 
vocational skills or CTE topics. At the same time, policies outlining the scope of dual credit 
programs and procedures for how college credit may be earned and transferred vary. This variation 
may accommodate the history or strengths of localities and encourage innovation. However, this 
non-conformity also raises concerns about course quality assurance and hampers efforts to 
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systematically study the effectiveness of dual credit programs in encouraging high school and college 
success.3  
Though national demographic figures on participants are unavailable (Allen, 2010), earlier 
studies suggest white and affluent students are more likely to enroll in these courses (Museus, 
Lutovsky, & Colbeck, 2007). However, especially in recent years, dual credit has been touted as a 
vital policy approach that can successfully target students underrepresented in college due to these 
programs’ flexibility; and many states have used this aim to justify broadening dual credit coverage 
and course offerings in order to engage students across the geographic, socioeconomic, and even 
academic achievement spectrum (Karp et al., 2007; Hoffman, Vargas, & Santos, 2009; Hughes et al., 
2012). Tennessee’s statewide dual credit initiative, the focus of this paper, was established for many 
of these reasons.  
When it comes to the credit-bearing dimension of dual credit courses, no studies have 
investigated the causal effect of receiving college credit in high school through dual credit. However, 
two papers have examined the effect of receiving college credit through scoring a higher AP score 
while in high school. Using data from the College Board and the National Student Clearinghouse for 
graduating high school cohorts 2004-2009, Smith, Hurwitz, and Avery (2017) implement an RD 
approach to estimate the effect of earning a higher AP integer score (1-5), and thus college credit, on 
college completion.4 They find that students who receive college credit on a single AP exam are 1-2 
percentage points more likely to receive a BA degree within four years of high school graduation 
compared to their peers who do not receive college credit. Though receipt of college credit has no 
                                               
3 Concerned about issues of quality assurance, the National Alliance of Concurrent Enrollment Partnership (NACEP) 
serves as national voluntary accreditation organization for dual credit and dual enrollment programs and courses based 
on a set of established criteria. For more information, see http://www.nacep.org/about-nacep/. 
 
4 They have access to the underlying AP exam continuous raw scores that map into the 1-5 integer scaled scores. They 
use these underlying continuous scores to compare students right around each scoring threshold (1/2, 2/3, etc.). 
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effect on the six-year graduation rate, suggesting that earning college credit in high school improves 
time-to-degree, though not overall completion. Looking at other integer margins where scoring 
above or below a threshold does not distinguish earning college credit, they do not find an effect on 
four-year BA completion. Therefore, they attribute the increased propensity to graduate within four 
years to AP college credits’ direct ability to fulfill college graduation requirements (e.g., introductory 
course requirements, general education requirements) and not just the psychological benefits of 
earning a higher integer score. 
In a related paper that employs the same data source, student cohorts, and RD technique, 
Avery, Gurantz, Hurwitz, and Smith (2018) estimate the effect of receiving a higher AP integer score 
on college major choice. They find that scoring a higher AP integer score increases the probability of 
a student decides to major in that exam subject, with the effects strongest at the 4/5 margin. 
Compared to their similarly scoring peers who merit a 4, students scoring a 5 are 0.64 percentage 
points (or 5 percent) more likely to major in the AP exam’s subject area. Avery et al. also find a 
similar positive relationship at the 2/3 margins and 3/4 margins, though they are smaller in 
magnitude. Interestingly, whereas the results from their paper looking at BA attainment found the 
effect of earning college credits on completion was due to AP credits’ ability to meet college course 
requirements, they find evidence that the positive effect of AP score on college major choice is 
primarily driven by a behavioral effect. A higher integer scores communicates a positive signal to 
students, shifting their major choice, even at integer margins where a higher score does not coincide 
with a boost in college credits.5 The credit-bearing aspect, on other words, does not seem to matter 
in driving student major decisions.   
                                               
5 The most common threshold that coincides with a jump in college credits is at the margin of earning a 2 or a 3 on an 
AP exam. 
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The findings from these two AP papers suggests that the overall effect of earning college 
credit in high school may affect some aspects of students’ postsecondary course-taking behaviors 
and performance, but not others. While it may mechanically reduce a student’s time-to-degree by 
helping them meet degree requirements earlier, it may not necessarily influence their course-taking 
behavior. These papers also highlight the importance of considering the signaling effect of attaining 
a certain score on an exam with college-credit-bearing potential – whether the student earns college 
credit with their score or not.  
This paper adds to the existing body of literature by providing insight into how dual credit, 
as opposed to dual enrollment or AP, affects postsecondary enrollment and performance through 
the mechanism of college credit accrual. I rely on unique data from Tennessee’s statewide dual credit 
initiative to estimate the causal effect of successfully obtaining college credit on a range of early 
postsecondary outcomes including college choice, GPA, credits accrued, and persistence. Using an 
RD approach, I explore how outcomes differ between dual credit participants who obtain college 
credit and those participants whose course performances do not merit college credit.  
3. Tennessee’s Statewide Dual Credit policy context 
Tennessee’s Statewide Dual Credit (SDC) initiative was implemented as part of a larger 
enterprise aimed at establishing and improving early postsecondary experiences in the state. In 2007, 
and later in 2012, the Tennessee General Assembly passed legislation governing early postsecondary 
opportunities for high school students. Together, Public Chapter 459 (2007) and Public Chapter 967 
(2012) developed the Cooperative Innovative High Schools Initiative, creating a consortium 
oversight body with the purpose of establishing pilots for “innovative dual credit programs with 
public postsecondary institutions” and expanding “early-college opportunities” (TDOE, 2016). The 
consortium is led by the Chancellor of the Tennessee Board of Regents and the President of the 
University of Tennessee system, and its members include representatives from the State Board of 
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Education, the Tennessee Department of Education (TDOE), the state’s postsecondary systems6, 
and the Tennessee Higher Education Commission. The 2012 legislation also established the Office 
of Postsecondary Coordination and Alignment within TDOE, tasked with overseeing 
implementation efforts.  
As the first major initiative to emerge from these public charters, Tennessee’s SDC policy is 
the product of a collaborative effort between Tennessee secondary and postsecondary educators 
(TDOE, 2017). Together, educators developed high school courses that “incorporated college-level 
learning objectives” and content that would align high school courses with college expectations. 
Trained high school instructors teach these SDC courses on high school campuses.7 Each course 
pairs with an aligned challenge exam, a cumulative assessment taken online at the end of the course.8 
Students who score at or above a designated cut score on the challenge exam earn three college 
credit hours that can be applied to any public postsecondary institution in Tennessee, upon 
enrollment.9 In essence, high school exam passers bank transferable college credit that becomes 
transcripted once they officially enroll in a Tennessee public college. 
Tennessee’s SDC represents a “structural reform” to the K-12-to-college pipeline by tightly 
integrating or “fusing” together secondary and postsecondary education and forcing them, in 
addition to state and local agencies, to “adapt to a new educational paradigm” (Karp, 2015). This 
reform differs from the most common decentralized approaches where agreements to establish dual 
                                               
6 These include the Tennessee Board of Regents, the University of Tennessee system, and the Tennessee Independent 
Colleges and Universities Association.  
 
7 Both first-time and experienced SDC high school instructors attend professional development sessions over the 
summer, where they participate in sessions articulating the alignment of secondary and postsecondary learning objectives 
for their course. They also receive supplemental resources provided by the SDC faculty work group (TDOE, 2017). 
 
8 The exam is free and students are only allowed one attempt. 
 
9 In reality, in-state private institutions also accepted passing scores for college credit (P. Watson, Tennessee Department 
of Education, personal communication, October 9, 2017).   
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credit or enrollment programs and to honor college credits are determined on a case-by-case basis, 
specific to student circumstances and institutional preferences. Critics argue the lack of 
standardization in these approaches perpetuates the disconnect between high school and college. 
Structural reform, exemplified by Tennessee’s SDC, is often hailed as the preferred method for 
streamlining the secondary-postsecondary transition in a meaningful, comprehensive way (Karp, 
2015; Hughes et al., 2012; Venezia, Kirst, & Antonio, 2003).  
Since the 2013-14 academic year, the Consortium has gradually rolled out SDC courses, 
encompassing a diverse swath of subject areas. According to TDOE (2017), the courses are chosen 
based on consideration of several factors including workforce trends, vertical alignment with 
postsecondary programs, and student interest. All SDC courses go through a pilot stage for three 
years, at which point the Consortium determines whether the course should be submitted to the 
State Board of Education for formal approval of full implementation. In this process, some pilot 
courses are dropped or altered to become a different course.  
Table 1 outlines information about the 14 different SDC courses and their accompanying 
challenge exams that have been implemented from 2013-14 through 2018-19. Both the subjects 
covered and their respective exam components vary, though the majority of exams are 
predominately multiple choice in structure. Four exams require additional assessment components 
including essay questions (American History, Introduction Sociology, and World History) or a 
student speech (Speech and Communication). By the 2018-19 year, five courses progressed from 
pilot to full implementation stage: Introduction to Agricultural Business (in 2016-17), Introduction 
to Plant Science (in 2016-17), Introduction to Sociology (in 2017-18), Pre-Calculus (in 2018-19), and 
Statistics (in 2018-19). Two pilot courses, College Algebra and Criminal Justice I, transitioned into 
other courses – Pre-Calculus and Criminal Justice II, respectively – while Health Information 
Technology was retired in 2016-17 after only being offered for the 2015-16 year. Note that any 
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student who earns college credit in a course that subsequently changes or retires still banks college 
credit for that course (TDOE, 2017; 2019). 
Tennessee’s comprehensive SDC policy offers important opportunities to learn about the 
influence of dual credit course-taking on a suite of secondary and postsecondary outcomes. More 
recently, Hemelt, Schwartz, and Dynarski (2019) have worked with Tennessee’s Office of Research 
and Policy and the Office of Postsecondary Coordination and Alignment to design an experiment 
that would evaluate key outcomes. As the first randomized, controlled trial employed in dual credit 
research, the authors evaluate the effect of a school-level implementation of dual credit College 
Algebra on student high school and college outcomes. Out of the 14 dual credit courses listed in 
Table 1, College Algebra is the only course implemented as an experiment where treatment high 
schools offer a dual credit version of the course and control high schools offer a regular, high school 
version. This experiment lasted for two years (2013-14 and 2014-15), and the partnership aspect of 
this work has allowed interim findings to shape the rollout of other dual credit courses. 
Hemelt et al. find that participation in an SDC College Algebra altered students’ later high 
school math course-taking, shifting students away from remedial math and boosting enrollment in 
AP courses. However, they fail to find a statistically significant effect of participating in College 
Algebra on overall college enrollment rates within a year of expected high school graduation. Still, 
they find some suggestive evidence that participation did incline students to enroll in Tennessee 
public four-year colleges and away from Tennessee public two-year institutions. Finally, they are 
unable to find conclusive evidence that dual credit College Algebra exposure affected students’ first-
year college math performance in terms of GPA, credits earned, or number of math courses taken. 
This RD paper complements and expands upon the work of Hemelt et al. (2019) by 
exploring how passing a dual credit challenge exam – in a broader set of courses – affects student 
postsecondary enrollment and early performance. College Algebra course pass rates are quite low, 
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with only 27 percent of the 4,105 exam takers obtaining a minimum of 75 percent on their challenge 
exams.10 Within the experimental setup, this affords little power to detect effects of passing on 
postsecondary outcomes. In contrast, this analysis pools together challenge exam records across a 
range of dual credit courses to isolate the effect of securing transferable college credit as distinct 
from participating in a dual credit course.  
Students earn bankable college credit by passing a course-specific challenge exam, scoring at 
or above a designated score. Successful passers may have different postsecondary experiences 
relative to those who also took the course, but who failed to earn the corresponding credit nest egg 
as well. For both groups, exposure to rigorous course content may have enhanced participants’ 
preparedness and expectations for college study. Yet, in the context of Tennessee’s SDC policy, 
exam passers may disproportionately benefit from a financial or momentum standpoint by earning 
college credits before setting foot on a college campus.  
The purpose of this research is to understand the potential premium (or penalty) that dual 
credit exam passers receive in terms of early-stage college outcomes. Proponents of dual credit 
expansion often cite its ability to confer college credits to high schoolers as a major benefit and 
strategy for improving student performance along a spectrum of enrollment and performance 
outcomes. Yet, there is little evidence to back up these assertions to date. This paper aims to 
contribute to the literature by providing causal estimates for how dual credit, through the 
mechanism of college credit accumulation, influences students’ educational outcomes. Tennessee’s 
SDC initiative provides a compelling context for conducting this research. Specifically, my research 
questions are: 
                                               
10 Challenge exam pass rates by year, separately, are 16.4 percent in 2013-14 (out of 2,027 students) and 37.5 percent in 
2014-15 (out of 2,078 students).   
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(1) Does passing an SDC challenge exam (and therefore banking college credit) increase the 
likelihood a student will enroll in college within a year of expected high school 
graduation? 
(2) Does passing a challenge exam affect the type of college or institution a student 
matriculates at within a year of graduating? 
(3) How does passing a challenge exam and earning college credits before college affect early 
student performance as measured by credit accumulation, remedial credits earned, and 
first-year GPA? 
(4) Does passing a challenge exam increase the likelihood a student will persist to their 
second year of college?  
(5) How does banking three college credits in high school affect student performance (e.g., 
credits accumulation, GPA) into students’ second year of college?   
4. Data  
4.1 Analytic sample generation 
I use data from four sources. First, I integrate (1) SDC challenge exam records from TDOE 
with (2) student-level administrative-level data from Tennessee’s data consortium, the State 
Longitudinal Data System (“MeasureTN”). MeasureTN data contain information on all students in 
Tennessee public high schools including demographics, school and course enrollment, and 
standardized test achievement. I supplement these K-12 data with postsecondary data from two 
additional sources. (3) The Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC) provides student-
institution-semester-level data capturing any student that touches a Tennessee public postsecondary 
institution. In order to capture students who enroll in private and out-of-state postsecondary 
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institutions, I also incorporate data from the (4) National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), likewise 
structured at the student-institution-semester level.11  
To generate the analytic sample, I begin with de-identified student-challenge exam records 
provided by TDOE for challenge exams taken up through the 2016-17 school year (the most recent 
available). These records include score information for 10 of the 14 courses listed in Table 1, 
excluding Criminal Justice II, Introduction to Business, Speech and Communication, and American 
History. The raw data file contains 16,384 observations with 1,003 students holding more than one 
exam record. Hence, a unique record is identified at the student-exam-year level.12 Each record 
specifies a student’s earned raw exam score percentage, the exam’s designated cut score percentage, 
and whether a student passed the exam (i.e., scored at or above the cut score). I then merge these 
records with student-level data from MeasureTN, THEC, and NSC.  
I next restrict the sample to those students who are expected to matriculate at college within 
the window for which I have available postsecondary data. In addition, to probe the hypotheses that 
college credit earned in high school may provide momentum for students into their second year, I 
further restrict my sample to those students who could be expected to have up to two years of 
college experience. Spring 2018 is the latest term for which I have complete postsecondary records 
                                               
11 TDOE and THEC submit cohorts of high school graduates to the NSC to measure rates of immediate college 
enrollment and choice. Based on data for the past cohorts of high school graduates, about 90 percent of all college-going 
students attend an in-state college – and 90 percent of those in-state enrollees appear at public institutions. It is also 
important to note that college credits earned through SDC courses are not required to be recognized at private or out-
of-state institutions. 
 
12 Out of the 1,003 students, 69 students take the same challenge exam course twice in different years, while 411 
students take more than one challenge exam course in the same year. The remaining students take multiple challenge 
exam courses over different years. 
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in both THEC and NSC data. I therefore restrict the sample to only those students whose 
expected13 on-time high school graduation year is 2013-14, 2014-15, or 2015-16.14  
Additionally, I focus on student-exam records where a student scores within ± 30, ± 25, or 
± 20 percentage points of the exam’s cut score, depending on the corresponding cut score’s value. A 
student’s challenge exam score represents a percentage between 0-100 percent. For exams with a cut 
score of 70 percent (e.g., Plant Science), students cannot score more than 30 points above the 
threshold; therefore, I create a symmetrical lower bound by retaining students who score no less 
than 30 points below the cut score. I apply this same lower bound logic to the exams with the cut 
scores of 75 percent (students within ± 25) and 80 percent (students within ± 20).  
Consideration of course-specific cut scores and exam components also led me to drop all 
Sociology students from my analytic sample (N=617). Sociology is the only remaining course in my 
sample with a 2-essay exam component, and these questions require evaluation by a postsecondary 
faculty member. Due to random testing error, students cannot fully determine their scores on a 
given challenge exam, and this imprecise control is sufficient to produce random assignment at the 
cut score (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). However, if essay graders are aware of the minimum score 
required for a student to bank college credit, they may be able to manipulate the position of a 
student around the passing threshold by grading more leniently. TDOE clarifies that, though these 
faculty graders are often participants in the development of SDC courses and challenge exams, they 
evaluate essays according to a standardized rubric and remain unaware of a student’s performance 
on the multiple-choice portion (TDOE, 2017; 2019). Still, inspection of Sociology students scoring 
around the cut score revealed both a positive discontinuity in the density of students at the threshold 
                                               
13 A student’s expected graduation year is generated based on her entering 9th grade cohort year. TDOE provides 
entering cohort information for each student. 
 
14 Restricting the sample as such also means that I no longer include challenge exam records for any courses first offered 
in the 2016-17 academic year (i.e., Psychology and World History). 
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(McCrary test (2008)) and discontinuities in key demographic covariates that are also likely correlated 
with college enrollment and performance (e.g., race and ethnicity, achievement on prior end-of-
course exams). I cannot rule out the possibility that grader bias may manipulate a student’s exam 
score percentage in Sociology, and so to preserve internal validity in my RD model, I eliminate these 
Sociology exam takers from my further analyses.   
Finally, I restrict the sample to only those students who have non-missing information for 
demographic and achievement variables including gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, 
English Language Learner (ELL) status, and Algebra I end-of-course (EOC) exam score. The 
Algebra I EOC is a state-mandated assessment that students must take after completing the Algebra 
I course, which is taken by nearly all students by the end of 9th grade. The full analytic sample 
contains 6,027 unique student-exam observations, including 284 (4.7 percent) who take more than 
one exam either in a different course or in a different year.  
Table 2 shows the SDC course offerings, exam pass rates, and participant counts by course 
category and year for the full analytic sample. As the table indicates, both the pass rate and the 
number of exam takers varies widely between SDC courses and between years for the same SDC 
course. The courses with the highest overall pass rates are Agricultural Business (40.2 percent), 
College Algebra (36.1 percent), and Plant Science (34.0 percent) – though pass rates fluctuate within 
each course between 3-30 percentage points year-to-year. In contrast, none of the 33 students who 
took Health Information Technology passed the associated challenge exam and the pass rate for 
Criminal Justice is only 7.7 percent.  
This variation in pass rates and participation rates between years, within the same course, is 
not a reflection of changes in the content or standards of the exam.15 Nor does it seem likely due to 
                                               
15 Personal communication with TDOE research and strategy team members, J. Attridge and C. Martin (8/2018), 
confirm that the challenge exams have not changed in rigor or content over this time. At the school level, there is 
suggestive evidence of survivor bias, where the schools that continue to offer and expand their SDC offerings are more 
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changes in the composition of students taking the challenge exams. For each course offered over 
multiple years in my analytic sample, I tested the balance of key student demographic and academic 
achievement variables between years. There is some evidence that the proportion of exam takers in 
certain courses became less White, Non-Hispanic over time (in College Algebra and Criminal Justice 
I). Meanwhile, some courses became comprised of slightly lower-achieving students – as measured 
by performance on the Algebra I EOC exam – over time (in College Algebra, Agricultural Business) 
while others appeared to draw relatively higher-achieving students (Plant Science).  
However, these differences in means were either not statistically significant at conventional 
levels or weakly significant depending on if standard errors were clustered at the school-level or 
cohort-level. Moreover, these compositional changes were not related to the course pass rate in that 
given year. To sum up, the wide variation in exam participation and pass rates within courses does 
not have a clear explanation, at least from observable student-level data. Table 1A in the Appendix 
provides an analogous table to Table 2 for the full sample of challenge exam records up through 
2016-17 (N=16,438). It shows similar, seemingly idiosyncratic variability in participation and pass 
rates by year for the same SDC course. Finally, for additional context, the percentage of Tennessee 
students scoring a three or above in 2017 on AP exams in topical areas similar to SDC courses are as 
follows: Human Geography (49 percent), Psychology (64.2 percent), and Statistics (54.3 percent). 
4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 3 presents a comprehensive list of summary statistics for the full analytic sample of 
challenge exam takers and broken out by SDC broad subject and key courses, separately. Column 1 
describes the full, pooled analytic sample. Column 2 describes “Math” participants in College 
Algebra, Pre-Calculus, and Statistics, while column 3 describes characteristics of just College Algebra 
                                               
likely to have historically higher challenge exam pass rates relative to the schools that decide to no longer participate in 
Tennessee’s SDC program.  
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exam takers (who comprise 70.5 percent of all Math participants). In a similar fashion, column 4 
provides figures for “CTE” exam participants in the courses Criminal Justice I, Health Information 
Technology, Agricultural Business, and Plant Science. Column 5 describes just Plant Science 
participants (representing 76.0 percent of all CTE). Students may appear in more than one column if 
they took multiple SDC courses.  
Variables of interest are grouped into four panels. Student-level demographic and 
achievement variables include means for gender, race and ethnicity, disability and Ell status, as well 
as prior Algebra I EOC achievement.16 Means and standard deviations are presented for students’ 
standardized Algebra I scores. A student’s score is standardized (i.e., mean=0, sd=1) within the 
population of all students in the state of Tennessee (TN) who took the Algebra I EOC in the same 
year. Column 1 in the top panel indicates that, overall, SDC examinees in the analytic sample are 
mostly White (87.2 percent) 12th graders17 (71.0 percent), who are about equally likely to be male or 
female. They also perform, on net, a little more than half a standard deviation above (0.56) the 
statewide mean on the Algebra I EOC exam.  
The demographic profile of students in the analytic sample aligns in some ways with that of 
the broader set of all Tennessee high school students in the academic years covered (not shown). 
Still, along several dimensions, some stark differences emerge. The share of Tennessee high school 
students who are White in these years is about 69 percent, indicating that the analytic sample share is 
about 18 percentage points higher. In the opposite direction, about 24 percent of Tennessee high 
school students are Black, while in the analytic sample, the share is only 6.6 percent. The analytic 
                                               
16 I do not have student-level data on eligibility for free or reduced-price meals – an indication of socioeconomic status – 
as I am legally prohibited from having it due to the manner in which TDOE interprets guidance from the federal 
Department of Agriculture. 
 
17 For all SDC courses, grade levels 11 and 12 (and occasionally 10) are the grade levels suggested by TDOE as 
appropriate times for students to take SDC courses. There are no 9th graders in the analytic sample because the earliest a 
9th grade dual credit participant would be expected to graduate (if they took an SDC course in the first year, 2013-14) 
would be in the 2016-17 academic year. 
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sample is also higher achieving, on average, according to Algebra I standardized scores. The mean 
score for all Tennessee high schools is 0.260 (sd=0.992), which is less than half the value for the full 
analytic sample. Dual credit participants are not necessarily representative of all Tennessee high 
school students. 
Moreover, the pooled sample masks variation between course subject areas. Math exam 
takers are more female (55.9 percent) and comprised of more non-White (15.8 percent) students 
than the full sample. Meanwhile, CTE exam takers are disproportionately more White (92.9 percent) 
and male (58.7 percent) than the Math examinees. Compared to Math, CTE courses also contain a 
relatively higher proportion of 10th graders (5.9 percent vs. 1.3 percent) and 11th graders (30.0 
percent vs. 24.0 percent). Finally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, students who take SDC Math exams 
have the higher average Algebra I EOC performance, with students performing 0.753 standard 
deviations about the statewide mean (compared to 0.199 standard deviations above the mean for 
CTE).18 The second panel in Table 3 provides SDC course and exam information, illustrating further 
variation in student experiences. CTE students more likely than Math students to take (18.2 percent 
vs. 11.2 percent) and pass (6.2 percent vs. 3.8 percent) other SDC exams.  
The third panel in Table 3 shows unconditional mean college enrollment figures within one 
year of a student’s expected high school graduation (spring) semester. Beyond basic enrollment, the 
table provides means for college choice based on characteristics of the institution at which a student 
enrolls. These choice outcomes fall along several dimensions including out-of-state versus in-state, 
private19 versus pubic, and Tennessee public four-year versus two-year versus Tennessee Technical 
                                               
18 To put these standardized math scores into further context, the Math mean of 0.753 is in the 79th percentile in the 
distribution of all Tennessee high school students with a non-missing Algebra I SD score. The CTE mean of 0.199 is in 
the 52nd percentile. Math students scoring 0-10 points above the passing margin have a mean score of 0.91 which is in 
the 84th percentile of the score distribution, while CTE students scoring 0-10 points above have a mean score of 0.46 
which is in the 68th percentile of the score distribution.  
 
19 All in-state, private institutions are four-year institutions in my analytic sample.  
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College. The preferred college enrollment variable (“Any college”) utilizes information from both 
NSC and THEC data sources. For comparison, I also show unconditional enrollment figures that 
just use THEC data (“Any college, just THEC”) because, for performance measures summarized in 
the panel below, I can only use THEC data.20  
Over 78 percent of the full sample enrolls in some form of postsecondary education within 
the year following high school graduation, with approximately 92 percent (=.721/.784) of enrollees 
attending an in-state institution.21 Within the group of in-state enrollees, 89 percent enroll in public 
institutions, of which 54 percent enroll in public four-year colleges. Like demographic variables, 
postsecondary enrollment outcome means exhibit wide variation based on the SDC course subgroup 
of interest. CTE students are less likely than Math students to enroll in any college within a year of 
graduation (64.7 percent vs. 85.6 percent), and of those students who do enroll in college, CTE 
students are more likely to enroll at in-state, public two-year institutions (53 percent) while Math 
students are more likely to enroll at in-state, public four-year colleges (49 percent). 
The fourth and final panel in Table 3 summarizes means and standard deviations for college 
performance measures including credits attempted and earned, remedial credits earned, and 
cumulative GPA. Because these measures can only be gathered for students who attend a Tennessee 
public institution in the THEC data, these summary statistics apply to a subset of the larger sample 
as noted by the italicized N’s in the row right above the panel. Compared to their Math examinee 
peers, CTE takers both attempt (25.7 vs. 30.7) and earn (21.9 vs. 28.3) fewer credits and earn more 
                                               
20 Note that the percentage of students enrolled in “Any college (just THEC)” does not align with the percentage of 
students enrolled in an “In-State, public” which draws on information from both NSC and THEC data sources. This is 
because there 409 students who are flagged as first (or mostly) enrolling in an in-state, public institution in the NSC data 
but not in the THEC data. This discrepancy may arise because enrollment dates do not align in the two data sources for 
these students. 
 
21 A very small percentage of students (3.0 percent, or 183 out of 6,027) appear to enroll in more than one institution 
type, which is why unconditional means along certain dimensions (out-of-state versus in-state, private versus public, etc.) 
do not add up perfectly in the First Year Postsecondary Enrollment panel.  
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remedial credit hours (4.93 vs. 0.89). Their first-year GPAs also appear to be slightly lower, though a 
higher proportion of CTE students who attend a THEC institution are likely to be missing a 
recorded first-year GPA (9.0 percent compared to 2.6 percent for Math). I also track these same 
college enrollment and early performance measures within two years of expected high school 
graduation; though for brevity, these sample means are not included in the table.   
The wide variation in demographic, college-going, and early performance measures between 
examinees in different courses underscores the importance of considering the effect of passing a 
challenge exam separately by broad subject area – Math and CTE – and where possible, by 
individual course. As a final illustration of the variation in these subject areas, Figure 1 shows the 
number of exam takers and the exam pass rate by Tennessee county for Math and CTE, with the 
darker shades representing higher values. The top two panels show exam participation counts. 
Although there is high overlap in the counties with schools that offer both Math and CTE SDC 
courses, a higher proportion of Math examinees are likely to be in located in more urban, densely-
populated counties, while CTE examinees are scattered throughout more rural counties. The bottom 
two panels show the pass rates by county, revealing similar geographic variation in where Math and 
CTE students who successfully bank college credit are located. These geographic differences are 
likely to relate to a student’s likelihood of enrolling in college and the type of institution in which 
they choose to enroll. Moreover, these enrollment decisions are likely to spill over into a student’s 
early college performance as well. 
5. Empirical approach 
5.1 Regression discontinuity estimation 
The requirement that students achieve a minimum score on a challenge exam in order to 
pass and receive bankable college credit lends itself well to a RD estimation strategy. I exploit these 
cut score criteria to estimate the local average treatment effect of passing an exam on postsecondary 
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enrollment and performance by focusing on the passing margin. Relative to those exposed to dual 
credit coursework but scoring just shy of the cut score, how do dual credit students who score just 
above the passing threshold fare in college-going and early college achievement? Pooling together 
challenge exam records across the SDC courses affords enough power to detect treatment effects 
within broad subject areas; and in some instances (e.g., College Algebra and Plant Science), there is 
enough power to examine courses individually. For all exam records, I re-center each observation’s 
score around zero by subtracting the exam-relevant cut score percentage from the student’s raw 
score percentage. All recentered scores greater than or equal to zero are considered passing, and 
those below zero are failing.   
Though I employ both parametric and nonparametric approaches in RD estimation, my 
preferred estimates come from parametric models of the following form: 
 
(1)					)#*% = 	, +	./0122#*% + .34(56789#*%) + :;#% +	<* +	=% +	>#*%	 
   
Here, 0122#*% is an indicator equal to one if student i in SDC course c taken in year t 
received a challenge exam score at or above the relevant cut score. The function 4(56789#*%) 
represents the relationship between the assignment variable (i.e. the recentered challenge exam 
score) and the outcome. I interact polynomial functions of this assignment variable with the 0122#*% 
indicator to allow the relationship between challenge exam score and the outcome to differ on either 
side of the cutoff. In some specifications, I insert a vector of student-year-level controls ;#% that 
includes gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, standardized Algebra I EOC score, 
and dummies indicating if a student took the same exam twice, took more than one exam in a 
different course, or passed another exam. I also include SDC course fixed effects (<*) and year fixed 
effects (=%). Finally, >#*% is the stochastic error term. Within this setup, ./ represents the effect of 
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passing a challenge exam and thus earning transferable college credit, officially credited upon 
enrollment at a Tennessee public institution (details of this second piece are described more below). 
In all statistical models, I adjust the standard errors to account for the discrete nature of the 
assignment variable by clustering observations at each recentered score point (Lee & Card, 2008). 
For consistency across models, I also select my preferred linear parametric models to have a 
bandwidth of ± 10 around the passing threshold.22 This allows me to compare the same sample of 
students across a variety of postsecondary enrollment and performance outcomes. I also provide 
estimates from nonparametric models that use a data-driven approach to select an optimal 
bandwidth for comparison purposes.  
5.2 Exploration of RD assumptions 
 Several conditions must be met in order for the RD strategy to yield valid causal inference 
(Schochet et al., 2010; Jacob et al., 2012). First, the assignment rule (in essence, determination of 
whether a student passed/failed an exam) must be clear and followed with a high degree of fidelity. 
Second, the score used to determine pass/fail status (and therefore, bankable college credit) must 
not be strategically manipulatable and must have sufficient density on either side of the cutoff. 
Finally, these challenge exam scores should be the only factor identifying Pass-Fail status such that 
differences in outcomes in the neighborhood of the cutoff cannot be attributable to other potential 
mechanisms. Below, I examine each of these assumptions in turn.  
 First, features of the design and implementation of Tennessee’s SDC policy help ensure that 
conditions of the first assumption are met: only students scoring at or above the threshold bank 
college credit. In accordance with Public Chapter 967, a student’s SDC challenge exam results must 
                                               
22 For these parametric models, I include a flexible linear term in the assignment variable, allowing the slope to differ on 
either side of the cut off. The nonparametric bandwidth selector developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 
2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017) suggested optimal bandwidth ranging from ± 7 to ± 12 for a 
range of college enrollment and college choice outcomes in both the pooled and course subgroup samples. Therefore, I 
adopt an intermediate value ± 10.  
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be reported on their official high school transcript alongside other test scores like SAT/ACT and 
EOC exam results (TDOE, 2017). Upon passing the test, the student immediately banks college 
credit, and the transcript serves as an official score report and record. Once a student enrolls at a 
Tennessee public institution, registrars at each institution access the state data system to check a 
student’s SDC score against the cut score for that exam and year, ensuring that only those who score 
at or above the designated cut score receive transcripted credit. Each postsecondary institution has 
discretion as to how the credit is awarded (i.e., elective credit, general education requirement), and 
students are responsible to contacting their school’s records office to ensure they have received 
credit.  
Though this process is highly prescribed, there are two aspects of how credit is ultimately 
awarded that may challenge the integrity of the first RD assumption. The first is the fact that a 
student’s transcript reports only their score percentage and not a pass/fail status for registrars to 
reference.23 One may be concerned that lenient registrars may be more forgiving of students who 
perform just below the cut score, deciding to transcript them credit as well. Conversations with 
TDOE research team members clarified that this aspect was not a cause for concern. Registrars 
were trained how to access cut score information for each exam and to compare students’ scores to 
the relevant passing threshold. In addition, informal conversations between TDOE and registrars 
revealed that the high passing standard was being upheld. In other words, there is no evidence to 
suggest registrars were not following the assignment rule with a high degree of fidelity. 
The second aspect that draws concern is the fact that students are responsible for following 
up with their institutions to make sure their three credits were officially transcripted as college credit. 
Unlike the first concern that the reporting process may allow for failers to receive college credit, this 
                                               
23 The reason the score is listed rather than “Pass” or “Fail” is because TDOE was concerned that having the word 
“Fail” printed on a student’s high school transcript would cause students emotional harm (personal correspondence with 
T. Martin from TDOE, 7/2017). 
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aspect leads to the concern some passers may be treated as failers and not awarded credit, depending 
on their motivation and know-how for ensuring their credit was properly banked. Conversations 
with TDOE clarified that the process for ensuring the transcription of banked credit from both the 
institution side and the student side became more streamlined and clearer the longer SDC courses 
were implemented. To address this timing aspect, I include year fixed effects in my models with 
covariates. I also run supplementary regressions splitting the sample into students with earlier 
expected graduation years (2013-14 and 2014-15) from those with an expected graduation year of 
2015-16 to observe whether the effect of passing differs based on a student’s familiarity with 
confirming their banked credit is awarded. Even so, it is important to clarify that I am unable to 
observe whether institutions did in fact transcript students’ banked college credit and how they 
transcripted that credit (e.g., as elective credit, towards a major requirement, etc.). Thus, I interpret 
my RD estimates as the effect of students passing a challenge exam and earning bankable college 
credit, rather than as the effect of utilizing or transcribing college credit. In this manner of 
interpretation – regardless of the two concerns discussed above – Tennessee ensures that the 
assignment rule is used transparently and consistently. Only passers bank college credit. 
 To probe the second RD assumption regarding smoothness of score densities around the 
threshold and continuity of the assignment variable, I utilize the McCrary (2008) test. I perform the 
McCrary test for the full, pooled analytic sample as well as for the broad subject areas of Math and 
CTE and the individual courses of College Algebra and Plant Science. Figure 2 presents the 
distribution of the assignment variable, recentered challenge exam score, and tests for any jump at 
the threshold for the full sample of all SDC exam records as well as Math and CTE. I do not detect 
statistically significant evidence of bunching near the threshold, and this null effect is consistent 
across tests where different bandwidths are employed. This is true for the pooled sample and subject 
areas shown, as well as for College Algebra and Plant Science courses separately (not shown). Still, 
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to be sure that there is no manipulation of position around the cutoff, I will need to assess the 
validity of the third assumption as well. 
 The final assumption is that around the threshold, one can consider students on either side 
as essentially equivalent in observable and unobservable ways except for one distinguishing factor: 
receipt of bankable college credit. I probe this assumption by examining differences in observable, 
pre-challenge exam characteristics between failing and passing students as I move across the 
recentered score threshold. I do not observe a statistically significant discontinuity along a multitude 
of dimensions including gender, prior achievement, disability status, ELL, or grade level for any 
subject or course subgroup.24 As an illustration, Section I of Figure 3 shows scatterplots for 
standardized Algebra I EOC performance for the full sample as well as Math and CTE in Panels A 
through C. The solid lines on are estimated regression lines from a simple parametric specification 
based on a data points within ± 10 points of the threshold.  
Along the dimensions of race and ethnicity, I do observe evidence of a slight negative 
discontinuity at the passing threshold for the probability of being White, Non-Hispanic for the full 
analytic sample. This discontinuity of 4.6 percentage points is statistically significant at only the 10 
percent level, and neither of the discontinuities for Math or CTE are significant at conventional 
levels. Section II in Figure 3 shows the discontinuities for the same course groupings depicted in 
Section I for the outcome of White, Non-Hispanic. Though I am not concerned that this imbalance 
in race and ethnicity threatens the internal validity of my models – especially when I restrict my 
focus to broad subject areas and courses – I do address the potential that this feature of the data 
could bias my estimates by controlling for a range of student-year-level characteristics (;#%) as well as 
SDC course fixed effects (<*).  
                                               
24 Formal results of these covariate balance models are not presented in this paper due to the large number of covariates 
considered across several subject and course groupings.  
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5.3 Limitations 
 This paper has several limitations. As noted above, I cannot observe whether a student’s 
banked college credits were successfully transcribed upon entry into college. Therefore, my estimates 
should be interpreted as the local average treatment effect of banking college credit in high school, 
encapsulating both the students who are proactive in eventually ensuring their credits are officially 
enshrined in their college record as well as those who are not. Second, I am unable to track early 
college performance measures for students who do not appear in the THEC dataset. In practice, this 
means that I cannot observe college performance outcomes for students who attend an out-of-state 
college or an in-state, private institution. Third, I do not have data on the college course-taking 
behavior of students to know in which courses or broad subject areas they are attempting credits, 
earning credits, or undergoing remediation. This also means that even within my subgroup analyses I 
cannot know if passing a challenge exam in a CTE course, for example, causes a relative boost to a 
student’s GPA because they continue to excel in other CTE courses in college or because they 
switch to another broad field.  
Last, two of the three cohorts I study are expected to enter college at a time when the state 
of Tennessee enacted two sweeping policy changes. In fall of 2015, the state implemented the 
Tennessee Promise, an initiative that guaranteed free tuition at any in-state, two-year college for 
students who meet a set of academic and extracurricular requirements. I might expect this change to 
influence the likelihood of students attending college right at the passing margin, especially because 
the Tennessee Promise may water down a central benefit of earning three college credits in high 
school; namely, it reduces the cost of postsecondary education. In 2015, the state also eliminated 
traditional remediation courses in college and switched to a corequisite model where students in 
need of developmental coursework would enroll in a regular, credit-bearing course in addition to a 
learning support credit (e.g., additional coursework, tutoring, or labs). Because of this change, the 
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number of courses officially listed as “remedial” dropped in the 2015-16 academic year. Both of 
these policy changes affect the cohorts of students whose expected graduation years are 2014-15 and 
2015-16. Though neither may actually alter the magnitude of the estimates of passing a challenge 
exam, they underscore the importance of accounting for differences between cohorts. I do this by 
including grade and year dummies in the models with covariates and by stratifying my samples by 
expected graduation year in supplementary analyses.   
6. Findings 
6.1 First-year college enrollment 
 6.1.1 Full analytic sample 
I begin by first looking at the effect of passing a challenge exam (banking college credit) in 
the full, pooled analytic sample, drawing students from all courses. I find that passing the exam does 
have a small positive effect on the likelihood of students enrolling in college within a year of their 
expected high school graduation. Table 4 shows a range of parametric and nonparametric RD 
estimates of the effect of passing on college enrollment across seven columns. Columns 1 through 5 
show estimates from parametric models with varying data windows and polynomials of the running 
variable. Estimates in columns 6 and 7 are for data windows selected using a data-driven, optimal 
bandwidth selection procedure outlined in Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and 
Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). I only present nonparametric results from one 
common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector in my analyses, though findings are 
robust to different bandwidth selectors.25 I also employ a rectangular (or uniform) kernel to allow 
the reader to more easily compare estimates from columns 4 through 7. This follows the reasoning 
                                               
25 For example, other bandwidth selectors from Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, 
Farrell, & Titiunik (2017) include the coverage error-rate (CER) and two different MSE-optimal bandwidth selectors 
below and above the cutoff (MSETWO). Though I only present nonparametric estimates for local linear RD estimators, 
I also run the models using a local quadratic RD estimator as well. The overall findings in these models are the same. 
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of Lee & Lemieux (2009) and Cattaneo & Vazquez-Bare (2016) who note that a more transparent 
way to increase the weight of observations near the cutoff is to perform a series of local linear 
regressions within an increasingly narrow data window.  
The preferred parametric models, with a data window of ±10, in columns 4 and 5 indicate 
that the effect of passing increases a student’s likelihood of enrolling in college the next year by 4.5 – 
5.3 percentage points (5.6 to 6.6 percent), depending on inclusion of covariates and fixed effects. 
These estimates are statistically significant at the 10 percent- and 5 percent-levels, respectively. The 
magnitude of the estimate on college enrollment is positive and relatively stable across different data 
windows and polynomial orders of the assignment variable (columns 1 through 3). Columns 6 and 7 
contain estimates, with and without the set of covariates, and robust 95 percent confidence intervals 
using a common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector (bandwidths of ±5.6 and ± 
6.8). These nonparametric models estimate a similar passing effect of 3.9 – 5.7 percentage points, 
though neither estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels.   
Figure 4 presents a visual representation of the effect of passing a challenge exam for the full 
analytic sample without covariates. The figure suggests that the apparent positive effect of enrolling 
in college is due to the decreased probability of students right below the cutoff going to college 
(students scoring 1-6 points below). Even relative to students scoring 7-12 points below the passing 
threshold, these students are slightly less likely to enroll in college within that first year (78 percent 
versus 82 percent). This may be an idiosyncratic feature of the data, or perhaps indicates a 
discouragement effect whereby students who fall just short of banking credit are less motivated to 
enroll in college than both their higher-achieving and even lower-achieving peers. I consider this 
potential discouragement effect more below. 
Before moving on, it is important to note that these regressions looking at college 
enrollment within a year of high school graduation include students in all grade levels, tenth through 
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twelfth. When examining the effect of earning AP college credits while in high school on 
postsecondary measures, Smith et al. (2017) argue that most seniors taking an exam will have most 
likely already selected their preferred college and paid a deposit by the time they would receive their 
scores verifying whether they receive college credit or not. Therefore, they argue that the effect of 
earning college credits is unlikely to shift the enrollment patterns for twelfth-grade students (though 
arguably still could for eleventh- and tenth-grade students). Similarly, in this study, seniors taking 
SDC exams are likely to have committed to a postsecondary institution by the time they learn 
whether they have banked college credits or not.26 However, when I drop these students from the 
enrollment regressions, I encounter two dilemmas. The first is that my sample size is severely 
reduced to (from 6,027 to 1,746) due to the fact that 71 percent of the students in my analytic 
sample are twelfth-graders. Within this smaller subset of eleventh- and tenth-graders, I have less 
power to detect an effect, and the estimates are imprecise with larger standard errors (though they 
are positive). 
The second dilemma is that even when splitting out the sample into seniors and younger 
students to estimate the effect of banking college credit on enrollment, I find that the overall sample 
effect is being driven by the enrollment behavior of twelfth-grade students. Twelfth-grade exam 
passers are 4.9 to 6.2 percentage points (6 to 7.5 percent) more likely to enroll in college within a 
year of expected high school graduation compared to their barely failing peers, with and without 
controls. These estimates are significant at the 5 percent- and 1 percent-levels, respectively. Once 
again, this positive discontinuity appears mostly to be attributed to the decreased probability of 
students scoring 1-6 points below the cut score to attend college rather than a sizeable increase in 
                                               
26 Some versions of SDC courses are only one semester long, so it is possible that some twelfth-grade students who take 
a fall semester course would learn of their exam scores before they make a final commitment to a postsecondary 
institution. Unfortunately, I do not have information on when students take their exams to know the extent to which 
this would be occurring for high school seniors. 
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the probability of enrolling experienced by students scoring 0-10 points above the cut score. To 
preserve a larger sample, I retain all three grade levels in my enrollment and choice regressions. 
These results suggest that high school seniors are using information learned from their 
challenge exam scores to alter their postsecondary enrollment behavior. I am unable to explain why 
this may be happening, contrary to what we may expect given the timeline of college acceptance and 
receipt of SDC exam results. However, it does not appear to be due to changes in enrollment 
students may make after their first fall term on a college campus (i.e. enrolling first in the spring 
term or switching schools between fall and spring). Estimates for fall enrollment only (not shown) 
are essentially identical to the estimates for enrollment within one year of graduation.  
A possibility may be that high school seniors who pass an SDC exam experience a 
psychological boost (or at least avoid a psychological penalty) by finding out they have successfully 
banked college credit. This positive signal may incline passers to ensure that they complete the steps 
necessary to finalize their college plans for the following fall and reduce the likelihood they 
experience “summer melt” (Castleman & Page, 2014). Compared to the barely failing peers, passers 
may have more motivation to register for courses, submit housing forms, and take academic 
placement tests after receiving affirmation that they are college-ready. Moreover, by banking three 
college credits, passers may be more financially able to reconcile the gap between cost of attendance 
and the financial aid package they receive (Castleman & Page, 2014). 
Several studies have shown the incidence of summer melt to be surprisingly high, with 
anywhere from 10 to 20 percent of students failing to matriculate at their intended college between 
graduation and the start of fall semester; and this rate is even higher for low-income students at 
anywhere from 15-30 percent (Castleman & Page, 2014; Arnold et al., 2009; Roderick et al., 2008). 
Perhaps passing a challenge exam reduces the likelihood students fail to matriculate at college. 
Meanwhile, their barely failing peers may have anticipated they would bank college credit as well; 
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and upon discovering they have not, be discouraged to tackle the steps necessary for ensuring their 
successful transition to college. This may manifest as students right below the cut score being less 
likely to transition to college within a year of high school graduation. 
6.1.2 SDC subgroups 
To account for heterogeneous treatment effects by SDC course and selection of different 
students into dual credit courses, I stratify this full sample by subject and course. Table 5 provides 
parametric and nonparametric estimates, mirroring the layout of Table 4. Columns 1-5 provide 
estimates from local parametric RD models while columns 6 and 7 provide estimates from 
nonparametric models using an MSE-optimal bandwidth selector and a linear polynomial of the 
assignment variable. Panel A shows estimates for Math courses, Panel B of just College Algebra, 
Panel C of CTE courses, and Panel D of just Plant Science. The preferred specifications with a data 
window of ±10 show suggestive evidence that there is a positive inducement into college observed 
for both Math and CTE broadly (about 5 percentage points), though these estimates are not 
statically significant. The estimates for CTE are also highly sensitive to the inclusion of covariates 
and fixed effects.27 This sensitivity is noteworthy given that Panel D shows the effect of passing a 
Plant Science exam increases the likelihood of a student enrolling in college by more than passing 
any other exam. Without covariates, the estimated effect is 11.2 percentage points (or about 18.4 
percent) and significant at the 5 percent-level; though with controls the effect is 7.5 percentage 
points (12.3 percent) and no longer statistically significant.   
Figure 5 presents these discontinuities visually without covariates, with Panels A through D 
corresponding with the course subgroups and estimates in Table 5. Panels C and D (CTE and Plant 
                                               
27 When stratified by grade-levels, twelfth-grader passers experience a boost to enrollment about equal in size to 
eleventh- and tenth-graders in Math (around 4.7 to 5 percentage points). However, twelfth-grader passers experience a 
larger boost to enrollment than younger students in CTE courses, those these estimates are still noisy and dependent on 
inclusion of covariates. 
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Science) show that the probability of enrolling in any postsecondary institution within a year after 
graduation generally increases as students score higher on their challenge exams. However, Panels A 
and B (Math and College Algebra) show a more complicated relationship between a student’s score 
and their probability of enrolling in college, especially right around the passing threshold. Like the 
full sample results, the positive discontinuity at the margin is related to the decreased probability of 
enrolling for students scoring right below the passing cut score, relative to students who scored even 
lower on the same challenge exam. Again, the downward sloping lines on the left side of the cutoff 
for Math and College Algebra are suggestive of a potential discouragement effect of the challenge 
exam for students who ultimately fall short by 1-6 points.  
These results suggest that the discouragement effect for barely failers in the full sample is 
experienced largely by Math, and not CTE, students. Given the differences in baseline Algebra I 
achievement between these two broad groups, Math examinees may hold higher expectations of 
their college readiness and ability to earn college credit than CTE students. They are also more likely 
to attend four-year institutions which hold higher academic standards than two-year institutions. 
Together, this may make the discovery that they came close, but did not merit college credit, all the 
more disappointing for Math students right below the passing threshold. Both Table 5 and Figure 5 
also underscore the importance of considering SDC as a collection of unique course offerings, rather 
than as a single, monolithic policy initiative.  
6.2 First-year college choice 
 6.2.1 Full analytic sample 
 Table 6 provides full sample estimates for the local average treatment effect of passing a 
challenge exam on the type of institution at which a student enrolls within that first year. These 
choice estimates are unconditional, meaning that the models include all students – even those who 
did not enroll in college (they receive a zero for each outcome). Thus, one should interpret point 
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estimates here as the effect of passing an exam on the joint probability of enrolling in college and 
choosing to attend an institution of that type. The layout of Table 6 mirrors that of Tables 4 and 5 
with respect to showing parametric and nonparametric estimates under different model parameters.   
Estimates in Panels A and C suggest that passing has essentially no effect on propelling 
students to enroll in out-of-state institutions nor in in-state private institutions These results make 
sense given that SDC legislation requires all in-state public postsecondary institutions to transcript 
college credit earned by challenge exam passers. Out-of-state and private institutions are under no 
such obligation.28 Therefore, I would expect the increased rate of college going among passers (4.5 
to 5.3 percentage points) to translate into increased enrollment at in-state, public institutions. Panels 
B and D do show that passing an exam increases the probability a student enrolls at an in-state 
college generally by 4.3 to 4.7 percentage points (5.8 to 6.4 percent), and in an in-state, public 
specifically by 3.9 to 4.2 percentage points (5.9 to 6.4 percent) – though the latter results are not 
statistically significant. Panels E and F show the breakdown of in-state, public enrollment by four-
year and two-year institutions. Neither estimate is statistically significant, though the suggestive 
evidence that passing an exam may slightly boost two-year enrollment is relatively stable across 
model specifications. Finally, there is no effect for enrollment at Tennessee Technical Colleges. 
6.2.2 SDC subgroups 
 To explore the nuance of passing at the subject- and course-level that may be obscured in 
the full sample, I present SDC subgroup estimates in Table 7 for a select group of college choice 
outcomes: (i) in-state, private, (ii) in-state, public, (iii) in-state, public four-year, and (iv) in-state, 
public two-year. For ease of interpretation, each subgroup-outcome panel only contains four 
columns: the first two show estimations from parametric specifications and last two show 
estimations from nonparametric models. The parametric models have flexible linear terms in the 
                                               
28 Although we know some institutions did honor these course credits.  
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assignment variable and a data window of ± 10 on either side of the score threshold. The 
nonparametric specifications are akin to the ones displayed in previous tables, using a uniform 
kernel and MSE-optimal bandwidth selector, as well as a linear polynomial of the assignment 
variable. The results in Table 7 underscore the disparate effects of passing a challenge exam in a 
Math course versus passing an exam in a CTE course on college choice.  
There is suggestive evidence that passing a Math course – and College Algebra specifically – 
may slightly increase the likelihood a student enrolls in an in-state private institution by 2.0 to 4.1 
percentage points. This effect represents a sizeable increase of 20.4 to 41.8 percent relative to the 
control outcome mean. CTE exam passers appear less likely to enroll at a Tennessee private, by 
about the same amount, though these estimates are not consistent in magnitude or statistical 
significance across specification type. As we expect ,given the type of institutions that are required to 
transcript SDC credit, the results suggest that both Math and CTE exam passers are more likely to 
bank their credit at an in-state, public institution. However, CTE passers are even more likely to, and 
Plant Science passers are particularly more likely to do so. Figure 6 shows the discontinues in 
graphical form for the Full Sample, Math, CTE, and Plant Science in separate panels.  
The causal estimates for CTE are primarily driven by the fact that Plant Science passers are 
10.2 to 13.8 percentage points (18.7 to 25.3 percent) more likely to enroll in an in-state public 
relative to their barely failing peers. The estimates for Plant Science rise to the 10 percent- and 5 
percent-level, respectively. Practically speaking, these effect sizes for Plant Science are quite 
meaningful. The marginal Plant Science exam passer has an expected likelihood of attending an in-
state, public institution (68.4 percent) that is nearly equal to the expected probability of the average, 
marginally failing Math or College Algebra student (70.3 percent). Notably, the nonparametric 
estimates do not largely differ from the parametric estimates for the CTE or Plant Science 
subgroups. Once again, the panels in Figure 6 show differences in overall trends between SDC 
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subgroups as well. Whereas the likelihood of enrolling in a Tennessee public increases along the 
recentered score axis for CTE and Plant Science students, it appears to peak for Math students right 
at the score cutoff, as the downward sloping line on the right side of the threshold illustrates.29 
Figure 7 visually displays the probability of enrolling in a Tennessee four-year and a 
Tennessee two-year institution, stratified by the same SDC subgroups in Table 7. The estimates in 
the table as well as the figures show that there is no meaningful discontinuity at the threshold for in-
state, public four-year enrollment for any subgroup. Barely passers, like their barely failing peers, 
appear to experience a boost to four-year enrollment in Math (College Algebra), while those scoring 
further away from the passing margin in either direction are much less likely to enroll, creating the 
peaked shape of the two linear lines in Panels A and B. Conversely, with CTE and Plant Science, the 
likelihood a student enrolls at a four-year institution within a year of graduating generally increases as 
the student’s score percentage increases, even though the absolute proportion of students attending 
a Tennessee four-year is often less than the proportion of Math students attending a four-year along 
most of the recentered score axis.  
Section II of Figure 7 shows the discontinuities and local linear regressions for enrolling at 
an in-state, public two-year institution without covariates. The effect of passing a Math or College 
Algebra exam has a similarly null effect on increasing a student’s probability of entering a two-year 
college. Yet, the slopes of the linear lines on either side of the threshold in Panels E and F seem to 
reveal more about the behavior of exam takers right near the passing margin. As previously shown, 
Math students who barely fail the challenge exam experience a slight discouragement effect of 
enrolling at all. However, those that do enroll have a similarly high probability of enrolling in a 
Tennessee public four-year as their otherwise similar peers who barely pass the exam and bank 
                                               
29 As a student scores higher and further above the cut score on a Math challenge exam, especially in College Algebra, 
they are more likely to enroll in out-of-state colleges and in-state, private institutions within that first year.  
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credit. For these Math – and College Algebra – students right above and below the passing margin, 
students appear to substitute away from enrolling in a Tennessee two-year and instead enrolling in 
an in-state, public four-year. Hemelt et al. (2019) found similar evidence that participation in dual 
credit College Algebra tended to tilt students away from public two-years and towards public four-
years.        
For CTE, and particularly Plant Science, exam passers appear to be more likely to bank their 
earned credits at in-state, public two-year institutions as indicated by the large positive 
discontinuities for both groups. The large positive estimates in the preferred specifications are not 
statistically significant for CTE as a broad group, though Plant Science passers are 15.9 to 18.1 
percentage points more likely to enroll than their otherwise similar, yet failing, peers (significant at 
the 5 percent-level). These estimates represent 43.0 and 48.9 percent of the control mean, 
respectively. Panels G and H in Figure 7 illustrate that while there is an apparent jump at the passing 
threshold in both instances, the magnitude of the discontinuities is due to (1) the dramatic increase 
in the probability of two-year enrollment for students scoring 0-3 points above the cut score; and, 
(2) the decreased probability of enrolling in a Tennessee public two-year among those Plant Science 
students who score between 1-6 points below the passing cut score. Closer inspection of the data 
reveals that these barely failing students are much more likely than their peers who score both below 
and above them to attend an in-state, private institution (not shown). For Plant Science students, 
passing and banking credit leads them to substitute away from Tennessee private institutions to 
public two-year institutions.   
6.3 First-year college performance 
 6.3.1 Full analytic sample 
 While encouraging college enrollment is a positive effect of passing a challenge exam, many 
stakeholders ultimately care about how these dual credit opportunities affect college completion – 
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and the student performance and course-taking behavior that leads students to persist towards 
graduation. To examine how passing a challenge exam and banking college credit in high school 
affects student performance, I use measures of credits attempted and earned, remedial credits 
earned, and cumulative student GPA30 provided by THEC. Because these outcomes are only 
available for students who attend a Tennessee public institution as captured in the THEC dataset, I 
must restrict my sample to students who enroll in a THEC institution within one year of their 
expected high school graduation. Out of the 6,027 students in the full sample, this means I retain 
3,472 observations (or about 58 percent of the original sample).31     
 It is important to reiterate that in the following regression analyses, I am unable to clearly 
identify the underlying mechanism behind the effect of banking college credit on early 
postsecondary performance outcomes. As the last section showed, passing a challenge exam did 
shift the enrollment patterns of students at Tennessee public institutions. CTE and Plant Science 
passers were more likely to enroll in public two-year colleges, while students scoring both right 
above and right below the passing threshold in Math and College Algebra courses shifted their 
enrollment away from public two-years and towards public four-year institutions. These enrollment 
decisions are likely correlated with a student’s first-year college performance. Therefore, any causal 
effect I observe of banking credit on first-year performance is the combined effect of a student’s 
enrollment behavior and their performance. I am not able to disentangle the two effects from one 
                                               
30 Not all THEC students have a non-missing first year GPA so models that include GPA as an outcome do have 
slightly smaller sample sizes. I do run RD specifications testing whether there is a discontinuity at the passing margin for 
whether a student is missing a GPA and I do not find a statistically significant difference in the full sample nor across all 
the SDC subsamples I consider. 
 
31 For this smaller THEC sample, I also perform covariate balance tests by the full, pooled sample and by key SDC 
subject and course subgroups to ensure that the internal validity of my models is preserved once I look at students who 
enrolled in a Tennessee public institution (as defined by THEC). For each SDC subgroup, the results of these balance 
tests match of their larger sample counterparts. Still, to address potential imbalance issues, I employ covariates and fixed 
effects in some models as a comparison.  
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another, even for twelfth-graders, given that I observe their enrollment behaviors to be most 
affected by barely passing/failing a challenge exam.32   
 Table 8 contains the output for the full sample of all SDC courses. The layout of this table 
mirrors that of previous tables, with the first five columns containing estimates from parametric 
specifications and columns 6 and 7 containing estimates from nonparametric specifications. 
Columns 4 and 5 contain the preferred regression output. None of the estimates for the pooled 
sample are statistically significant, though there is some suggestive evidence of some underlying 
patterns. Panels A through D indicate that exam passers may actually attempt and earn slightly fewer 
credits than their otherwise similar peers who barely failed. It may not necessarily be surprising that 
exam passers attempt slightly fewer credits within the year following high school graduation. 
Perhaps knowing they already have banked a class’s worth of credit before setting foot on campus, 
they desire to take a reduced course load the first year as they adjust to the demands of college life. 
Still, because passing students have earned three additional credits from the exam, one might expect 
to observe a slight positive, “mechanical” discontinuity at the passing margin for credits earned – 
even after accounting for a slightly reduced attempted credit load (Panel A).33 However, Panel C 
suggests that the gap between passers and failers may actually be more negative for earned credits 
than for attempted credits.  This suggests challenge exam passers are not performing well enough to 
earn regular credit in every course they take within the first year.  
 The results in Panels E through G provide some additional suggestive evidence of this 
observation. Once again, none of these estimates rise to conventional levels of statistical 
                                               
32 I do run all of the regressions looking at early performance outcomes stratified by grade level as I did previously for 
college enrollment and choice. Largely, I observe that the effect of passing a challenge exam is about the same in 
magnitude and statistical significance for twelfth-graders and the combined group of eleventh- and tenth-grade students 
for all outcomes. 
 
33 Even if passers attempt one fewer course than their peers (equal to three credits), if they successfully transferred their 
banked credit, we may expect barely passers and barely failers to earn the same number of total credits (3 credits earned 
minus 3 fewer credits attempted equals 0 difference in credit accumulation).  
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significance, though Panels E and F show that students who barely pass their challenge exam earn 
are more likely to earn remedial credits within the first year. This finding is interesting because it 
suggests that there is some aspect of earning three college credits that induces student to take more 
remediation – the opposite intention of dual-credit programs. Moreover, Panel G shows that passers 
may also experience slightly lower cumulative GPAs than their peers, suggesting they underperform 
and may not receive full credit in some of the courses they do take. All of these first-year 
performance results may relate to the fact that exam passers shift their enrollment to in-state, public 
institutions and away from other institution types.  
 6.3.2 SDC subgroups 
While the full sample estimates benefit from a larger sample size that improves estimate 
precision by reducing the size of standard errors, they also potentially obscure variation in the 
experience of exam passers across SDC subgroups. Table 9 presents estimates for the broad SDC 
subgroups Math and CTE for the outcomes related to credits attempted and credits earned. Again, 
because I can only observe postsecondary performance measures for students enrolled in a THEC 
institution, the sample sizes of these SDC subgroups are smaller than in the previous enrollment and 
choice models. These smaller sample sizes mean that I do not show results for College Algebra and 
Plant Science students separately, as these estimates are imprecise and often noisy. Moreover, the 
results of each of these course subgroups mirror – and often drive – the overall effects observed for 
Math and CTE, respectively. Within each subgroup-outcome panel in Table 9, the first two columns 
show estimates from local linear regressions within a data window of ± 10, with and without 
controls; the third column shows estimates from nonparametric specifications using an MSE-
optimal bandwidth selector.  
 I find that the experience of Math students and CTE students at the margin differ. Math 
passers attempt between 1.330 and 1.407 fewer credits (roughly 4.4 percent fewer) than their peers, 
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though only the model inclusive of covariates is weakly significant at the 10 percent-level. Math 
passers who have banked credit are also roughly 6.5 percentage points (9.9 percent) less likely to 
have attempted 30 or more credit hours within the first year of college. The preferred models are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent-level. Meanwhile, the estimates for CTE are inconsistent, 
sensitive to model parameters, and not statistically different from zero. Though, there is perhaps 
some suggestive evidence that CTE passers are more likely than their failing peers to attempt 30 or 
more credit hours within a year of high school graduation.  
 These same general patterns persist when it comes to credits earned within the first year.   
Math students who have banked college credit appear to earn roughly 2 fewer credits than their 
peers, though these estimates are not statistically significant. Still, they are 8.6 to 9.0 percentage 
points (15.5 to 16.2 percent) less likely to earn 30 or more credits within the first year, and both of 
these estimates are significant at the 5 percent-level. Once again, the estimates for CTE college 
credit bankers are much less precise and fluctuate across models. I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that CTE exam passers earn neither more nor less credits than their barely failing peers within a year 
of high school graduation.  
Sections I and II of Figure 8 show these subgroup findings visually for credits earned and 
whether a student earned 30 or more credits.34 Panels A illustrates the drop-off in credits earned at 
the threshold for Math courses. Though the local linear lines on both sides of the threshold indicate 
an overall positive correlation between a higher challenge exam score and more credits earned, 
passers scoring 0-9 points above the cut score do appear to earn fewer credits than what would be 
predicted for them based on their challenge exam score. Panel B reveals a similar positive correlation 
between exam score and credits earned, but with no clear discontinuity for CTE students. Despite 
the negative discontinuity at the threshold for the Math courses, barely passers in Math still earn 
                                               
34 Visually, the RD plots for credits attempted and credits earned are nearly identical. 
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more credits on average than barely passers in CTE courses (about 27 credits compared to 21 
credits).  
Math students who bank college credit appear to attempt fewer credits than their peers in 
the first year while also earning less overall, despite entering with a nest egg of three credits. CTE 
passers do not appear to attempt or accumulate credits a rate different from their peers, even though 
they also enter with a banked set of three credits. Both of these findings suggest that passers 
underperform in their college coursework within that first year, especially Math passers. Table 10 
explores this angle by showing estimates for remedial credits earned and first-year GPA for Math 
and CTE, separately. The layout of this table mirrors that of Table 9 previously. The results suggest 
that both Math and CTE passers earn slightly more remedial credits than their respective peers 
within the first year, though estimates for both groups are not statistically different from zero, and 
the CTE estimates are particularly noisy.  
Still, Math passers do appear slightly more likely to earn any remedial credits within a year of 
high school graduation by 3.4 to 3.7 percentage points, an increase of 64.4 to 74.4 percent. Remedial 
courses do not count towards earned credit. Math passers also earn slightly lower cumulative GPAs 
within the first year, 0.159 to 0.175 points below their barely failing peers – a 5 to 6 percent change – 
with the latter estimate statistically significant at the 10 percent-level. Meanwhile, CTE passers 
appear to earn slightly higher GPAs by 0.149 to 0.271 points (a change of 6.5 to 11.8 percent), 
though only the model with covariates is weakly significant at the 10 percent-level. Sections III and 
IV in Figure 8 depict the estimates for earning any remedial education and first year GPA for Math 
and CTE in Panels E through H. 
What distinguishes the experience of Math passers such that they both attempt and earn 
fewer credits and earn lower first-year GPAs compared to their peers while CTE passers’ first year 
experiences deviate little from their barely failing peers? Without college course-level data, I cannot 
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identify the types of classes students take, how they perform in them, or which ones are considered 
remedial. I also cannot know how, or even if, students’ banked credits are formally transcripted to 
know whether the gaps in credits, in particular, are the result of students not ensuring their three 
credits are properly transferred. These limitations make explaining the underlying mechanisms 
challenging, on top of the fact that the observed discontinuities should be considered a joint product 
of the shift in student enrollment behavior as well as a shift in student performance. 
Math students around the passing threshold, both those who barely fail and those who 
barely pass, appear to shift away from in-state, public two-year colleges and into in-state, public 
four-year colleges. These four-year institutions have more rigorous academic standards and course 
offerings.  Perhaps, compared to their barely failing peers, Math students right above the passing 
threshold are more likely to take relatively more challenging coursework upon enrollment, even with 
a slightly reduced course load (fewer attempted credits), after entering with three college credits. 
This could be because by earning math credit in high school, passers meet some of their college 
graduation requirements and are able to skip introductory math courses in College Algebra, Pre-
Calculus, or Statistics.35 It could also be the result of passers receiving a positive signal from passing 
the challenge exam, and deciding to take on more demanding coursework in other subjects.  
In either case, these marginally passing students may come to find these more rigorous 
courses to be more challenging than expected and may underperform as a result by failing to earn 
credit for the course or by receiving a lower GPA. These students may respond by attempting fewer 
courses, taking remedial coursework, or even taking the introductory course they originally skipped. 
Note that these student responses could be occurring in both the first and second terms within that 
                                               
35 At in-state, public four-year, courses like College Algebra, Pre-Calculus, and Statistics may be offered to entering 
freshmen. Still, even if they are not and more rigorous courses like Calculus I or Differential Equations are the 
introductory courses, this same general theory holds up. The banked college credit may serve as a prerequisite for taking 
these more difficult courses. 
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first year of college, as freshmen students in particular must sometimes wait until a later term to 
enroll in desired courses.36   
 Meanwhile, for CTE exam passers, I observed previously that passing led to a substantial 
increase in student enrollment in Tennessee public two-year colleges. At these institutions, exam 
passers may not be presented with the same opportunity to skip certain introductory courses (e.g., 
no corresponding course may exist). Perhaps they also see little benefit in prolonging a certificate or 
AA program by reducing their course load at an already oversubscribed community college. Though 
the estimates in Table 9 and 10 are noisy, the visual representations in Figure 8 suggest that passers 
do not experience a similar penalty to passing as Math students when it comes to earned credits or 
first-year GPA. To be clear, these descriptions of Math and CTE passers’ behavior and the 
underlying mechanisms driving the estimated causal effects are hypothetical. I cannot test them with 
the data I have on hand. Future work will involve working with TDOE to understand and identify 
these mechanisms more thoroughly.  
6.4 Second-year college enrollment and choice, student persistence 
 Though proponents of dual-credit opportunities argue that their strength lies in motivating 
and preparing students to enroll in college initially, helping patch the leaky pipeline from high school 
to college, researchers are also interested in how these programs can encourage student persistence 
and academic momentum into later years. Others have noted that participation, broadly, in a dual- 
credit or dual-enrollment programs is associated with increased student persistence to later terms as 
well as higher cumulative GPAs and more credits accumulated within three years of high school 
graduation (Allen & Dadger, 2012; Swanson, 2008; Karp et al., 2007). This section of the paper 
                                               
36 In RD models run for just the first fall term (not shown) the estimated effects of passing for Math students were 
attenuated across all early performance outcomes, suggesting that these gaps in credits attempted/earned, remediation, 
and GPA widened in the spring term.   
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investigates whether students who banked college credit in high school experience an additional 
boost to their second-year experiences, starting with enrollment at any institution.       
 When looking at second-year enrollment and college choice, I run RD specifications both 
unconditional on student enrollment in the first year as well as conditional on first-year enrollment. 
In both the unconditional and conditional regressions, I find no substantively or statistically 
significant effect of passing a challenge exam on enrollment within two years of expected graduation 
for the full sample, the broad Math category, or the CTE category.37 Table 11 provides estimates for 
these unconditional and conditional RD models by subgroup. Within each subgroup-outcome panel, 
the first two columns refer to local linear parametric regressions and the last two columns to 
nonparametric specification, both with the same constraints and conditions applied in previous 
tables. While the estimates in the subgroup-outcome panels for CTE suggest there may be some 
slight boost to enrollment, whereby passers are more likely to enroll within two years of graduating 
high school whether they were enrolled the first year (conditional estimate 6.7-7.6 percentage points) 
or not (unconditional estimate: 6.8-8.3 percentage points), none of these estimates are statistically 
significant. Moreover, these estimates appear fairly noisy upon visual inspection of the data. 
Figure 9 presents the parametric specifications, without covariates, visually for Math (Panel 
I) and CTE (Panel II). In Panel II, the positive discontinuity is caused by the disproportionately 
lower probability of CTE students scoring 1-3 points below the cut score of enrolling in college 
within two years of graduating. With the exception of this anomaly, the correlation between 
challenge exam score and second-year enrollment appears steadily positive across the score axes in 
Panels C and D. On the other hand, the downward-sloping regression lines on the right side of the 
passing threshold for Math in both Panels A and B suggest an opposite trend. Students scoring both 
                                               
37 This is also true for College Algebra and Plant Science courses, individually. However, I do not formally present these 
regression results here.  
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at the margin and further above the passing cut score are either about as likely or even less likely to 
enroll in any college within two years of graduating high school.  
I also explore how passing a challenge exam in high school affected the likelihood a student 
would enroll in certain institution types within two years of graduating – both unconditional and 
conditional on first-year enrollment. I do not find statistically significant effects of banking credit on 
enrollment in any type of college or university for either the full sample or SDC subgroups. The 
regressions conditional on first-year enrollment mirror the results found when looking at initial 
college enrollment in most instances. Altogether, the estimates in the models that examine second-
year enrollment and persistence find no real effect of passing an exam on showing up two years 
later.   
6.5 Second-year college performance 
 Finally, I estimate the effect of banking college credit on the performance of students within 
two years of high school graduation. Once again, I restrict my focus to only those students who 
enroll in an THEC institution and who, therefore, have measures of postsecondary performance. 
The second-year samples contain the same number of observations as their first-year sample 
equivalents because the second-year outcomes measure a student’s total number of credits 
attempted, credits earned, remedial credits, and GPA by the end of the two-year period – even if a 
student drops out of college or experiences no change between years one and two.38 
 In the full sample, I find the effect of passing a challenge exam stays fairly persistent and not 
statistically significant into students’ second year. As these results obscure differences between Math 
and CTE examinees, I focus my discussion of the second-year results on students in these two 
broad SDC subgroups, but provide full sample results in the tables as well (as Panel A). Table 12 
                                               
38 For THEC students who drop out, their second-year variable values are equivalent to their first-year variable values 
because that is what they attained (in terms of credits and GPA) within two years’ time.  
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provides second-year estimates of credits attempted and earned with Math and CTE results in 
Panels B and C, respectively. The first two columns within each subgroup-outcome panel refer to 
the preferred local linear regressions with a data window of ± 10, while the third column refers to 
estimates from nonparametric regressions using an MSE-optimal bandwidth and no covariates.  
 For Math passers, the gap in credits attempted and credits earned between them and their 
barely failing peers expands within the additional year timeframe. Two years after expected high 
school graduation, Math passers attempt 2.5 to 2.8 fewer credits than their peers, a decrease of 4.5 to 
5.1 percent. Passers also earn 3.5 to 3.7 fewer credits than their peers by this same point, a decrease 
of 6.9 to 7.3 percent. Math passers are also 9 percentage points (18.4 percent) less likely to have 
earned 60 or more credits with two years of high school graduation. With the exception of the 
estimate for earned credits inclusive of covariates, all of these coefficients are significant at the 10 
percent-level. Once again, the estimates for CTE passers are not statistically significant and highly 
sensitive to model parameters. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that they perform about as well 
two years after graduating as their peers who barely fail to bank college credit. 
 Figure 10, Sections I and II show the discontinuities for Math and CTE subgroups for 
credits earned and for whether students earned 60 or more credits within two years. Like the first-
year results, Panel A illustrates a drop-off in credits earned at the threshold for Math. Again, passers 
scoring 0-9 points above the cut score do appear to earn fewer credits than what would be predicted 
for them based on their challenge exam score. Similarly, Panel B reveals no clear discontinuity for 
CTE students. Panels C and D in Section II show analogous patterns for Math and CTE passers 
when the outcome documents whether a student has accumulated 60 more credits. 
Table 13 shows similar regression results for the outcomes focused on earned remedial 
credits and GPA two years after high school graduation. While the gap in earned remedial credits 
between barely passers and their peers narrows somewhat between years one and two for Math 
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students (from about +0.55 to +0.49), the difference remains statistically insignificant. However, 
Math passers are still 3.5 to 3.8 percentage points (43.9 to 47.7 percent) more likely to have earned 
any remedial credit, though only the latter estimate is significant at the 10 percent-level. Panel B also 
reveals that the negative discontinuity at the threshold for cumulative GPA remains about the same 
in magnitude, and perhaps slightly larger, into year two for Math passers. However, now the 
difference is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Panel C in Table 13 shows results for CTE regressions. Again, the estimates are imprecise 
and sensitive to model parameters, though there is some evidence that CTE passers earn more 
remedial credits within two years relative to their peers. Without controls, CTE passers earn 1.571 
more remedial credits than their peers (not statistically significant), but inclusive of controls, CTE 
passers earn 2.874 (or 59.7 percent) more remedial credits, significant at the 5 percent-level. In the 
models inclusive of covariates, CTE passers are also 10.4 percentage points (34 percent) more likely 
to earn any remedial credits than their peers – statistically significant at the 5 percent-level. Passers 
also appear to have earned slightly higher cumulative GPAs by the end of two years (.108 to 0.265 
points) though their GPA advantage has narrowed somewhat from the first year and is no longer 
statistically significant. Sections III and IV in Figure 10 show the visual representations of the 
relationship between exam cut score and the outcomes earning any remedial credit and cumulative 
GPA by the second year for Math and CTE.  
When it comes to performance two years after expected high school graduation, the patterns 
observed for the first year largely carry over into year two for both Math and CTE passers, with a 
few exceptions. Math students who pass a challenge exam and bank three college credits 
underperform relative to their peers, by earning lower GPAs and both attempting and earning 
roughly three fewer credits overall – despite entering college with a credit nest egg of similar size. 
They also appear to more likely to have earned remedial credits than their barely failing peers. As for 
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passers of CTE exams, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that they perform about as well as their 
peers within both one and two years of high school graduation when it comes to attempted credits 
and earned credits. However, there is some evidence that CTE passers earn more remedial credits 
than their peers within two years of high school graduation. This finding is interesting because at the 
same time, CTE passers also appear to earn slightly higher GPAs than their peers. Perhaps CTE 
passers are more likely to engage in remedial coursework, but are able to perform well enough in 
these courses to merit credit (remedial) and boost their GPAs relative to their barely failing peers. 
Still, the smaller sample size of CTE examinees for performance outcomes introduces noise and 
imprecision into models focused on first-year and second-year results.  
7. Additional regressions models 
7.1 Demographic subgroups  
In addition to stratifying the larger sample by unique SDC subject and courses to explore 
how the effects of passing an exam might differ between groups, I also ran RD specifications 
stratified by key demographic subgroups of interest to explore other heterogenous effects. In 
particular I probed how the effect of passing and banking credit differed by student characteristics 
such as expected graduation year and gender.39 Stratifying by expected graduation year allowed me to 
test whether the effect of passing was attenuated for the two cohorts of students expected to enter 
college when Tennessee’s two major reforms were enacted in 2015, affecting remediation and cost 
to enroll in pubic, two-year institutions. When looking at heterogenous effects by demographic 
                                               
39 I also consider the dimensions of students’ race/ethnicity, whether they passed another challenge exam, and their 
PLAN composite score performance (the pre-ACT assessment typically administered in 10th grade). However, I do not 
discuss these demographic dimensions in the paper because I find no statistically significant difference in the effect of 
passing between groups and/or because the some of the demographic subgroups are extremely small, leading to 
imprecise estimates. For example, the proportion of minority students in the pooled sample is already small at 13 
percent, but the proportion is even smaller within the CTE subgroup (7 percent). Likewise, the number of who students 
who pass more than one exam, and therefore may experience a multiplicative effect of passing, is extremely small across 
all SDC subgroups (3-6 percent). Finally, it is important to note that I do not have SES information for individual 
students (e.g., parental education levels, household income, etc.), which means that I cannot assess how this dimension 
may influence the effect of passing a challenge exam.  
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subgroups, I observe differences between groups within the CTE subgroup. As a caveat although, 
when interpreting these results below, it is important to keep in mind the small CTE sample sizes I 
am working with, especially when looking at postsecondary performance measures (THEC data) 
stratified by narrow subgroups. While these subgroup estimates are suggestive of an underlying 
effect, their magnitudes are likely to be imprecise.  
7.1.1 Expected graduation year  
When looking at differences by expected graduation year, I only observe a statistically 
significant difference between the estimates for the outcomes enrolling in Tennessee private and 
enrolling in a Tennessee public two-year institution for CTE passers.  For those students whose 
expected graduation year was 2015-16, passing a CTE challenge exam decreased the likelihood they 
would enroll in a Tennessee private by about 13 percentage points – a large 200 percent change – 
significant at the 1 percent-level, while increasing the likelihood they would enroll in a Tennessee 
public two-year by approximately 19 percentage points – an increase of 58 percent – significant at 
the 10 percent-level. Meanwhile, exam passers with earlier expected graduation years (2013-14 and 
2014-15) were slightly more likely to enroll in a private institution by 3.9 percentage points, and only 
about 4.5 percentage points more likely to enroll in a Tennessee two-year institution (though neither 
estimate rises to the level of statistical significance). To summarize, passers of CTE exams who 
entered college earlier received about the same inducement into attending an in-state, private as they 
did to attending an in-state, public two-year. However, for students entering college in the 2016-17 
year, passing an exam heavily shifts student enrollment away from privates and into public two-year 
colleges. All private institutions in this sample are four-year colleges. 
This result is interesting because it suggests that the Tennessee Promise did not water down 
the effects of passing a challenge exam on public two-year enrollment. Perhaps many of the students 
in this study would not have met all the requirements for the Promise in order to receive a free two-
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year education, so its implementation had no effect at the passing margin. Instead, perhaps later 
cohorts were shifting away from privates to public two-years because students, administrators, and 
parents were much more familiar with the process of ensuring banked credits were officially 
transcripted at college. Moreover, students would know their banked credits are guaranteed to be 
accepted at a public Tennessee institution. Or, perhaps the Tennessee Promise added additional 
momentum to those students who earn college credit from their SDC exam. Even if having three 
additional credits doesn’t affect a student’s cost burden, passing a challenge exam could still provide 
additional psychological and academic momentum.40  
This shift away from in-state, private institutions and into public two-year colleges for CTE 
passers whose expected graduation year was 2015-16 may also explain the positive difference in first-
year GPAs experienced by passers in this cohort. While passing CTE students graduating in 2013-14 
and 2014-15 did not have cumulative GPAs that differed meaningfully or statistically from their 
barely failing peers, this was not the case for CTE passers graduating in 2015-16. Relative to their 
peers, these students had GPAs 0.612 to 0.765 points (29 to 36 percent) higher within one year, 
significant at the 1 percent-level. This positive effect on GPA is likely a combination of the fact that 
passers were more likely to attend a public two-year institution with less rigorous academic standards 
compared to privates, as well as the likelihood that passing an exam improved their first-year 
performance. These first-year differences carry over into the second year for later graduating CTE 
cohorts. As or other early performance outcomes, I do not observe a difference in outcomes for 
students graduating later (2015-16) and those graduating earlier (2013-14 and 2014-15), including for 
remediation.  
                                               
40 Why would this shift in enrollment towards public two-years arise just for students whose expected graduation year 
was 2015-16 and not for the 2014-15 cohort as well? The answer is unclear. Perhaps, though the Tennessee Promise was 
instituted in Fall 2015, students graduating high school in Spring 2015 were not as knowledgeable about the free two-
year college opportunity as students graduating one year later.   
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7.1.2 Gender  
As for differences between males and females, I do observe some evidence that passing a 
CTE exam increases the number of credits males attempt and earn within a year of high school 
graduation by about 3-7 credits – or 14 to 32 percent – (significant at the 1 percent-level), while 
decreasing the number of credits females attempt and earn by about 8-10 credits – a change of 27 – 
34 percent – (statistically significant at the 1 percent-level). Similarly, passing boosts male CTE 
students’ GPAs by about 0.77 points, or 37.9 percent (significant at the 1 percent-level), while 
decreasing female students’ GPAs by about 0.62 points, or 23.7 percent (significant at the 5 percent-
level). Despite the fact that female CTE students scoring right below the passing threshold attempt 
more credits, earn more credits, and hold higher first-year GPAs than males scoring right below the 
threshold, passing a CTE exam delivers a boost to male performance and an apparent hit to female 
performance. 
The premium to passing for males (and penalty to females) extends into year two, with 
barely passing males continuing to accrue about 8-12 more credits than their barely failing peers; 
meanwhile, passing females lag behind their barely failing peers by about 14 credit hours. The GPA 
gaps remain intact and at the same magnitude as well. All of these effects are statistically significant 
at the 1 percent-level. It will be important in future work to probe why male CTE students and 
female CTE students respond differently to the effect of passing a challenge exam and banking three 
college credits. Passing an exam did not appear to differentially affect male or female propensity to 
enroll in college, nor to shift their enrollment at certain types of THEC public institutions (four-year 
versus two-years).41 This suggests that the observed effects that passing has on early performance by 
                                               
41 There was some evidence that passing an exam shifted female CTE students out of in-state, private institutions and 
into in-state, public institutions generally. Although, they were no more nor no less likely to enroll in certain public 
institution types than their male counterparts.  
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gender can be primarily ascribed to the way passing affects students’ postsecondary course-taking 
behavior.  
7.2 Placebo cut scores 
 I also test whether the effect of receiving a certain challenge exam score affects college 
enrollment and performance measures at other cut scores. Even though students must achieve a 
recentered value of zero or higher in order to bank college credit, it may be reasonable to believe 
that the relationship between a student’s exam score and their likelihood of going to college or their 
performance once in college would be determined at a lower or high passing threshold. Several 
figures have shown discordant student outcomes either 1-6 points below the passing threshold or 0-
6 points above the passing threshold, which may reflect points at which we might observe 
discontinuities in student outcomes. To assess alternative cut scores, I chose a selection of cut scores 
with a recentered value between -10 and +15 on the score axis and re-ran all of my models.  I do not 
find any alternative cut scores that consistently show a discontinuity in my outcomes of interest 
across all SDC subsamples.  
8. Discussion 
This paper focuses on the credit-bearing dimension of dual credit participation to isolate the 
effect of earning college credit while in high school from the overall effect of participating in a dual-
credit course. I find that banking a nest egg of college credit before setting foot on campus does 
seem to boost initial college enrollment, especially among CTE (Plant Science) students and 
especially at in-state, public two-year colleges. Though CTE students are lower performing (as 
measured by baseline Algebra I EOC scores) and have lower on-average baseline likelihoods of 
attending any college relative to their Math peers, students who successfully pass a CTE Challenge 
Exam experience the largest jump in college enrollment relative to their barely failing peers. Plant 
Science passers are 10-14 percentage points more likely to enroll in an in-state, public institution 
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within a year of expected high school graduation, and 16-18 percentage points more likely to enroll 
in a Tennessee two-year college in particular.   
Although there does not appear to be a statistically significant effect of banking college 
credit for Math or College Algebra students on enrollment in any college institution, there is 
suggestive evidence that right around the passing threshold students scoring within three points of 
the cut score – in either direction – substitute away from enrolling in public two-year colleges and 
instead into public four-year institutions. Beyond the first year, I find no meaningful effect of 
passing a challenge exam on persistence to the second year of college for Math students; though I 
do observe some suggestive evidence – though not conclusive – that CTE exam passers are slightly 
more likely to be enrolled within two years of high school graduation, regardless of whether they 
were enrolled in year one. 
Though banking college credit provides initial momentum towards college enrollment in 
some SDC subject areas, I do not find a similar boost to student performance once they are on 
campus. CTE students at the passing margin experience no statistically significant difference in 
terms of credits attempted, credits earned, or remedial credits earned within a year of expected high 
school graduation. There is some slight suggestive evidence that passers may earn slightly higher 
cumulative GPAs during this time, but like most of the other outcomes, these estimates are 
imprecise and highly sensitive to model parameters. Within two years of expected high school 
graduation, CTE passers at the threshold do appear to earn slightly more remedial credit than their 
peers, despite earning slightly higher GPAs and both attempting and earning about the same number 
of credits overall.  
The experience of Math examinees is less ambiguous. Within a year of expected high school 
graduation, Math passers appear to fare slightly worse than their peers who barely fail the exam – 
attempting and earning fewer college credits in the first year. Proponents of dual credit argue that 
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one of its benefits is its ability to reduce student time-to-degree; though if students who earn college 
credit are falling behind their peers in terms of credit accumulation, it is difficult to see how this 
happens. This is especially true in light of the fact that robust credit accumulation within the first 
year of college is highly predictive of timely degree completion (Adelman, 2006). Math passers are 
6.5 percentage points less likely to attempt 30 or more credits and about 8.8 percentage points less 
likely to earn 30 or credits within a year of expected high school graduation. Considering that Math 
students, especially around the passing threshold, are more likely to attend a four-year institution, 
where typical degrees require 120 total credit hours – averaging out to 30 per year – these effects 
may meaningfully reduce barely passers’ time-to-degree. Math passers are also 3.7 percentage points 
more likely to earn remedial credits and hold first-year GPAs that are 0.175 points less than their 
barely failing peers.  
These gaps between barely passers and barely failers largely persist, and expand somewhat, in 
the second year after a student’s expected high school graduation. Math passers continue to attempt 
2.6 to 2.8 fewer credits and earn about 3.7 fewer credits than their barely failing peers. They are also 
9 percentage points less likely to earn 60 or more credits within that timeframe, indicating that 
passers are still just as likely to be behind their barely failing peers in hitting important credit 
thresholds in year two. They also remain 3.8 percentage points more likely to earn remedial credit 
and experience a cumulative GPA deficit, though the difference is no longer statistically significant.  
 The experience of Math examinees, in particular, highlights the potential of unintended 
consequences of Tennessee’s SDC program and the way it delineates college credit using exam cut 
score criteria. Even when it came to initial enrollment, there was evidence that Math students 
scoring 1-6 points below the passing threshold were less likely than their peers scoring even further 
below them to enroll in any college after high school graduation. These students appear to 
experience a discouragement effect at the passing threshold, perhaps because they held higher 
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expectations of their college readiness and ability to earn college credit than their peers scoring seven 
or more points below. This discouragement effect was experienced even by twelfth-graders who 
presumably had already committed to a postsecondary institution by the time they confirmed their 
exam score percentage. Though I cannot know for sure what underlies these students’ lower 
probability of enrolling in college within a year, it is possible that not banking college credit 
increased the likelihood barely failers experienced “summer melt” and were less likely to complete 
steps necessary for finalizing their college enrollment.  
 These unintended consequences also may spillover into the behavior of students who do 
successfully enroll in college. Math students around the passing margin were more likely to enroll in 
public, four-year institutions, which old higher academic standards and expectations than the public, 
two-year colleges that these students were substituting away from. This shift in enrollment may 
explain, or at least relate to, the negative discontinuities in performance outcomes that Math passers 
experience in both years one and two. In these more rigorous academic settings, unlike their barely 
failing peers, passers may have been able to transcript their three credits towards college graduation 
requirements by testing out of remedial courses or introductory coursework, or even by meeting 
prerequisites for other courses. Even without using the credit towards degree requirements, passers 
could have felt an additional confidence to tackle more challenging coursework within the first year 
of college. What started out as a nest egg of academic momentum, however, may have inadvertently 
become a hindrance to students. Relative to their barely failing peers, these passers earn fewer 
credits, participate in more remediation, and earn lower GPAs than their peers, suggesting that 
whatever changes they made to their course-taking behavior in response to banking college credit 
ended up not benefiting them. Despite entering college with a three-credit bonus, these students fall 
behind their peers by about that same amount within two-years’ time. 
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 Across all SDC subgroups, the estimates in all of these models can describe what is 
happening at the passing margin; however, they cannot illuminate the mechanisms underlying why 
passing a challenge exam and banking college credit translates into relatively poorer (or no better) 
performance in college compared to similar students who also participated in the same dual credit 
experience but did not receive college credit. One possibility is that the challenge exam cut score for 
some exams – particularly in Math – is too low. Perhaps for students scoring 0-6 points above the 
cut score, passing a challenge exam is not equally indicative of their readiness for college work as it is 
for students who surpass the threshold by 7 points or more. Another possibility is that the challenge 
exam cut score is too such that we may not expect much of a different between barely passers and 
barely failers. Placebo RD tests were unable to point to a specific alternative threshold above or 
below zero that coincided with improved academic performance among exam takers. Still, 
understanding where the optimal passing margin is located is important, given that students 
internalize the positive signal and utilize their banked college credit to make important decisions 
about their academic agendas.  
 An additional possibility is that the credit-bearing aspect of dual credit is simply just not as 
powerful or as important in boosting students’ early postsecondary experiences as simply 
participating in dual credit – whether students earn college credit or not. Prior studies have focused 
on this participation dimension and have found that exposure to rigorous, college-level work itself 
leads students to earn higher GPAs, need less remediation, and accumulate credits at a faster rate 
once in college. If Tennessee’s SDC courses are likewise boosting the postsecondary achievement of 
all dual credit participants, then the nuance between students who earn three additional college 
credits and those that do not may be insignificant. This seems to particularly be the case with CTE 
students and Plant Science students who are more likely to attend Tennessee two-year institutions.  
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It could also be the case that banking college credit in high school is a somewhat powerful 
treatment effect, distinct from the aspect of participating in dual credit, yet the treatment dosage of 
three credit hours is simply too small to be meaningful. In their analysis of the effect of dual 
enrollment in Florida, Karp et al. (2007) find that the premium to credits earned and cumulative 
GPAs in college scaled with the number of dual enrollment courses students took in high school. 
Though these authors do not parse apart the credit dimension of the course from the exposure to 
college-level material, it seems reasonable to think that the effect of banking credit varies with the 
number of credits students bank. Unfortunately, the number of students who pass multiple SDC 
exams in my sample is too small to exploit as a way of investigating this dosage dimension. 
Given the findings of this research, particularly that the effect of passing a challenge exam 
varies depending on the SDC course of interest, stakeholders in Tennessee should investigate whether 
and how students utilize their banked college credit once in college. Without a clear understanding of 
if or how exam passers use their nest egg of credit in deciding which courses to take, it is difficult to 
know for sure why passers may underperform in college compared to their peers who barely miss 
the mark for banking credit. College course-level data will also allow researchers to better 
disentangle the joint effect that passing an exam has on shifting student enrollment and shifting 
student postsecondary behavior. In this study, I am unable to distinguish these two forces to know 
the primary mechanism driving differences in student outcomes between barely passers and barely 
failers. Finally, it will also be important to further probe why the effect of passing an exam may vary 
by student background. For example, it is not immediately clear why male passers of CTE exams 
would experience an increase in credits attempted and earned as well as GPA, while female passers 
experience a decrease in these same performance measures, relative to their peers.  
One of the primary benefits proponents of dual credit and other credit-based transition 
programs tout is their ability to confer college credits to students while in high school. The findings 
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from this research indicate that effect of earning these credits depends upon the SDC course and the 
type of students selecting into these courses. They also highlight the importance of considering the 
unintended consequences of policies that grant college credit based on cut score criteria. Future 
work that aims to investigate the underlying mechanisms behind the discontinuities in student 
experiences around the passing threshold will help better contextualize how the credit-bearing 









Statewide Dual Credit course and challenge exam implementation 





College Algebra 2013-14 thru 2014-15 40 Multiple Choice 120 min. 75% 
Pre-Calculus 2015-16 thru 2018-19 40 Multiple Choice 120 min. 75% 
Statistics 2015-16 thru 2018-19 60 Multiple Choice 120 min. 75% 
CTE Courses 
Criminal Justice I 2014-15 thru 2016-17 100 Multiple Choice 180 min. 80% 




Choice 120 min. 75% 
Introduction to 
Agricultural Business 2013-14 thru 2018-19 
100 Multiple 
Choice 120 min. 70% 
Introduction to Business 2018-19 110 Multiple Choice 120 min. 80% 
Introduction to Plant 
Science 2013-14 thru 2018-19 
100 Multiple 




Choice; 1 Speech 
120 min., plus 
5-7 min. Speech 80% 
Social Science Courses 
American History 2017-18 thru 2018-19 50 Multiple Choice; 2 Essays 120 min. 80% 
Psychology 2016-17 thru 2018-19 130 Multiple Choice 120 min. 70% 
Introduction to Sociology 2014-15 thru 2018-19 50 Multiple Choice; 2 Essays 120 min. 70% 
World History  2016-17 thru 2018-19 50 Multiple Choice; 2 Essays 120 min. 80% 
Notes: The five fully implemented courses and years of implementation are Introduction to Agricultural Business (2016-17), 
Introduction to Plant Science (2016-17), Introduction to Sociology (2017-18), Pre-Calculus (2018-19), and Statistics (2018-
19). College Algebra transitioned into Pre-Calculus in the 2015-16 year, and Criminal Justice I transitioned into Criminal 
Justice II in the 2017-18 year. Health Information Technology was retired after the 2015-16 year. Please see TDOE's 






SDC challenge exam pass rates overall and by year, Full Analytic Sample 
Course  Exam Cut Score 
Academic Year 
Overall 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16  
All Courses – 0.308 0.277 0.446 0.147 
N=6,027 N=2,045 N=2,361 N=1,621 
         
Math Courses  – 0.297 0.243 0.463 0.144 
N=3,943 N=1,287 N=1,491 N=1,165 
College Algebra 75% 0.361 0.243 0.463 . 
N=2,778 N=1,287 N=1,491 
Pre-Calculus 75% 0.164 . . 0.164 
N=292 N=292 
Statistics 75% 0.137 . . 0.137 
N=873 N=873 
CTE Courses – 0.328 0.334 0.415 0.154 
N=2,084 N=758 N=870 N=456 
Criminal Justice I 80% 0.077 . 0.111 0.057 
N=142 N=54 N=88 
Health Information Technology 75% 0.000 . . 0.000 
N=25 N=25 
Introduction to Agricultural 
Business 70% 
0.402 0.511 0.357 0.388 
N=333 N=88 N=196 N=49 
Introduction to Plant Science 70% 0.340 0.310 0.460 0.156 
N=1,584 N=670 N=620 N=294 
Notes: This table contains information on 6,027 unique student-exam instances. There are 284 students who have 
more than one exam record, either in different years or different courses. Boxes with (.) indicate that the SDC 




 Table 3 
Summary statistics, Full Sample and SDC Course Subgroups 
 Full Sample Math  College Algebra CTE 
Plant 
Science 
  1 2 3 4 5 
N 6,027 3,943 2,778 2,084 1,584 
Demographics & Achievement      
Male 0.491 0.441 0.433 0.587 0.581 
White, Non-Hispanic 0.872 0.842 0.846 0.929 0.933 
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.066 0.084 0.084 0.032 0.029 
Asian, Non-Hispanic 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.008 0.006 
Hispanic 0.037 0.045 0.046 0.022 0.023 
Other, Non-Hispanic 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.008 
Has disability 0.081 0.065 0.053 0.112 0.116 
ELL status 0.040 0.051 0.053 0.018 0.021 
10th grade 0.029 0.013 0.018 0.059 0.071 
11th grade 0.261 0.240 0.340 0.300 0.301 
12th grade 0.710 0.747 0.642 0.641 0.628 
Algebra 1 EOC standardized score 0.562 0.753 0.738 0.199 0.167 
  (0.650) (0.497) (0.500) (0.744) (0.764) 
SDC Course & Exam       
Took same SDC course twice 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.026 0.034 
Took multiple SDC courses 0.136 0.112 0.090 0.182 0.143 
Passed another SDC course 0.046 0.038 0.026 0.062 0.045 
Expected graduation year 2013-14 0.192 0.199 0.283 0.179 0.209 
Expected graduation year 2014-15 0.368 0.366 0.519 0.371 0.377 
Expected graduation year 2015-16 0.440 0.435 0.198 0.450 0.414 
       
First-Year Postsecondary 
Enrollment 
     
Any college (NSC & THEC) 0.784 0.856 0.838 0.647 0.623 
Any college (just THEC) 0.576 0.610 0.597 0.512 0.497 
Any out-of-state college 0.067 0.083 0.077 0.036 0.032 
Any in-state college 0.721 0.778 0.766 0.612 0.593 
In-State, private 0.080 0.099 0.095 0.044 0.039 
In-State, public 0.644 0.684 0.676 0.569 0.554 
In-State, public 4-year 0.346 0.423 0.411 0.199 0.174 
In-State, public 2-year 0.297 0.274 0.279 0.343 0.350 





Table 3 continued…. 
 
N 3,472 2,405 1,659 1,067 787 
First-Year Postsecondary 
Performance          
Number of attempted credit hours  29.170 30.689 30.601 25.747 25.220 
  (10.801) (9.572) (9.906) (12.503) (12.606) 
Student attempted 30+ hours  0.564 0.636 0.620 0.403 0.379 
Number of earned credit hours  26.364 28.326 28.051 21.940 21.231 
  (13.914) (12.881) (13.057) (15.096) (15.096) 
Student earned 30+ hours 0.474 0.536 0.519 0.334 0.314 
Number of earned remedial credit       
hours  
2.129 0.887 0.987 4.928 5.011 
(8.991) (4.254) (4.372) (14.529) (14.641) 
Student earned any remedial credit 0.158 0.088 0.099 0.316 0.328 
First-year GPA 2.662 2.794 2.755 2.341 2.290 
  (1.110) (1.039) (1.045) (1.208) (1.208) 
Student is missing a first year GPA 0.046 0.026 0.028 0.090 0.097 
Notes: The full sample and SDC subsamples are restricted to observations with non-missing demographic and 
achievement measures. Means are presented for each variable and standard deviations for continuous variables are 
shown below means in parentheses. 284 (4.7%) students take more than one Challenge Exam, and thus appear more 
than once in the table. Math includes the courses College Algebra (70.5%), Pre-Calculus (7.4%), and Statistics 
(22.1%). Computer and Technical Education (CTE) includes the courses Criminal Justice I (6.8%), Health 
Information Technology (1.2%), Introduction to Agricultural Business (16.0%), and Introduction to Plant Science 
(76.0%). About 3% (N=183) of students enroll in more than one institution type in the year following expected high 
school graduation, which is why unconditional means along certain dimensions (out-of-state versus in-state, private 
versus public, etc.) do not add up perfectly in the First Year Postsecondary Enrollment panel. For the First Year 







Effects of passing challenge exam on postsecondary enrollment, Full Sample 
  Parametric Nonparametric 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.060** 0.063*** 0.081*** 0.045* 0.053** 0.057 0.039 
  (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) [-.048;173] [-.05;.129] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assignment variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 1,415 1,633 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 5.581 6.788 
Control group outcome mean 0.760 0.791 0.799 – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, grade-level, year of exam, 
standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a 
student passed another exam. Fixed effects refer to both course and year dummies. The nonparametric models, Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform 
(rectangular) kernel and data driven-bandwidth selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & 
Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD 
treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by recentered challenge exam scores are in 


















Effect of passing challenge exam on postsecondary enrollment, by SDC Course Subject 
A. Math (N=3,943) 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.043 0.082*** 0.092** 0.047 0.050 0.065* 0.055 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.037) [0;.185] [.005;.162] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,943 2,529 2,529 1,747 1,747 1,222 1,351 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 7.020 8.146 
Control outcome mean 0.849 0.860 0.869 – – 
B. College Algebra (N=2,778) 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.040 0.083** 0.095** 0.043 0.047 0.018 0.015 
  (0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) [-.035;.124] [-.039;.119] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 2,778 1,886 1,886 1,327 1,327 1,704 1,704 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 13.825 13.358 
Control outcome mean 0.824 0.843 0.855 – – 
C. CTE (N=2,084) 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.033 0.019 0.045 0.018 0.048 0.036 -0.021 
  (0.060) (0.074) (0.079) (0.066) (0.069) [-.107;.198] [-.219;.124] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 2,084 1,275 1,275 890 890 806 456 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 9.304 5.785 
Control outcome mean 0.586 0.648 0.653 – – 
D. Plant Science (N=1,584) 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.078* 0.092* 0.119** 0.075 0.112** 0.112 0.057 
  (0.047) (0.051) (0.053) (0.049) (0.052) [-.038;.303] [-.103;.231] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 1,584 952 952 674 674 674 613 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 10.628 9.237 
Control outcome mean 0.546 0.610 0.610 – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, 
grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the 
same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. Fixed effects refer to year dummies. 
The nonparametric models, Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel and data driven-bandwidth 
selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). 
The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector 
for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by 






Effects of passing challenge exam on college choice, Full Sample 
A. Any Out-of-State  
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.006 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.007 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) [.055;.052] [.059;.041] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 1,856 2,208 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 7.807 8.468 
Control outcome mean 0.0607 0.0628 0.0619 – – 
B. Any In-State   
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.055** 0.061** 0.073*** 0.043* 0.047** 0.047 0.037 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) [.068;.173] [.061;.14] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 1,415 1,633 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 5.592 6.728 
Control outcome mean 0.703 0.731 0.740 – – 
C. In-State, Private 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.008 -0.015 -0.012 0.002 0.002 -0.016 -0.007 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) [.078;.044] [.069;.045] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 1,856 2,208 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 7.790 8.420 
Control outcome mean 0.0779 0.0812 0.0825 – – 
D. In-State, Public 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.045 0.073** 0.083*** 0.039 0.042 0.070 0.048 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) [.036;.192] [.03;.159] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 1,539 2,077 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 6.698 8.192 
Control outcome mean 0.629 0.654 0.661 – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, 
grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the 
same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. Fixed effects refer to course and 
year dummies. The nonparametric models, Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel and data driven-
bandwidth selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & 
Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal 
bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard 





Table 6 continued…. 
 
E.  In-State, Public 4-Year 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  -0.003 0.007 0.035 -0.003 0.013 0.025 -0.001 
  (0.035) (0.044) (0.057) (0.035) (0.045) [.089;.142] [.101;.092] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 1,633 2,077 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 6.746 8.220 
Control outcome mean 0.321 0.352 0.370 – – 
F. In-State, Public 2-Year 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.057 0.065 0.052 0.039 0.031 0.039 0.064 
  (0.043) (0.054) (0.061) (0.040) (0.044) [.039;.143] [.025;.17] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 2,077 1,856 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 8.141 7.268 
Control outcome mean 0.301 0.297 0.288 – – 
G. TN Technical College 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  -0.010 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.006 
  (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) [.031;.029] [.021;.037] 
Data Window All (±15) (±15) (±10) (±10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 6,027 3,804 3,804 2,637 2,637 2,208 2,294 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 8.927 9.598 
Control outcome mean 0.0278 0.0266 0.0268 – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, 
grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the 
same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. Fixed effects refer to course and 
year dummies. The nonparametric models, Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel and data driven-
bandwidth selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & 
Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal 
bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors 






Effects of passing challenge exam on Tennessee college choice, by SDC Subgroup 
A. Math 
(N=3,943) 
In-State, Private In-State, Public In-State, Public 4-Year In-State, Public 2-Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
  0.020 0.020 0.001 -0.003 0.021 0.020 0.054 0.049 0.010 0.015 0.039 0.019 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.004 
  (0.019) (0.019) [.077;.09] [.081;.085] (0.035) (0.035) [.062;.194] [.06;.191] (0.036) (0.036) [.093;.179] [.1;.146] (0.031) (0.028) [.102;.091] [.088;.1] 
Data Win.  (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All 
Covs & FEs Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
N of Stus 1,747 1,747 1,222 1,222 1,747 1,747 1,222 1,222 1,747 1,747 1,351 1,488 1,747 1,747 1,752 1,752 
Nonpar. Bw. – – 7.851 7.788 – – 7.876 7.909 – – 8.297 9.365 – – 11.447 11.164 




In-State, Private In-State, Public In-State, Public 4-Year In-State, Public 2-Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
  0.038 0.041* 0.024 0.034 -0.003 -0.004 -0.028 -0.029 -0.024 -0.022 -0.027 -0.027 0.005 0.005 -0.012 -0.010 
  (0.023) (0.023) [.037;.097] [.03;.107] (0.052) (0.053) [.134;.07] [.134;.07] (0.054) (0.055) [.129;.094] [.136;.082] (0.044) (0.037) [.131;.065] [.117;.074] 
Data Win.  (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All 
Covs & FEs Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
N of Stus 1,327 1,327 1,598 1,522 1,327 1,327 1,886 1,886 1,327 1,327 1,886 1,886 1,327 1,327 1,705 1,705 
Nonpar. Bw. – – 13.096 12.729 – – 15.600 15.227 – – 15.968 15.623 – – 14.814 14.866 
Contr. mean 0.0976 – – 0.703 – – 0.452 – – 0.261 – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies 
for whether a student took more than one exam in the same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. Fixed effects refer to year dummies. The first two 
columns in each panel (e.g., 1, 2, 5, and 6) contain estimates from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of ±10. The last two columns in each panel (e.g., 3, 4, 7, and 8) contain estimates from 
nonparametric models using a linear polynomial of the assignment variable. The nonparametric models, Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel and data driven-bandwidth 
selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common 
mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by recentered challenge 











In-State, Private In-State, Public In-State, Public 4-Year In-State, Public 2-Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
  -0.035 -0.035 -0.053 -0.049 0.045 0.077 0.062 0.031 -0.044 -0.013 -0.011 -0.024 0.099 0.111 0.157** 0.123 
  (0.024) (0.023) [.149;.018] [.143;.019] (0.071) (0.072) [.148;.214] [.147;.194] (0.046) (0.036) [.155;.113] [.168;.094] (0.077) (0.081) [.021;.331] [.063;.284] 
Data Win.  (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All 
Covs & FEs Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
N of Stus 890 890 634 634 890 890 634 634 890 890 806 726 890 890 634 634 
Nonpar. Bw. – – 7.853 7.708 – – 7.051 7.708 – – 9.981 8.831 – – 7.609 7.227 




In-State, Private In-State, Public In-State, Public 4-Year In-State, Public 2-Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
  -0.040 -0.040 -0.059* -0.032 0.102* 0.138** 0.138* 0.102 -0.035 -0.013 -0.030 -0.024 0.159** 0.181** 0.202** 0.153** 
  (0.029) (0.028) [.15;.006] [.123;.035] (0.052) (0.055) [.014;.347] [.059;.286] (0.041) (0.029) [.178;.1] [.181;.108] (0.065) (0.070) [.051;.424] [.005;.359] 
Data Win.  (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All (±10) (±10) All All 
Covs & FEs Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
N of Stus 674 674 550 477 674 674 674 674 674 674 733 550 674 674 550 613 
Nonpar. Bw. – – 8.551 7.817 – – 10.009 10.380 – – 11.621 8.815 – – 8.262 9.184 
Contr. mean 0.0318 – – 0.546 – – 0.133 – – 0.370 – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies 
for whether a student took more than one exam in the same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. Fixed effects refer to year dummies. The first two 
columns in each panel (e.g., 1, 2, 5, and 6) contain estimates from local linear regressions with a bandwidth of ±10. The last two columns in each panel (e.g., 3, 4, 7, and 8) contain estimates from 
nonparametric models using a linear polynomial of the assignment variable. The nonparametric models, Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel and data driven-bandwidth 
selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common 
mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by recentered challenge 







Effects of passing challenge exam on first year college performance, Full THEC Sample (N=3,472) 
A. Number of Attempted 
Credit Hours  
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  -0.826 -0.857 0.007 -1.075 -0.614 -0.399 -1.132 
  (0.965) (0.838) (1.330) (0.797) (1.202) [-3.654;2.867] [-3.837;1.804] 
Data Window All (+/-15) (+/-15) (+/-10) (+/-10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,472 2,262 2,262 1,576 1,576 1,112 1,245 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 7.417 8.258 
Control outcome mean 28.16 28.87 29.41 – – 
B. Student Attempted 30+ 
Hours 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  -0.029 -0.039 0.004 -0.024 -0.004 -0.013 -0.040 
  (0.039) (0.038) (0.051) (0.037) (0.048) [-.155;.143] [-.177;.088] 
Data Window All (+/-15) (+/-15) (+/-10) (+/-10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,472 2,262 2,262 1,576 1,576 1,112 1,245 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 7.359 8.042 
Control outcome mean 0.531 0.553  0.574  – – 
C.  Number of Earned Credit 
Hours  
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  -1.728 -1.038 0.318 -1.510 -0.803 -1.091 -1.749 
  (1.310) (1.578) (2.143) (1.249) (1.732) [-4.14;2.406] [-5.091;1.963] 
Data Window All (+/-15) (+/-15) (+/-10) (+/-10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,472 2,262 2,262 1,576 1,576 1,617 1,321 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 11.441 8.524 
Control outcome mean 24.61 25.76  26.71  – – 
D.  Student Earned 30+ 
Credits 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  -0.058 -0.071 -0.034 -0.058 -0.038 -0.040 -0.071 
  (0.043) (0.059) (0.073) (0.038) (0.052) [-.179;.096] [-.215;.02] 
Data Window All (+/-15) (+/-15) (+/-10) (+/-10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,472 2,262 2,262 1,576 1,576 1,303 1,321 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 8.325 8.344 
Control outcome mean 0.418 0.451  0.483  – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, 
grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the 
same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. The nonparametric models, 
Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel and data driven-bandwidth selection procedure described by 
Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates 
displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect 
estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by recentered challenge exam scores 





Table 8 continued…  
 
E.  Number of Earned 
Remedial Credit Hours 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.096 1.174 0.613 0.777 0.534 0.333 0.702 
  (0.715) (0.798) (1.001) (0.645) (0.769) [-2.391;2.663] [-1.826;3.031] 
Data Window All (+/-15) (+/-15) (+/-10) (+/-10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,472 2,262 2,262 1,576 1,576 654 654 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 4.444 4.391 
Control outcome mean 2.543 2.226  1.917  – – 
F.  Student Earned Any 
Remedial Credit 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  0.012 0.059 0.033 0.041 0.031 0.049 0.077** 
  (0.033) (0.045) (0.059) (0.033) (0.045) [-.019;.141] [.011;.177] 
Data Window All (+/-15) (+/-15) (+/-10) (+/-10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,472 2,262 2,262 1,576 1,576 1,372 1,112 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 9.765 7.895 
Control outcome mean 0.185 0.154  0.144  – – 
G. First Year GPA (N=3,313) 
Parametric Nonparametric 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  -0.154 -0.044 0.040 -0.078 -0.045 0.006 -0.039 
  (0.094) (0.094) (0.109) (0.096) (0.106) [-.304;.38] [-.297;.283] 
Data Window All (+/-15) (+/-15) (+/-10) (+/-10) All All 
Polynomial of assign. variable Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Linear 
Covariates & FEs Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 3,313 2,168 2,168 1,510 1,510 1,060 1,246 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – – – – 7.583 8.307 
Control outcome mean 2.558 2.652  2.729  – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, 
grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the 
same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. The nonparametric models, 
Columns 6 and 7, are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel and data driven-bandwidth selection procedure described by 
Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates 
displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect 
estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by recentered challenge exam scores 












Effects of passing challenge exam on first-year credits attempted and credits earned, by THEC SDC Subgroup 
A. Math (N=2,405) 
Attempted Credit Hours Student Attempted 30+ Credits Earned Credit Hours Student Earned 30+ Credits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  -1.330* -1.407 -1.453 -0.064** -0.066** -0.046 -1.937 -2.009 -1.533 -0.086** -0.090** -0.080 
  (0.740) (0.945) [-4.011;1.833] (0.031) (0.033) [-.171;.077] (1.149) (1.303) [-5.254;1.908] (0.038) (0.043) [-.233;.036] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 1,083 1,083 921 1,083 1,083 1,401 1,083 1,083 1,258 1,083 1,083 1,164 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 9.672 – – 13.474 – – 12.520 – – 11.964 
Control outcome mean 31.08  – 0.654  – 28.99 – 0.554  – 
B. CTE (N=1,607) 
Attempted Credit Hours Student Attempted 30+ Credits Earned Credit Hours Student Earned 30+ Credits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  -1.203 0.853 0.668 0.052 0.126 0.051 -0.703 1.519 2.126 -0.005 0.070 -0.049 
  (1.904) (2.146) [-4.965;7.412] (0.087) (0.090) [-.186;.317] (2.110) (2.146) [-7.439;10.655] (0.082) (0.077) [-.371;.214] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 493 493 352 493 493 352 493 493 249 493 493 249 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 7.633 – – 7.358 – – 5.432 – – 5.780 
Control outcome mean 25.30  – 0.378  – 21.08  – 0.305  – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for 
whether a student took more than one exam in the same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. The first two columns of each panel represent local linear 
regressions local linear regressions with a bandwidth of ±10. The nonparametric models (columns 3, 6, 9, and 12) are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel, linear polynomial of the assignment 
variable, and data driven-bandwidth selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed 
are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors 








Effects of passing challenge exam on first-year remedial credits and GPA, by THEC SDC Subgroup 
A. Math (N=2,405) 
Earned Remedial Credit Hours Student Earned Any Remedial Credit  First Year GPA (N=2,342) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  0.540 0.558 1.246 0.034 0.037* 0.044 -0.159 -0.175* -0.148 
  (0.504) (0.481) [-.166;3.481] (0.022) (0.020) [-.016;.128] (0.111) (0.091) [-.477;.212] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 1,083 1,083 601 1,083 1,083 915 1,053 1,053 887 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 5.056 – – 8.459 – – 8.574 
Control outcome mean 0.888  – 0.0797  – 2.891  – 
B. CTE (N=1,607) 
Earned Remedial Credit Hours Student Earned Any Remedial Credit  First Year GPA (N=971) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  1.826 0.742 0.158 0.080 0.034 0.100 0.149 0.271* 0.443 
  (1.200) (1.126) [-5.359;4.827] (0.047) (0.049) [-.15;.348] (0.187) (0.147) [-.365;1.234] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 493 493 204 493 493 297 457 457 230 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 4.397 – – 6.702 – – 5.630 
Control outcome mean 4.458  – 0.301  – 2.302  – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I 
EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. The 
first two columns of each panel represent local linear regressions local linear regressions with a bandwidth of ±10. The nonparametric models (columns 3, 6, and 9) are calculated 
using a uniform (rectangular) kernel, linear polynomial of the assignment variable, and data driven-bandwidth selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik 
(2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal 
bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by recentered challenge exam scores 









Effects of passing challenge exam on postsecondary enrollment within two years of expected high 
school graduation 
  Unconditional on 1st Year Enrollment  Conditional on 1st Year Enrollment  
A. Full Sample 
N=6,027 N=4,724 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  0.025 0.028 0.124* 0.031 -0.013 -0.012 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.033) (0.040) [.008;.303] [.08;.163] (0.034) (0.043) [.089;.108] [.093;.104] 
Data Window ±10  ±10  All All ±10  ±10  All All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 2,637 2,637 1,073 1,506 2,135 2,135 1,800 1,800 
Nonparametric bandwidth – – 4.673 6.166 – – 8.747 8.689 
Control outcome mean 0.614 – – 0.737 – – 
B. Math  
N=3,943 N=3,375 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  -0.006 -0.008 0.010 0.011 -0.046 -0.049 -0.052 -0.043 
  (0.030) (0.031) [.078;.157] [.078;.156] (0.038) (0.047) [.167;.052] [.142;.085] 
Data Window ±10  ±10  All All ±10  ±10  All All 
Covariates & Fixed 
Effects Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 1,747 1,747 1,482 1,482 1,515 1,515 1,293 1,287 
Nonparametric bandwidth   8.444 8.396 – – 9.952 8.991 
Control outcome mean 0.681 – – 0.769 – – 
C. CTE 
N=2,084 N=1,349 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  0.068 0.083 0.077 0.101 0.076 0.067 0.069 – 
  (0.065) (0.067) [.108;.275] [.087;.299] (0.050) (0.046) [.131;.272] – 
Data Window ±10  ±10  All All ±10  ±10  All All 
Covariates Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
N of Students 890 890 634 542 620 620 566 – 
Nonparametric bandwidth   7.026 6.886 – – 9.162 – 
Control outcome mean 0.462 – – 0.646 – – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, 
grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the 
same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 represent 
local linear regressions local linear regressions with a bandwidth of ±10.   The nonparametric models (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8) are 
calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel, linear polynomial of the assignment variable, and data driven-bandwidth selection 
procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The 
nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for 
the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered by recentered 

















Effects of passing challenge exam on credits attempted and earned by the end of the second year, by THEC SDC Subgroup 
A. Full Sample (N=3,472) 
Attempted Credit Hours Student Attempted 60+ Credits Earned Credit Hours Student Earned 60+ Credits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  -1.972 -0.930 -0.877 -0.048 -0.024 0.003 -2.492 -1.195 -0.983 -0.083* -0.058 -0.063 
  (1.856) (2.568) [-6.854;6.134] (0.047) (0.061) [-.12;.179] (2.292) (3.115) [-6.135;6.847] (0.042) (0.060) [-.19;.096] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 1,576 1,576 1,112 1,576 1,576 1,112 1,576 1,576 1,321 1,576 1,576 1,112 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 7.481 – – 7.065 – – 8.670 – – 7.912 
Control outcome mean 51.42  – 0.478  – 46.25  – 0.417  – 
B. Math (N=2,405) 
Attempted Credit Hours Student Attempted 60+ Credits Earned Credit Hours Student Earned 60+ Credits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  -2.598* -2.763* -3.192 -0.048 -0.050 -0.048 -3.486 -3.652* -3.919 -0.090* -0.090* -0.103* 
  (1.404) (1.410) [-7.449;2.89] (0.051) (0.050) [-.18;.079] (2.165) (2.111) [-9.721;2.319] (0.047) (0.053) [-.226;.035] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 1,083 1,083 1,087 1,083 1,083 1,401 1,083 1,083 1,401 1,083 1,083 1,401 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 11.485 – – 13.420 – – 13.843 – – 13.887 
Control outcome mean 55.25  – 0.550  – 50.75  – 0.488  – 
C. CTE (N=1,607) 
Attempted Credit Hours Student Attempted 60+ Credits Earned Credit Hours Student Earned 60+ Credits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  -1.590 2.439 5.063 -0.069 0.020 0.026 -0.597 3.617 7.852 -0.073 0.001 0.049 
  (3.892) (4.246) [-8.382;19.894] (0.071) (0.074) [-.186;.298] (3.973) (4.064) [-9.164;24.372] (0.068) (0.062) [-.251;.329] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 493 493 297 493 493 352 493 493 249 493 493 249 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 6.117 – – 7.133 – – 5.501 – – 5.660 
Control outcome mean 41.96  – 0.301  – 35.13  – 0.241  – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, grade-level, year of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for 
whether a student took more than one exam in the same course or in multiple courses, and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. The first two columns of each panel represent local linear 
regressions local linear regressions with a bandwidth of ±10.   The nonparametric models (columns 3, 6, 9, and 12) are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel, linear polynomial of the assignment 
variable, and data driven-bandwidth selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed 
are calculated using one common mean-squared error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors 
clustered by recentered challenge exam scores are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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 Table 13 
Effects of passing challenge exam on remedial credits and GPA by the end of the second year, by 
THEC SDC Subgroup 
A. Full Sample 
(N=3,472) 
Earned Remedial Credit Hours Student Earned Any Remedial Credit  Second Year GPA (N=3,336) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  0.983 0.719 0.580 0.048 0.037 0.057 -0.090 -0.052 -0.007 
  (0.648) (0.786) [-2.19;3.06] (0.033) (0.045) [-.018;.146] (0.103) (0.126) [-.29;.363] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 1,576 1,576 654 1,576 1,576 1,372 1,516 1,516 1,197 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 4.540 – – 9.762 – – 8.108 
Control outcome mean 2.032  – 0.145  – 2.633  – 
B. Math (N=2,405) 
Earned Remedial Credit Hours Student Earned Any Remedial Credit  Second Year GPA (N=2,363) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  0.477 0.498 1.165 0.035 0.038* 0.047 -0.171 -0.185 -0.175 
  (0.502) (0.480) [-.299;3.444] (0.021) (0.020) [-.018;.127] -0.12 -0.112 [-.495;.176] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 1,083 1,083 601 1,083 1,083 915 1,059 1,059 899 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 5.293 – – 8.734 – – 9.850 
Control outcome mean 0.907  – 0.0797  – 2.809  – 
C. CTE (N=1,607) 
Earned Remedial Credit Hours Student Earned Any Remedial Credit  Second Year GPA (N=973) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  2.874** 1.571 1.437 0.104** 0.055 0.151 0.108 0.265 0.481 
  (1.195) (1.220) [-4.519;7.16] (0.045) (0.052) [-.105;.4] (0.219) (0.170) [-.327;1.286] 
Data Window (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All (+/-10) (+/-10) All 
Covariates & FEs Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N of Students 493 493 204 493 493 297 457 457 230 
Nonpara. bandwidth – – 4.32 – – 1067 – – 5.607 
Control outcome mean 4.811  – 0.305  – 2.169  – 
Notes: The vector of covariates includes the student-year-level measures of gender, race and ethnicity, disability status, ELL status, grade-level, year 
of exam, standardized Algebra I EOC score, dummies for whether a student took more than one exam in the same course or in multiple courses, 
and dummies for whether a student passed another exam. The first two columns of each panel represent local linear regressions local linear 
regressions with a bandwidth of ±10.   The nonparametric models (columns 3, 6, and 9) are calculated using a uniform (rectangular) kernel, linear 
polynomial of the assignment variable, and data driven-bandwidth selection procedure described by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014; 2015) 
and Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, & Titiunik (2017). The nonparametric estimates displayed are calculated using one common mean-squared error 
(MSE)-optimal bandwidth selector for the RD treatment effect estimator. Robust 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Standard errors 
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Figure 2 
McCrary test for the Full Sample, Math, and CTE 
 




Notes: All three graphs depict the McCrary (2008) test for discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable at the cutoff for challenge exam takers. The bin 
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Covariate balance in Algebra I EOC and White, Non-Hispanic for Full Sample, Math, and CTE 
 
I. Algebra I EOC Standardized Score 
 
    A. Full Sample                                B. Math            C. CTE 
     
 
II. Probability of White, Non-Hispanic 
 
     D. Full Sample                                E. Math            F. CTE 
   
 
 
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff using a rectangular kernel. N’s include Full 


















-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30


















-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30


















-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30





















-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30





















-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30





















-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30




Probability of enrolling in any college within a year of expected high school graduation, Full Sample 
 
 
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff 
using a rectangular kernel. Table 4 presents a range of parametric and nonparametric estimates of the discontinuities at 
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Figure 5 
Probability of enrolling in any college within a year of expected high school graduation, SDC 
Subgroups 
 




C. CTE    D. Plant Science 
 
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff 
using a rectangular kernel. Table 5 presents a range of parametric and nonparametric estimates of the discontinuities at 
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Figure 6 
Probability of enrolling at an in-state, public institution within a year of expected high school 
graduation 
 




C. CTE    D. Plant Science 
 
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff 
using a rectangular kernel. Tables 6 and 7 present a range of parametric and nonparametric estimates of the 
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Figure 7 
Probability of enrolling at an in-state, public within a year of expected high school graduation, by SDC Course Subgroup 
 
I. Public 4-Year 
A. Math          B. College Algebra         C. CTE       D. Plant Science 
 
 
II. Public 2-Year 
E. Math          F. College Algebra    G. CTE  H. Plant Science 
 
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff using a rectangular kernel. Table 7 presents a 




























































































































































First-year college performance, by THEC SDC Course Subgroup 
 
I. Credits Earned      II. Student Earned 30+ Credits 
        A. Math                B. CTE            C. Math                       D. CTE     
    
 
 III. Student Earned Any Remedial Credit                       IV. First Year GPA 
       E. Math             F. CTE            G. Math                      H. CTE     
    
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff using a rectangular kernel. Tables 9 and 10 
















































































































Probability of enrolling in college within two years of expected high school graduation, Math and 
CTE 
 
I. Math  




C. Unconditional on first year enrollment  D. Conditional on first year enrollment 
 
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff 
using a rectangular kernel. Table 11 presents a range of parametric and nonparametric estimates of the discontinuities at 
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Figure 10 
Second-year college performance, by THEC SDC Course Subgroup 
 
I. Credits Earned      II. Student Earned 60+ Credits 
      A. Math            B. CTE           C. Math                       D. CTE 
      
 
              III. Student Earned Any Remedial Credit                       IV. Second Year GPA 
      E. Math            F. CTE           G. Math                       H. CTE 
     
Notes: Solid lines represent fitted local linear regressions, without covariates, within the data window ±10 of the cutoff using a rectangular kernel. Tables 12 




















































































































CHAPTER 2:  EXCESS CREDIT HOUR POLICIES AT NORTH CAROLINA 
INSTITUTIONS: WHO PAYS THE SURCHARGE? 
 
1. Introduction 
 Over the last several decades, the average time it takes for a student to complete a college 
degree has risen steadily. In the 1972 cohort, 53 percent of bachelor’s degree (BA) earners graduated 
in four years or less with this number dropping to 39 percent in the 1992 cohort, and rising only 
slightly to 42 percent in the 2004 cohort (Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2012; Kramer, Holcomb, & 
Kelchen, 2018). This trend in increasing time-to-degree predominates at public colleges and 
universities, particularly less selective institutions. As evidence, while the mean time-to-degree 
decreased at highly selective privates from 4.31 to 4.20 years between the 1972 and 1992 cohorts, 
average time increased at top 50 public four-years from 4.49 to 4.66 years and from 4.49 to 4.93 
years for non-top 50 public four-years (Bound et al., 2012). This pattern is particularly noteworthy, 
given that the growth in time-to-degree over this period has coincided with a significant rise in the 
price of attending college.  
Adjusted for inflation, between 1976 and 2016, average published tuition and fees at public 
four-year institutions increased from $2,600 to $9,650 – an increase of 271 percent (Ma, Baum, 
Pender, & Welch, 2016). Although grant aid has also increased over this period, it has not kept pace 
with the out-of-pocket expenses that students pay. For example, the mean net price (total cost of 
attendance minus all aid) of attending a public four-year increased in real terms from $10,100 to 
$11,800 between 2000-2012 (NCES, 2014).42 By extending their time in college, students increase the 
overall cost of their diploma, paying tuition and fees for additional terms and for living expenses 
                                               
42 These net prices are for full-time, full-year undergraduates. “Aid” includes grants, loans, work-study, and other aid.  
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(Kelchen, Goldrick-Rab, & Hosch, 2017). They also forgo earnings in the labor market, potentially 
increasing the opportunity cost of their college investment (Turner, 2004). 
Together, the growth in time-to-degree and rise in cost of college attendance likely help to 
explain part of the growing debt burden students face. In 2015, the average debtor held $30,100 
upon graduating college, an increase of 28 percent from the mean debt – $23,450 – owed in 2008 
(Cochrane & Cheng, 2016; TICAS, 2014). Considering that students from low-income households 
and underrepresented groups take longer to complete (Bowen, Chingos, McPherson, 2009), the 
costs of longer college tenure may be disproportionately shouldered by those who can least afford it. 
Recent studies suggest that this is the case. Black students, especially those from low-to-moderate 
income households, hold significantly more debt than their White peers upon graduating (Addo, 
Houle, & Simon, 2016; Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016).43 While the explicit connection between time-
to-degree and pervasive socioeconomic gaps in debt burdens has not been established, multiple 
studies link Black student debt to attendance at for-profit and underfunded public institutions. 
These institutions have lower student completion rates, longer time-to-degree, and serve a 
disproportionate share of low-income and minority students in general.  
Beyond the individual student, increased time to completion may also have important effects 
at the institution- and state- level. As students take longer to complete, institutions that have not 
accounted for the volume of continuing students might be forced to distribute fewer resources per 
student (e.g., have larger class sizes, fewer academic programs, etc.). Relatedly, at capacity-
constrained institutions, continuing students may crowd out the supply of incoming or returning 
students by taking up scarce course seats (Bound & Turner, 2007). These consequences may be 
most significant at public colleges and universities, who face an additional financial burden. At these 
                                               
43 Moreover, these disparities in student debt burdens appear to grow larger over time, with the Black-White debt gap 
tripling in size from $7,400 to $25,000 within only four years post-graduation (Li & Scott-Clayton, 2016). 
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institutions, students bear only a fraction of a course’s true cost – with federal, state, and 
institutional support subsidizing the rest (Kane, Orzag, & Gunter, 2003). Longer time-to-degree may 
put additional strains on institution and governmental finances. Finally, students extending their time 
to diploma delay entry into the workforce, and aggregated at a large scale, this may slow the growth 
in the pool of college-educated workers and affect the larger economy (Scott-Clayton, 2012; Turner, 
2004).  
In recent years, states have begun developing targeted policies aimed at addressing stagnant 
completion rates and increased time-to-degree. One policy that has garnered increasing attention by 
state legislatures and education agencies is the adoption of excess credit hour (ECH) policies. So far, 
a handful of states – including North Carolina – have implemented these policies as a way to 
discourage students at public institutions from taking too many credits and to encourage timely 
graduation (Grove, 2007). ECH policies assess a tuition surcharge for credits taken beyond a 
predetermined cutoff, ranging from between 110 and 150 percent of a degree’s usual required credits 
(Kramer, Holcomb, & Kelchen, 2018).44  If working as intended, proponents of these policies argue 
that they ensure states fund public colleges and universities efficiently while improving timely 
student completion.  
However, a recent study conducted by Kramer et al. (2018) finds that these intended effects 
do not appear to be borne out in the states that have adopted ECH policies. Using a difference-in-
differences (DD) framework that exploits variations in policy implementation across state and time, 
they find that ECH policies fail to bolster degree attainment or curtail time-to-degree. However, 
these policies do increase median student debt, shifting the costs of education from the state to the 
individual. Kramer and others make an important first step towards understanding the consequences 
                                               
44 A typical degree requires between 120-130 total credit hours. Some states, like North Carolina, have joint criteria for 
tuition surcharge assessment where a student must have been enrolled for more than a certain number of semesters and 
exceeded the credit-hour threshold.  
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of ECH policies on a broad scale using institution-level data. Still, without individual-level data, they 
are unable to know precisely which students are assessed a surcharge, and how they may differ from 
their peers along demographic dimensions. They are also unable to explore how more intermediate 
college performance and behavior measures may relate to a students’ likelihood of being assessed a 
surcharge. Aspects like students’ choice of major, frequency of failing or repeating courses, and 
financial aid funding – to name a few – may influence their trajectory towards an eventual surcharge 
penalty. To my knowledge, no prior work has looked specifically at the types of students most 
affected by these surcharge policies. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive picture of which students are most 
likely to be affected by excess credit hour policies as well as the role that early and intermediate 
college behaviors may play in increasing (or decreasing) the probability a student is assessed a 
surcharge. I use individual, student-level data from four public four-year colleges in the University of 
North Carolina (UNC) system, for students entering college from Fall 2006 through Fall 2009 to 
look specifically at which pre-college baseline characteristics are correlated with surcharge incidence. 
In addition, I probe what early college performance measures and behaviors may predict whether a 
student eventually is assessed the tuition surcharge. The first state to formally adopt an excess credit 
hour policy in 1994, North Carolina’s surcharge policy applies to students at all 16 constituent45 
UNC institutions and levies a 50 percent fee on tuition for students who exceed both a credit- and a 
time-limit. Students are only assessed the tuition surcharge if they exceed both (i)140 total credit 
hours and (ii) 8 regular (fall and spring) terms on campus.  
Importantly, this paper distinguishes between students who simply have a longer time-to-
degree and those who are assessed the surcharge, because the latter also exceed 140 credit hours – 
                                               
45 Technically, there are 17 total institutions part of the University of North Carolina System. However, the North 
Carolina School of Science and Mathematics is a special two-year, public residential high school that serves grades eleven 
and twelve only. It is not a postsecondary institution affected by the tuition surcharge policy. 
 101 
representing approximately 110 percent of a typical degree’s required credits. Prior studies have 
examined the factors related to extended time-to-degree and reduced completion outcomes, finding 
that college quality and institutional resources explain much of the gaps in graduation outcomes 
between institutions (Bound et al., 2012; Bound & Turner, 2007). Within a given institution, males, 
racial and ethnic minorities, and students from low-income households are less likely to graduate in 
four years or less compared to their peers (Bowen et al., 2010; DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 
2006). Though “surcharge” students in my study exhibit similar traits, they also differ from simply 
“delayed” students along many notable dimensions. These differences will be important for 
policymakers and higher education officials to consider as they contemplate the role of excess credit 
hour policies and their effects on individual students.  
This paper also arrives at a time at a time when policymakers in North Carolina are 
considering eliminating the tuition surcharge policy altogether. In March of 2019, three state 
senators introduced a bill that would do exactly that, claiming the policy disproportionately affects 
veterans, older students, and community college transfer students (Raleigh News and Observer, March 
13, 2019). However, in proposing this change, the bill’s sponsors provided no research or data to 
back up their claim that students of these backgrounds were more likely to be assessed the 
surcharge. This disconnect between policymakers’ beliefs and supported research-based evidence 
highlights the significance of this paper. By providing an evidence-based picture of which students 
are more likely to be assessed the surcharge, it can better inform stakeholders as they make decisions 
regarding the implementation of surcharge policies.   
I find that compared to their otherwise similar peers, Black and Hispanic males with lower 
measures of pre-college achievement (high school GPA, SAT score) are more likely to be assessed 
the surcharge. However, these immutable characteristics only tell part of the story. Surcharge 
students are also much more likely to major in a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, & Math) 
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field, particularly engineering and are more likely to formally commit to a degree path at later point 
in college. Still, whether in a STEM major or not, Surcharge students attempt fewer per-term credit 
hours and fail to earn credits at the rate of their peers, even with a comparatively lower course load 
each term. Meanwhile, they are much more likely to finance their education with federal grant aid, an 
indication that they may be economically more disadvantaged than many of their peers.  
In many ways, the types of students disproportionately affected by UNC’s surcharge policy 
resemble the kinds of students that institutions, governments, and federal agencies like the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are simultaneously working 
hard to support with respect to college completion and timely degree. These students are the targets 
of specific funding and policy initiatives aimed to increase representation of underrepresented 
groups in STEM and among the college-educated population more broadly. This perhaps represents 
an unintended consequence of the surcharge policy and one that should be considered in tandem 
with these policies’ effects on student debt burden.  In deliberating the place and purpose of North 
Carolina’s surcharge policy in future years, stakeholders should reconsider the blanket nature of the 
policy and ways that it may be amended so that it more effective in meeting its primary aims.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses relevant background 
literature, while section three explains North Carolina’s tuition surcharge policy in more detail. 
Section four details the nature of my data, how surcharge students are identified, and the process for 
selecting relevant comparison groups. Section five examines which baseline demographic 
characteristics are predictive of students being assessed the surcharge. Section six investigates the 
time-varying behaviors of students, particularly early in their college tenures, and how differences 
between surcharge students and their peers may relate to why they ultimately face an additional fee. 
Section seven ties together the findings of sections five and six to develop a more comprehensive 
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picture of the factors predictive of surcharge incidence. Section eight notes the limitations of this 
study, and section nine discusses the implications of my findings.  
2. Background literature 
2.1 Tuition, completion, and time-to-degree 
 Much of the literature examining time-to-degree and completion has concentrated on the 
role of tuition and fees. As Kramer et al. (2018) note in their paper, most of this recent literature has 
emerged from Europe, where tuition and/or fees have been introduced in some education markets 
that previously had no – or very low – tuition rates relative to US institutions. This body of work 
finds that an increase in tuition fees, even by a small amount significantly reduces time-to-degree and 
decreases the probability of late graduation (Bruckmeier, Fischer, & Wiggins, 2015; Garibaldi, 
Giavazzi, Ichino, & Rettore, 2011). These European studies also find that financial incentives used 
to reward students for on-time completion are similarly notably effective at reducing delayed 
graduation (Gunnes, Kirkebøen, & Rønning, 2013) and total credit hours completed by high-ability 
students (Leuven, Oosterbeek, & van der Kaauw, 2010). 
 Within the US, researchers have also examined the role of tuition pricing on student 
completion, though the focus has mostly been on college enrollment and persistence. Hemelt and 
Marcotte (2011) use institution-level data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS) to examine how tuition increases affect student enrollment. Looking at years 1991 through 
2006 – a period of rapid tuition growth – they find that a $100 increase in tuition and fees leads to a 
decline in enrollment of about 0.25 percent. They note that this estimate is quite similar to the 
tuition elasticities found from prior work focused on the 1980s and 1990s (Kane, 1995; Heller, 
1996). In addition, they find that a similar price increase significantly reduced the number of credit 
hours students completed. For both outcomes, the effects of tuition increases were most substantial 
at research active, doctoral-granting publics universities.  
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In a recent NBER paper, Deming and Walters (2017) probe the effect of tuition on 
enrollment and degree completion further by using an instrumental variables approach as a way of 
disentangling changes in tuition from changes in spending – trends that often happen 
simultaneously. They focus on non-selective public two-year and four-year institutions between 1990 
and 2013 and find evidence that spending changes – not tuition changes – have large causal impacts 
on enrollment and degree completion. These results hold across institution selectivity levels and 
diploma types. Deming and Walters caution that government programs aimed at reducing college 
costs by reducing per-student spending will have large, negative downstream effects on educational 
attainment; spending cuts erode instruction and academic support. Moreover, these spending 
changes appear to affect currently enrolled students, suggesting that persistence (an indication of 
time-to-degree) is also negatively impacted by cuts in institutional spending. Meanwhile, tuition 
changes appear to have no effect on student persistence. In general, these findings support earlier 
work that suggests student persistence is less affected by tuition increases than by changes in 
financial aid (Kramer et al., 2018; Paulsen & St John, 1997; St John, 1990).  
2.2 The role of financial aid  
A slew of recent work has also examined the role of both need-based and merit-based 
financial aid in promoting student time-to-degree and completion. Page, Kehoe, Castleman, and 
Sahadewo (2017) exploit selection criteria cutoffs to examine the impact of the Dell Scholars 
Program on a suite of college performance outcomes. The program targets low-income and first-
generation students who intend to pursue a bachelor’s degree. In addition to a generous financial aid 
package, scholars receive a suite of ongoing college supports. The authors find that the scholarship 
receipt substantially boosted college persistence and BA degree attainment. Relative to their non-
scholar peers, scholars were 6-10 percentage points more likely to graduate in four years and 9-13 
percentage points more likely to graduate in six years. Goldrick-Rab, Harris, Kelchen, and Benson 
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(2016) find similar positive effects of need-based aid on measures of persistence and completion in a 
randomized evaluation of the Wisconsin Scholars Grant program. Scholars are Pell-eligible, first-year 
students who have already enrolled at a Wisconsin four-year institution, and they have the 
opportunity to renew the $3,500-per year grant up to five times. They find that this offered funding 
increased on-time BA attainment by 5 percentage points (from 16 to 21 percent) and increased 
credit accumulation for later cohorts of students.  
Other scholars have looked at the role of merit-based initiatives, inclusive of performance-
based criteria, though most of these studies have focused predominantly on the enrollment margin 
(Bruce & Carruthers, 2014; Dynarski, 2004). Scott-Clayton (2011) offers an exception in her study of 
West Virginia’s PROMISE program. The program offers free tuition, renewed annually, to students 
who maintain a minimum GPA and course credit load. Using an RD framework that exploits 
discontinuities in the eligibility formula, she finds that this merit-based aid program increases overall 
BA completion and reduces time-to-degree significantly (between 4.5 and 6.5 percentage points). 
Angrist, Lang, and Oreopolous (2009) also find positive effects of performance-based financial 
scholarships on GPA and credit accumulation. Though, these effects were only experienced by 
females and were strongest for students who received both financial incentives and the offer of 
academic support services. Altogether, the findings from these merit-based financial aid studies 
suggest that pecuniary incentives attached to performance criteria may help induce students to 
persist at a steady rate towards eventual degree completion.  
2.3 Excess credit hour policies 
In their own way, excess credit hour policies aim to incentivize students to complete a 
college degree in a timely fashion. However, they depart from the typical aid-based interventions 
that often take shape as proverbial “carrots”, rewarding students for maintaining desired college 
benchmarks. Rather, excess credit our policies operate more as “sticks”, penalizing students for 
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taking too long to graduate or accruing surplus or unnecessary credit hours. These policies operate 
by levying an additional fee on tuition – between 25 percent and 100 percent – for students who 
exceed a certain credit hour threshold (typically between 110 percent and 150 percent of a degree’s 
usual required credits). These surcharge policies often apply to students attending both public two-
year and four-year institutions.46 Currently, only nine states47 have enacted excess credit hour 
policies, though other states have contemplated taking similar measures in the face of dwindling 
state funds available for postsecondary education (Grove, 2007).   
Though several states have had these policies in place for a decade or so, very little empirical 
work has evaluated the effect of these surcharge policies on student completion. Are these policies 
working as intended by improving four-year graduation rates and/or completion rates? Kramer and 
colleagues (2018) are the first scholars to conduct a systematic evaluation of these programs in order 
to answer this question. Using a DD strategy and multiple control groups, they use institution-level 
data from IPEDS and the College Scorecard to examine the effect of excess credit hour policies at 
public four-year institutions from 2000 to 2013. They find that, broadly, excess credit hour policy 
adoption does not appear to affect total degrees produced or time-to-degree, measured as either the 
four-year or six-year graduation rate.48  This null effect is despite the fact that tuition surcharges are 
as much as 30 times bigger than the $100 tuition increases reported in prior work to affect 
completion and course-taking behaviors. 
                                               
46 Although, in North Carolina, only students attending one of the 16 University of North Carolina System Institutions 
are subjected. All of these institutions are public four-year institutions. Public two-year institutions are not affected by 
the state’s tuition surcharge policy.  
 
47 These states and their fall implementation years are: Arizona (2007), Florida (2009), Massachusetts (1999), Nevada 
(2014), North Carolina (1994), Texas (1999), Utah (2013), Virginia (2006), and Wisconsin (2004). 
 
48 They do find a small, statistically significant positive effect on the six-year graduation rate for Hispanics of 2.5 to 3.4 
percent and a statistically significant negative effect on the six-year graduation rate for Black, non-Hispanic students of 
3.5 to 4.2 percent. 
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 Interested in how tuition surcharge policies may affect students in other, perhaps 
unintended ways, Kramer et al. also estimate their effect on student debt levels. They find that state-
level policy adoption has a strong and robust effect on student debt levels four years after adoption 
(an increase between 5.7 to 7.2 percent). This effect is concentrated among institutions serving low- 
and middle-income students, first-generation students, Pell recipients, and non-completers. 
Moreover, the authors find that students enrolled in bachelor’s degree-granting institutions (as 
opposed to master’s, and doctoral-granting) were most impacted, experiencing a median debt 
increase between 12 and 15 percent. The authors believe these differential effects by institution type 
can be explained by the reduced access to institutional aid that students at bachelor’s-granting 
institutions have relative to their peers at more prestigious doctoral-granting institutions. Taken 
together, Kramer and colleagues attribute their findings – a null effect on time-to-degree and 
positive effect on student debt – to the relatively low information students have about excess credit 
hour policies. Students only feel the consequences of these surcharges late into their college tenures 
and face little incentive to adjust their course progression or academic plans at an earlier point as a 
means of avoiding the surcharge penalty later.  
As the first study to investigate the impact of these increasingly relevant policies, Kramer et 
al. make an important contribution to the literature by highlighting how excess credit hour policies 
work (or fail to) in intended and unintended ways. Still, institution-level data only allows them to 
observe aggregate effects, without understanding how the tuition surcharge operates at the 
individual, student-level. Data limitations prevent them from developing a full picture of who is 
often impacted by surcharge policies and what early college behaviors may affect a student’s 
likelihood of being assessed the surcharge later. Their aggregated estimates, while informative from a 
broad policy perspective, likely obscure variation by key subgroups. Understanding the differential 
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effect of excess credit hour policies on diverse student groups is another important aspect of 
evaluating the efficacy and impact of excess credit hour policies.      
Using individual, student-level data on students entering four public four-year UNC System 
institutions between Fall 2006 and Fall 2009, I complement the work of Kramer and colleagues by 
examining how excess credit hour policies operate at the micro-level. At North Carolina institutions, 
a 50 percent surcharge is levied at the 140-credit threshold only for students who have also exceeded 
8 regular terms on campus. The analytic goals of this paper are descriptive in nature, dedicated to 
characterizing which students are most likely to be assessed the tuition surcharge. Moreover, I 
observe more intermediate student-level performance and behavior measures such as credit 
accumulation and course-taking patterns as a way of probing how a student’s early college 
experiences may also help predict their likelihood of surcharge incidence, even after controlling for 
immutable baseline characteristics.  
As states contemplate keeping or expanding these policies, policymakers should not only be 
aware of their net effect, but also which students are most likely to experience these excess credit 
hour penalties. This is especially important given the documented disparities in completion, time-to-
degree, and student debt between socioeconomic groups. What role do tuition surcharge policies 
play, if at all, in perpetuating these gaps? More specifically, my two primary research questions are: 
(1) Which students are most likely to be assessed the surcharge based on pre-college, 
baseline demographic and high school achievement variables? 
 
(2) How do the early postsecondary experiences of Surcharge students differ from their 
peers in measures of college performance and student decision-making? In other words, how 
do patterns of credit accumulation, major choice, financial aid receipt, etc. predict surcharge 
incidence? 
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3. North Carolina tuition surcharge policy 
 In 1992, the North Carolina General Assembly directed the UNC Board of Governors to 
develop and enact a process for charging students a 25 percent surcharge on tuition for any credit 
hours taken in excess of 140 for a single, four-year degree program requiring no more than 128 
credit hours. The policy formally went into effect in Fall 1994 at all 16 constituent UNC institutions 
and was formally codified into state law in 2009 as G.S. 116-143.7.49 The codified tuition surcharge 
policy mirrored the Board of Governor’s policy while also further clarifying how the surcharge was 
to be implemented. It also mandated that the surcharge be increased from 25 percent to 50 percent 
of tuition starting in Fall 2010.   
Importantly, the surcharge is only officially assessed if a student exceeds the credit-hour 
threshold as well as 8 regular term semesters (fall and spring terms, or equivalently four years).50 
Furthermore, not all credit hours count towards the 140-threshold. Credit hours that do count 
towards the surcharge include regular session degree-creditable courses, repeated courses, failed 
courses, courses dropped after the last official “add/drop date”, and credits that are accepted for 
transfer from other institutions.51 Credits that are omitted from the surcharge calculation include 
                                               
49 The System’s constituent university institutions are: Appalachian State University (ASU); Elizabeth City State 
University (ECSU); East Carolina University (ECU); Fayetteville State University (FSU); North Carolina Agricultural & 
Technical State University (NCA&T); North Carolina Central University (NCCU); North Carolina State University 
(NCSU); UNC Asheville (UNCA); UNC-Chapel Hill (UNCCH); UNC Charlotte (UNCC); UNC Greensboro (UNCG); 
UNC Pembroke (UNCP); UNC School of the Arts (UNCSA); UNC Wilmington (UNCW); Western Carolina University 
(WCU); and Winston-Salem State University (WSSU). 
 
50 For students who pursue a 5-year program approved by the Board of Governors or a 4-year program that requires 
more than 128 credit hours, the surcharge is levied on credit hours exceeding 110 percent of total credits needed to 
complete the degree. Similarly, for students who pursue a double major, the surcharge is levied on credit hours 
exceeding 110 percent of the minimum number of additional hours required to obtain the second degree. Double majors 
and students pursuing a 4-year degree requiring more than 128 hours must also be enrolled for more than 8 regular 
semesters (4 years) to be levied the surcharge, while 5-year degree pursuers must be enrolled for more than 10 regular 
semesters (5 years). 
 
51 According to information outlined on registrar websites, several UNC institutions do not always count transfer credits 
from out-of-state or private institutions towards the surcharge threshold. However, correspondence with several 
registrars’ offices confirmed that this change in handling of transfer credits occurred for cohorts entering after Fall 2009 
– my last cohort of interest.  
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The College Board’s Advanced Placement (AP), College-Level Examination Program (CLEP) 
exams, institutional advanced placement or course validation, and extension programs (e.g., those 
taken through distance, or online, platforms). In addition, any college credit earned as a high school 
student does not count towards the threshold. Finally, summer term credit hours – whether taken at 
a UNC institution or another institution – are also excluded from the surcharge calculation. 
For students who exceed both the credit-hour and time-limit caps, the surcharge is imposed 
on surcharge-eligible hours exceeding the 140-threshold in the current semester and any subsequent 
semesters. The surcharge is only assessed on tuition and not on required fees. The 2009 statute 
established criteria under which students could waive the surcharge. However, the waiver process is 
stringent, requiring students to submit a Tuition Surcharge Waiver Request Form and all relevant 
documentation to a review committee within 30 business days of receiving the semester’s tuition bill 
(with the surcharge applied). The committee may only waive the surcharge if a student demonstrates 
that their education has been disrupted by a military service obligation, a serious medical debilitation, 
a short-term or long-term disability, or an extraordinary hardship (FRD, 2012). Though I do not 
have a precise estimate of the proportion of students systemwide who request and successfully 
obtain a surcharge waiver, personal communication with registrar personnel at the institutions in my 
study reveal that the numbers are low. Typically, ten percent of surcharge students submit a waiver 
request and about three to four percent are approved.52  
Concurrent with the surcharge increase from 25 to 50 percent, the North Carolina General 
Assembly instructed its Fiscal Research Division to author a legislative report examining the effect 
of the 25-percentage point jump on a host of outcomes. Outcomes of interest included average 
number of credit hours attempted, number of students assessed, time-to-degree, tuition revenues 
generated, and the methods by which member institutions inform students they are approaching the 
                                               
52 Personal communication A. Paige, 1/2019.  
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credit hour limit (FRD, 2012). This brief report summarized means for each outcome, aggregated 
across all 16 UNC institutions and at the individual institution-level, when available. The report 
noted a small decline in mean aggregate credit hours attempted (from 140.4 to 137.1) as well as a 
small decline in mean semesters-to-degree between 2007-08 and 2011-12 (9.72 to 9.59 total 
semesters). Not only are these changes small, but the authors do not conduct any statistical analyses 
to investigate whether they are in fact related to the jump in the surcharge fee or to other factors 
that may have changed over time as well, such as the composition of students attending UNC 
institutions.  
 The legislative report also finds that total tuition revenues increased over this period, 
coinciding with the jump from 25 to 50 percent. At the end of fiscal year 2008, surcharge revenue 
was approximately $1.5 million. By the end of fiscal year 2012, revenue had increased to $5 million. 
Finally, the report noted that there is wide variation across institutions in the number of students 
assessed a surcharge and how students are informed they are approaching the threshold. Though all 
institutions informed students of the surcharge policy via course catalogs and campus websites, not 
all went beyond these basic measures during this time period. Eleven of the sixteen schools 
informed students of the policy at orientation sessions for new students, and only ten used academic 
advisors to educate students about the policy. While providing some basic information about the 
policy over a short timeframe and at an aggregate level, this brief does not conduct any rigorous 
statistical analyses nor probe how the surcharge operates at the individual, student-level. It does not 
examine the demographic or scholastic characteristics of surcharge students, nor investigate how 
early college choices and experiences may influence students’ likelihood of being assessed the 




4. Data and analytic sample 
4.1 Data 
The University of North Carolina-General Administration (UNC-GA) Data & Analytics 
office provided data for this study. This office works with institutional research departments across 
all 16 UNC higher education institutions to collect student, course, facilities, personnel, financial aid, 
and other data. These data are used to conduct analyses relevant for state and federal reporting 
standards as well as issuing reports to UNC’s Board of Governors. In this study, I utilize student-
level, term-level, and course-level data. Static, student-level data refer to demographic characteristics 
such as gender, race and ethnicity, citizenship status, NC residency status (in-state or out-of-state), 
high school GPA, and SAT score. Student-level data also include graduation information such as 
date, degree area, and total credits earned at graduation. They also identify whether a student 
transferred from another institution and the number of transfer credits accepted for transfer. The 
term-level data include choice of major, number and type of credits attempted, and source of 
financial aid funding (federal, private, etc.) by each registered fall, spring, summer I, or summer II 
term. Finally, course-level records describe the courses students take each registered term, the major 
courses are affiliated with, and how students perform in each course – including whether they fail to 
complete a course or withdraw past the drop deadline. 
This analysis focuses on the tuition surcharge incidence at four UNC institutions: (1) East 
Carolina University (ECU), (2) North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
(NCA&T), (3) North Carolina State University (NCSU), and the (4) University of North Carolina-
Charlotte (UNCC). A thorough examination of surcharge incidence at all 16 constituent institutions 
was beyond the scope of this work. Thus, this paper aims to serve more as an initial pilot study, 
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hoping to inform future analyses that delve into the surcharge policy systemwide. In addition, I 
focus on students attempting a four-year degree program, requiring no more than 128 credit hours.53 
I selected these four institutions in particular because, according to the 2012 Fiscal Research 
Division report, they have among the highest number of students assessed a tuition surcharge over 
the semesters reported in the study, Fall 2007 through Spring 2012 (FRD, 2012).54 Figure 1 
duplicates the legislative report’s Figure 4, showing the counts of students assessed the surcharge by 
each fall and spring term.  Together, these four institutions comprise approximately 45 percent of all 
per-semester students assessed a tuition surcharge over the five-year (ten-term) period. UNCC 
averages the largest number of surcharge students assessed per semester across all 16 schools, at 
roughly 657 students per semester. The mean surcharge breakdown for the other three institutions is 
580 students at NCA&T, 389 students at ECU, and 356 students at NCSU.55 Comparatively, the 
number of students assessed the surcharge over the same period averages a little over 160 at UNC-
Asheville, UNC-Pembroke, and UNC-Wilmington. At UNC-Chapel Hill, the state’s flagship 
institution, the per-semester mean is only 25 students.56 This variance in per-semester surcharge 
incidence between institutions is reflective of the variation they exhibit in terms of student 
                                               
53 UNCC has a five-year Architecture degree that is not approved by the Board of Governors. I was unable to verify any 
other five-year BA programs formally approved by the Board of Governors. Both UNCC and NCSU offer accelerated 
bachelor/master’s degrees in certain fields, including engineering, that can be completed in five years. Though, I am 
unable to tell from the data if students are enrolled in these programs. Still, acceptance into the programs is very 
competitive, often requiring students to enter as first-time freshmen, meet stringent academic requirements, maintain a 
high college GPA, and the receive robust support from their BA departments to be admitted to the graduate portion of 
the program. For all these reasons, the proportion of students likely to be enrolled in these programs within my analytic 
sample is small. Moreover, given the background characteristics of Surcharge students, the likelihood that a meaningful 
number of them qualify for these accelerated opportunities is reasonably low.  
 
54 These four institutions also generate the most surcharge revenue, constituting approximately half of all revenues 
between Fall 2007 and Spring 2012. 
 
55 NCA&T does not have a record for the number of students assessed in Spring 2008, attenuating its per-semester 
average using these calculations. 
 
56 At the UNC School of the Arts, the surcharge incidence is essentially zero because the coursework for their unique 
degree programs is highly proscribed (FRD, 2012).  
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populations, academic programs, and institutional resources, among other things. It also likely 
highlights institutional differences in how students are informed about the surcharge policy and how 
the waiver is process is applied, with some schools making more extensive efforts to educate 
students about the surcharge and/or issue waivers more generously.57   
 In addition to maintaining a narrow institutional focus, I also restrict my analyses to cohorts 
of students who enter an institution between Fall 2006 and Fall 2009. Cohorts entering before 2006 
do not have complete information for many key demographic and course-related variables. The 
choice of the Fall 2009 cohort as an upper bound is to ensure that I follow all of my cohorts over 
the same length of time. The UNC-GA tracks individual students for up to six years after they enter 
a UNC institution, whether as first-time freshmen or as transfer students. The Fall 2009 cohort is 
the latest one to have complete information for students up to six years after they enroll, if they are 
still enrolled. Figure 2 shows the on-time progression of cohorts in my sample and the years over 
which I track them. It also shows the timing of the surcharge increase from 25 to 50 percent in 
2010. Note that this jump was an across-the-board increase, meaning that it applied equally to all 
students regardless of their entering cohort year. Cohorts were not “grandfathered in” with a set 
surcharge rate.  The lightly-shaded boxes indicate years in which students would not be eligible for 
the surcharge (at or below four years or eight regular terms), while the darkly-shaded boxes indicate 
when students are eligible to be assessed the surcharge if they also exceed 140 credit hours. Figure 2 
illustrates that all four cohorts in my analysis would be subjected to a 50 percent surcharge rate in 
the term they are first eligible to be assessed the surcharge (regular term nine or year five).   
                                               
57 The 2012 Fiscal Research Division report also discussed differences in how institutions informed students they were 
approaching the surcharge, finding the practices to vary significantly. Out of the four institutions in my analysis, only 
NCA&T actually informed students they were at risk of the surcharge once they had attempted 94 credit hours. One of 
the report’s recommended policy changes was for the UNC system to implement a uniform practice across campuses, 
though I do not know whether this advice was followed. As for differences in surcharge waivers, personnel in UNCCH’s 
Registrar Office confirmed that the few students who do pass the credit- and time-limit caps often are successful at 
obtaining waivers, but that this is unique to the Chapel Hill campus, given its academic caliber, reputation, and 
institutional resources.  
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4.2 Analytic sample institutions and all UNC system institutions   
While not wholly representative of the institution types or academic experiences of all 
constituent UNC institutions, the four institutions selected for my analysis do embody many aspects 
of North Carolina’s public higher education landscape. Table 1 provides institution-level summary 
statistics for a handful of key dimensions, highlighting both the degree to which these four 
institutions are representative of all UNC system institutions as well as the diversity exhibit with 
regards to students served and institutional resources. The basic means are generated from the 
Integrated Education Postsecondary Database System (IPEDS) for various years between 2006 and 
2014. Column 1 summarizes information for 15 of 16 constituent schools in the UNC system for 
comparison (omitting the UNC School of the Arts due to its highly specialized and proscribed 
curriculum). Column 2 summarizes means across four institutions in my analytic sample, while 
columns 3 through 6 highlight individual institutional means for ECU, NCA&T, NCSU, and 
UNCC, respectively.  
The means in columns 1 and 2 reveal that, along many dimensions, the institutions in my 
analytic sample reflect the mean institution in the UNC system. This is particularly the case along the 
dimensions of race/ethnicity composition, student scores on the SAT and ACT, real mean financial 
aid awarded, and graduation rate. The four institutions I examine do, however, have an average 
student enrollment (both total and undergraduate) that is about 7,000-9,000 more than the 
institution-wide mean. Aggregated together, the institutions in my analytic sample also have a lower 
proportion of full-time, first-time undergraduates who are awarded aid – particularly federal aid, 
state aid, and Pell grants – compared to the average UNC institution.  
Still, column 2 masks the variation between institutions in my sample along the same 
dimensions. These four schools represent a diverse swath of institutional selectively levels as 
exhibited by the differences in Carnegie Classification, admission rates, and college entrance exam 
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scores of entering students (SAT and ACT). The student bodies of these institutions also vary from 
one another along race and ethnicity lines, enrollment capacity, graduation rates, and financial aid 
receipt.58 They also vary in terms of cost as noted by the differences in real in-state and real out-of-
state semester tuition rates across campuses.  
Though the UNC Surcharge Policy acts proportionally, levying the same relative 50 percent 
penalty on tuition across all UNC campuses, the absolute cost of the surcharge is much greater for 
some depending on which institution they attend and their residency status. As an example of the 
wide variation in absolute cost, an out-of-state surcharge student at NCSU could expect to pay up to 
$9,853 in additional per-term tuition while an in-state student at NCA&T could expect to pay up to 
$1,556 in additional per-term tuition with the 50 percent fee in place.59 All together, these differences 
in institutional resources and student bodies may relate to differences in how the surcharge policy is 
experienced by students on each campus. It will be important to account for institution selection 
when looking at student characteristics most correlated with surcharge incidence.  
4.3 Identifying surcharge students and relevant comparison groups 
Table 2 shows the number of unique students by institution and entering cohort in the 
original UNC-GA data I receive. The 73,386 students are fairly evenly distributed across all four 
entering cohorts, though they are not evenly distributed across the four institutions. Students 
attending ECU and NCSU comprise about 31 percent of all students, while UNCC students 
comprise 27 percent and NCA&T students only comprise 12 percent of the original sample of 
students. From this original set of 73,386 observations, I identify surcharge students and peers most 
appropriate to serve as a comparison in the descriptive analyses to follow. 
                                               
58 NCA&T is designated an Historically Black College Research University (HBCU).  
 
59 Authors’ calculations using means from Table 1. These tuition means are taken for the years 2010-2014 because these 
represent the years that students in the cohorts I track would first be assessed the tuition surcharge. All dollar amounts 
are in real 2015 dollars. 
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 Unfortunately, the UNC-GA does not collect information about which students are assessed 
the tuition surcharge or in which term the charge takes effect for each student. Though individual 
institutions within the UNC system maintain their own record of these students, they are not 
required to provide that information to the UNC-GA for reporting purposes. Without a clear 
variable identifying who faces a surcharge and when, I identify students as “surcharge eligible” by 
using attempted credit hour records at the term-level as well as counts of total regular terms students 
remain enrolled. I define students as surcharge eligible (henceforth, just Surcharge students) if they 
both (1) attempt a total number of credit hours in excess of 140, and if (2) they enroll for more than 
eight regular session (fall or spring) terms over the six-year period they are tracked. As a final 
criterion, these students must also be pursuing a single four-year degree program.60  
Regarding (1), recall that not all credit hour types count towards the tuition surcharge credit 
threshold (e.g., summer term hours, AP hours, extension hours, etc.) Therefore, to classify 
Surcharge students along the credit dimension, I only count attempted credit hours taken by 
students in-residence (on campus) in fall and spring semesters, in addition to any transfer credits. If a 
student exceeds 140 “surcharge-relevant” attempted hours over the time they are enrolled, they meet 
the first criteria for being assessed the surcharge. 61 They meet criteria (2) above if they remain 
enrolled at a UNC institution for nine or more fall/spring terms – not including any terms they may 
have been enrolled at a transfer institution. If a student meets both criteria (1) and (2), I flag them as 
Surcharge students and also flag the first term – and any subsequent terms – where a student meets 
these joint criteria. This method of identifying Surcharge students is likely to overestimate the total 
number of actual Surcharge students, given that some students exceeding both the credit- and time-
                                               
60 I address the issue of students who pursue two majors or two degrees below. 
 
61 Please note that some students will have attempted a total number of credits – inclusive of all credit types – that 
exceeds the number of surcharge-relevant credit hours. I consider these other credit hour types below. 
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limits will successfully navigate the waiver process. However, as noted above, the waiver process is 
highly regimented, and only a small proportion (3-4 percent) have their waivers approved at the four 
institutions in my study. 
After flagging Surcharge students using the procedure outlined above, I next turn my 
attention to all the students who do not hit the surcharge either by not meeting criterion (1), or not 
meeting criterion (2), or not meeting either criterion jointly. Because the purpose of this paper is to 
understand how students who are assessed the tuition surcharge differ from their peers, determining 
which peers are the most relevant for comparison purposes is an important step. To create a valid 
set of comparison groups, I start by restricting my sample to only those students who attempt a 
minimum of 120 surcharge-relevant credit hours over the six-year period they are tracked. A lower 
bound of 120 was chosen because nearly all degree programs offered at the institutions in my 
sample require students to earn 120-128 credits. This restriction drops 57 percent of students from 
the original sample of 73,386, shrinking the sample to 31,817 students.62 
In addition to establishing a lower bound on credits attempted, I also impose a lower bound 
on the number of regular session terms a student is enrolled, keeping only students who appear in 
residence for four terms or more (eliminating 309 students). Students who attempt 120 or more 
surcharge-relevant credits in fewer than four terms are not typical students.  I also right-censor the 
data by only keeping students who attempt 185 or fewer surcharge-relevant credit hours.  This 
eliminates 264 additional students, and gets rid of students who attempt an excessively high number 
of credits and who are likely to differ from their peers in many observable and unobservable ways.63 
                                               
62 This restriction disproportionately drops those students who earn college credit while in high school (2,054 of the 
3,009 students or 68 percent). However, this group of students is unlikely to serve as a strong comparison group for 
Surcharge students given their strong pre-college credentials and distance from the credit threshold. Importantly, 
dropping all students attempting fewer than 120 surcharge-relevant credit hours eliminates roughly the same proportion 
of first-time freshmen and transfer students from the sample (57 percent of each). 
 
63 Students attempting 185 credits or more are in the 99th percentile.  
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As for the total number of regular session terms a student is enrolled, there is no need to impose an 
upper bound because students are only tracked for up to six years, or twelve regular terms. 
A final restriction I make to better ensure that comparisons I draw between Surcharge 
students and non-surcharge students are relevant and meaningful is to eliminate all students who 
earn two degrees in the six-year period (899 students).64 By taking on a second major, these students 
face a higher attempted credit threshold equal to 110 percent of the total number of credits a 
student requires to earn both degrees. They are also likely to differ from students pursuing a single 
degree – Surcharge or not – in ways the observed data cannot fully capture. As an additional analytic 
precaution, I do remove the small number of Surcharge students – as I define them – who add a 
second major and retain it until the last term they appear in the system, even though they do not 
graduate with two degrees. I do this because, by officially declaring two majors, these “Surcharge” 
students would not technically be assessed an additional tuition fee at the 140-credit hour limit. 
Therefore, I may be concerned that I have falsely identified them as Surcharge students. To keep 
matters of classification simple, I drop these students from the analysis (789 students, representing 
12 percent of all 6,668 Surcharge students identified so far). I do retain Surcharge students who 
appear to pursue two majors at some point in time, but who drop the second major before their last 
enrolled term. I also keep all non-Surcharge students who add a second major and retain it for any 
length of time, including until their last term, even though they do not formally graduate with two 
degrees.  
From the original set of unique observations, my sample now contains 29,556 students. 
Table 3 shows the number of unique students by institution and entering cohort fall in the sample.    
                                               
64 To my knowledge, there are no five-year degree programs approved by the UNC Board of Governors offered at any 
of the institutions in my analysis. 
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Like the original sample from the UNC-GA, the analytic sample is fairly evenly distributed across all 
four entering cohorts, though they are not evenly distributed across the four institutions. The 
proportions in the analytic sample do differ from those in the original sample by a few percentage 
points, but broadly align with the earlier figures. ECU students comprise 28 percent of the analytic 
sample, NCSU students comprise 34 percent, NCA&T comprise 12 percent, and UNCC students 
comprise 26 percent of the analytic sample. 
4.4 Surcharge, Delayed, Typical, and Accumulator students 
After taking steps to retain the most relevant students for analytic purposes, I generate three 
separate comparison groups to measure against Surcharge students. I create these groups by 
exploiting the joint credit- and regular term-threshold criteria used to define surcharge status and by 
classifying students based on where they lie along both dimensions. Figure 3 illustrates how I 
distinguish between students based on how they are arrayed within a coordinate plane. The x-axis 
marks the total number of regular (fall/spring) terms a student spends on campus, with an imposed 
lower bound of four terms. Meanwhile, the y-axis demarcates the total number of surcharge-relevant 
hours a student attempts within a six-year window, with both the lower bound of 120 and upper 
bound of 185 in place. The x-axis is centered at 8 regular terms, and the y-axis is centered at 140 
credit hours. 
The circles represent groups of students who enroll for a given number of regular terms and 
attempt a given number of surcharge-relevant credits. The size of the circles corresponds with the 
number of students at each credit-term coordinate. The largest group of students in the sample 
contains those who are enrolled for eight total terms and attempt between 120-125 surcharge-
relevant credit hours. For context, this largest circle represents 4,990 students, and the second largest 
circle at eight total terms and 126-130 surcharge-relevant credits represents 2,241 students. The 
smallest circles represent anywhere from one to ten students.   
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Figure 3 also illustrates how I have defined each of the three comparison groups based on 
which quadrant (Q) a student falls within. Students exceeding 140 attempted surcharge-relevant 
hours and eight regular terms in Q1 are considered Surcharge students, while students exceeding 
eight regular terms but not 140 attempted hours in Q2 are considered “Delayed” students for my 
purposes. In Q3, students who neither exceed 140 credit hours nor eight terms are considered 
“Typical”; and in Q4, students who attempt more than 140 hours but in eight terms or less are 
considered “Accumulator” students.65 Though all three comparison groups offer opportunities to 
investigate differences between Surcharge students and their peers, Delayed and Accumulator 
students only differ from Surcharge students along a single dimension – total credit hours attempted 
(for Delayed) and total regular terms (for Accumulator). In the analyses below, I pay particular 
attention to how Surcharge students compare to their Delayed peers. 
Table 4 shows total attempted credit and term summary statistics for each group I have 
constructed. Group means – with standard deviations in parentheses – summarize the number of 
credits students attempt and the number of terms they remain in residence over the six-year period 
they are tracked. Column 1 summarizes information for the full sample of students, while the other 
columns summarize measures for each of the four groups. A plurality of students in the sample are 
considered Typical (42 percent), followed by Delayed (30 percent), Surcharge (20 percent), and 
Accumulator (8 percent). Surcharge students attempt an average of 152.40 total surcharge-relevant 
hours, while on the other end of the spectrum, Typical students attempt an average of 126.43 total 
hours.    
                                               
65 Note that students whose credit-term coordinate places them along the y-axis, where their total regular terms equal 
eight, are either part of the Typical group if their surcharge-relevant credits do not exceed 140 or part of the 
Accumulator group if their surcharge-relevant credits exceed 140. No students fall along the x-axis in the construction of 
these bins.    
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In addition to showing means for total surcharge-relevant credit hours that count towards 
the 140-limit, the table summarizes other credit hour types that do not count towards this threshold. 
“Total credit hours, all” is inclusive of summer hours, extension hours, and pre-college hours in 
addition to any tuition-surcharge relevant hours – including transfer hours. While Delayed students 
attempt the most extension (6.11) hours and enter with the most pre-college hours (0.43) on 
average, Surcharge students are right behind them at 4.54 and 0.238, respectively.66 Surcharge 
students also attempt slightly more total summer credit hours than Delayed students (10.94 versus 
10.08). However, when it comes to transfer credit hours, Accumulator students hold the most by far 
at 62.89, with Typical students next at 18.16 credit hours.  
The final section of Table 4 summarizes the mean number of terms students in each group 
spend in residence at a UNC institution in my sample. Surcharge students spend 10.43 total regular 
terms, while Accumulator students spend the least amount of time at 6.54 terms. Only fall and 
spring terms count towards the maximum eight-term surcharge limit. Still, I also summarize the 
mean number of total terms a student spends on campus, inclusive of summer session I and 
summer session II terms. Note that students can be enrolled up to two summer terms per academic 
year. When summer terms are counted, the mean number of terms that students remain in residence 
exceeds eight for all groups. Now that we have a sense of how each group is defined and where the 
average student in each group falls along both credit- and term- dimensions, the rest of the paper 
focuses on answering the key research questions.   
5. Which students are assessed the tuition surcharge? 
5.1 How do Surcharge students compare to those in other groups? 
 To answer my first research question, I focus on static, demographic measures and how they 
predict whether a student is eventually assessed the surcharge. These demographic measures are 
                                               
66 Summer credit hours can also be considered extension hours, and vice versa.  
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considered baseline characteristics because they summarize students’ qualities before they have 
attempted any college course credits or spent any terms on campus. I begin by first showing the 
demographic composition of all four groups separately, for context. Table 5 provides summary 
statistics for a suite of student-level measures by group, with standard deviations in parentheses for 
continuous variables. The first column summarizes statistics for the full sample, while columns 2 
through 5 summarize variables for each group. Column 6 indicates the p-value of the unadjusted 
difference in means between Surcharge and Delayed students. Although both groups exceed eight 
regular terms, only Surcharge students face a financial penalty for their attempted credit behavior. 
  The first takeaway from Table 5 is that NCA&T students in the sample are 
disproportionately overrepresented in the Surcharge group relative to how much they comprise of 
the full sample (21.2 percent of the Surcharge group compared to 11.8 of the full sample). Relatedly, 
the proportion of student attendees at the other three institutions are underrepresented in the 
Surcharge group relative to their full sample shares, with NCSU students especially so (29.5 percent 
compared to 34.4 percent). Even so, within the Surcharge group, NCSU students comprise the 
largest share, as they do in both the Typical and Delayed groups at 35.8 percent and 36.8 percent, 
respectively. Students attending ECU and UNCC are slightly overrepresented in the Accumulator 
category compared to their full sample shares. Though, this is unsurprising given that these two 
institutions hold the largest proportion of transfer students in the analytic sample at 27 percent 
(ECU) and 41 percent (UNCC). Transfer students enter with already accrued college credits that 
count towards the 140-credit limit. 
 Male students also comprise a greater share of the Surcharge sample relative to their full 
sample share (59.8 percent compared to 51.5 percent), while also comprising a slightly larger share 
of the Accumulator group as well (55.3 percent). Whereas the share of Surcharge students who are 
White, non-Hispanic (54.2 percent) is almost 12 percentage points less than the share of full sample 
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students who are White, the share of Surcharge students who are Black, non-Hispanic (33.1 percent) 
is about 11 percentage points more than the share of full sample students who are Black.67 Out-of-
state students are disproportionately overrepresented in the Typical group (17.9 percent), and non-
US citizens are overrepresented within the Accumulator category (5.2 percent), relative to their full 
sample proportions.68  
Students’ composite SAT scores and high school GPAs are standardized by institution and 
entering cohort year, inclusive of all students in the raw UNC-GA data.69 Both Surcharge and 
Delayed students have lower mean standardized SAT scores (-0.048 and -0.106, respectively) 
compared to Typical and Accumulator students; though, the latter two groups are more likely to 
have missing SAT score records. This same difference in pre-college performance across groups 
holds for students’ high school GPAs as well. Finally, transfer students are disproportionately 
represented in the Accumulator group, comprising 97 percent of this group compared to only 26 
percent of the full sample. The share of Typical students who are transfers is even three times larger 
than the share of Surcharge students who are transfers (35.2 percent compared to 11.3 percent). The 
fact that a relatively large proportion of Typical and Accumulator students are transfers may explain 
why these students are also more likely to be missing SAT and/or high school GPA information. 
These records would be retained by a students’ initial institution, but may not be carried over to the 
UNC institution in which they transfer.  
                                               
67 Other, non-Hispanic refers to Native American/Hawaiian, Multi-racial, and students of unknown race/ethnicity. US 
citizens can be considered out-of-state or in-state. A small subset of out-of-state and/or non-US citizens do qualify as 
NC residents, while a small set of in-state students are not granted NC residency status. 
 
68 Student-level data from the UNC-GA does not identify students’ birthdates, veteran status, or socioeconomic status 
(household income, parental education levels, etc.). I attempt to account for some aspect of student’s financial 
circumstances by linking a student’s home county with county-level measures of median household income and percent 
living in poverty (not shown). Home county information is only provided for students who are NC residents, so county-
level median household income is only reported for these students, in real 2015 dollars. 
 
69 ACT-to-SAT concordance tables were used to convert composite ACT scores to SAT scores for students who did not 
have SAT scores reported. Still, about 15 percent of the sample is missing an SAT/ACT score, and especially students in 
the Accumulator group. Only composite SAT and ACT scores are provided in the data. 
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 The final two sections of Table 5 do not summarize baseline, pre-college measures, but do 
help provide an initial picture of students’ summative completion behavior over the six-year period 
in which they are tracked. While roughly 95 percent of Typical students obtain a BA, about 85 
percent of Surcharge students earn a degree. The shares of Accumulator and Delayed students 
earning a degree are much more similar at 91 percent and 90 percent, respectively. By definition in 
the way these groups were constructed, neither Delayed nor Surcharge students have any students 
graduating in four years or less (equivalent to being in residence for eight regular terms or less). 
Though, even by the sixth year, Surcharge students hold the lowest graduation rate at 75.6 percent.70 
 When I restrict the sample to just students who graduate, I observe further differences in 
degree attainment between groups. Both Accumulator and Surcharge students are more likely to 
graduate in a science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) field (44.3 percent and 42.7 
percent, respectively).71 As for the specific fields in which students can earn a degree, I utilize the 
four-digit CIP codes for each course to classify a degree into one of eight categories listed in Table 
5. These fields are: plant and earth sciences, the physical sciences, computer science and math, 
engineering, social science, the humanities, business and communication, and education.72  
The last section of Table 5 shows that a larger share of Surcharge graduates holds degrees in 
engineering (28.3 percent) and computer science and math (5.6 percent) compared to their peers in 
                                               
70 There is a discrepancy between six-year graduation rates and the share of students earning a degree for each group 
(e.g., the six-year graduation rate for Delayed students is 86.5 percent even though 89.8 percent of Delayed students 
graduate). This is because for 4.3 percent of the sample, students formally graduate – based on their posted graduation 
date – at a date beyond when their coursework has completed. Of this 4.3 percent, the vast majority (70 percent) are 
Surcharge students who appear in the data for up to six years and who graduate sometime after year six. These 
graduation patterns are discussed more in the section 6.1 below. 
 
71 A degree is considered to be STEM if its six-digit classification of instructional programs (CIP) code is listed in the 
STEM Designated Degree Program List maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security. 
 
72 Because degree (and major) fields are identified from four-digit CIP codes and STEM determination is based on six-
digit CIP codes, there is not perfect overlap between the two. Specifically, 77 percent of plant and earth science, 62 
percent of the physical sciences (biology, chemistry, physics), and 96 percent of engineering degrees/majors are 
considered STEM. Though, 100 percent of computer science and math degrees/majors are considered STEM. 
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other groups. Though, the share of Accumulator graduates earning degrees in these and other 
STEM fields is also relatively high compared to the other two groups. The share of Surcharge 
students earning humanities degrees is also larger than the shares in other groups (12.9 percent), 
with the next largest share belonging to Delayed students (12.2 percent). Meanwhile, the Typical 
group holds the largest share of business and communication (23.1 percent) and education (9.3 
percent) degrees. Though, the share of Delayed graduates earning business and communication 
degrees is also relatively large (18.3 percent). The share of students earning degrees in social science 
(18.4 percent) and the humanities (12.2 percent) is also relatively large for Delayed students.  
 The differences between groups in earned degrees suggest that students in these groups 
pursue different majors and have differing course experiences during their time in college. It does 
appear that Surcharge students are more likely to earn degrees in STEM-related fields – especially 
engineering – relative to their peers in the Typical and Delayed groups. The decision to major in a 
STEM field may be made prior to being assessed the surcharge, or afterwards as a consequence. 
Regardless, these majors are often more challenging and credit-demanding than other degree areas. I 
explore how choice of these more rigorous majors may be predictive of surcharge incidence when I 
examine time-varying college behaviors in section six below. 
     A final noteworthy observation from Table 5 comes from the final column indicating the 
p-value of the difference in means between Surcharge and Delayed students. Though both groups of 
students remain on campus for more than eight regular terms, and therefore both experience a 
longer time-to-degree, they still differ along many demographic dimensions. These differences are 
important to take note of because one may be concerned that an analysis of Surcharge students 
duplicates – with an additional credit-bearing element – prior research that has focused on students 
with longer time-to-degree (Delayed). Surcharge students, in some ways, are a more extreme subset 
of generally delayed students in that they are even more male and less White, non-Hispanic than 
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their Delayed peers (Kurlaender et al., 2014; Bowen et al., 2010). However, along other dimensions 
they remain quite distinct. Surcharge students are also more likely to transfer from another 
institution and to have higher standardized SAT scores than Delayed students. They are also less 
likely to enter with college credits earned while in high school. 
 Furthermore, even when accounting for baseline student demographic and achievement 
characteristics, Surcharge students are still less likely to complete college than their Delayed peers. 
Table 6 shows the relationship between Surcharge status and a set of graduation-related outcomes in 
a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The first two columns in each outcome panel 
include all students across all four groups, while the third column includes only Surcharge and 
Delayed students. Each regression includes institution-by-cohort fixed effects with standard errors 
clustered at the institution-cohort level to account for college-specific and temporal trends. The 
specifications inclusive of baseline demographic and achievement covariates include those listed 
under the Demographics & Achievement section in Table 5 (e.g., gender, race and ethnicity, SAT 
score, transfer status, etc.).  
As the top row shows, Surcharge students are less likely to graduate ever and to graduate in 
six years compared to all other students. Compared to their Delayed peers, who also remain on 
campus beyond four years, Surcharge students are 3.5 percentage points less likely to graduate at all 
and 8.8 percentage points less likely to graduate in the six-year timeline they are tracked. The final 
outcome panel shows that even if the sample is restricted to students who do graduate, Surcharge 
students can expect to graduate 0.482 terms later than their Delayed counterparts. All of these 
estimates are highly statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  
Altogether, the relationship between Surcharge status and completion outcomes is additional 
evidence that these students are distinct from Delayed students. It also seems to suggest, as Kramer 
et al. (2017) found, that the imposition of the surcharge does not seem to work as intended, by 
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compelling these students to finish earlier. Even those students paying the additional 50 percent fee 
on tuition are still more likely than other delayed students to not graduate at all and to take longer to 
graduate if they do complete.  
5.2 What demographic characteristics are predictive of being assessed the surcharge? 
 While section 5.1 explored the differences between the four groups, this section focuses just 
on Surcharge students and how baseline demographic characteristics may predict a student’s 
likelihood of being in the Surcharge group (i.e., being assessed the surcharge). Table 7 shows a basic 
OLS multivariate regression, inclusive of the demographic and achievement variables in Table 5, 
where the outcome is being in the Surcharge group. Column 1 shows results for the full sample with 
all schools combined and includes institution-by-cohort fixed effects as well as standard errors 
clustered at the institution-by-cohort level. These fixed effects account for the fact that a students’ 
likelihood of being assessed the surcharge is related to the policies and academic culture of a 
student’s college, as well as the within-institution policy changes that may occur over time, including 
changing tuition rates or major requirements. Columns 2 through 5 show the same basic multivariate 
regression predictive of Surcharge incidence, but for each institution separately (and inclusive of 
cohort fixed effects.)73 
 The results in Table 7 confirm much of the unadjusted patterns observed in Table 5. 
Holding all else constant, males and racial/ethnic minorities are a little more than 7 percentage 
points more likely to be assessed the surcharge. Males at NCA&T are particularly more likely to end 
up in the Surcharge group compared to their otherwise similar female peers by 16.3 percentage 
points. Black, non-Hispanic students at all schools except for ECU are more likely to be assessed the 
                                               
73 The omitted referent categories are first-time freshmen, female, White, non-Hispanic, in-state students who are US 
citizens. I run similar regression models varying the fixed effects (e.g., institution fixed effects only) and how standard 
errors are clustered (e.g., robust, at the institution-level, etc.). The results from these models are nearly identical to the 
results presented in Table 7. I also run tests for multicollinearity in various models and do not find any models with a 
mean variance inflation factor above 4.  
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surcharge compared to their White peers by 7.3 to 16.1 percentage points. All of these estimates are 
statistically significant at either the 5 percent- or 1 percent-levels. All else constant, out-of-state 
students are also less likely to be assessed the surcharge – though only the full sample estimate is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent-level (at 4.8 percentage points). Meanwhile, while a student’s 
standardized SAT score is not predictive of surcharge incidence, a student’s high school GPA is; a 
one standard deviation increase in GPA, above a student’s cohort group mean, is associated with a 
0.029 percentage point decrease in the probability they will be assessed the surcharge. The estimated 
effect is fairly consistent across all schools, though even more negative at NCA&T at -0.047 
percentage points.  
Finally, being a transfer student does not appear to increase the likelihood a student will be 
assessed the surcharge for the full sample and three of four institutions. Transfer students at UNCC 
are 4.6 percentage points (p-value = 0.019) more likely to end up in the Surcharge group – 
everything else held constant. However, this coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
because the regression also includes the number of transfer credits a student would enter with upon 
enrollment. OLS regressions that drop this “Transfer credits at entry” variable produce strongly 
negative coefficients for the variable “Transfer student” across all four institutions. Even more 
noteworthy is the fact that the number of transfer credits a student enters with is negatively 
correlated with the likelihood a student will be assessed the surcharge. Because transfer credits count 
towards the 140 surcharge-relevant credit limit, one may expect this relationship to be positive. 
Altogether, there is no clear evidence that transfer students are more likely to be assessed the 
surcharge, even those entering with an abundance of transfer credits. This finding seems to conflict 
with the rationale provided by the North Carolina state senators for eliminating the surcharge policy 
outright – namely that transfer students are disproportionately affected by the policy. 
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Table 7 provides an initial picture of the students most likely to be assessed the tuition 
surcharge based on baseline demographic characteristics that are established before they have started 
attempting credits and accumulating terms in residence. The baseline picture that emerges indicates 
that males of minority racial/ethnic backgrounds – particularly Black, non-Hispanic males – are 
more likely to be assessed the surcharge, ceteris paribus. In-state students entering with lower high 
school GPAs compared to their peers who enroll at the same institution in the same cohort are also 
more likely to be assessed the surcharge. Last, transfer students are less likely to experience the 
tuition surcharge compared to their otherwise similar peers.  
However, this section does present a fully comprehensive picture. Though certain 
demographic groups may have a higher probability of meeting the joint criteria that determine 
surcharge status, many other aspects of their college experiences are likely to be even more 
important in predicting whether students are ultimately assessed the surcharge. These experiences 
and decisions are also likely to explain differences between the different groups, and particularly, 
what further distinguishes Surcharge students and Delayed students. Moreover, these differences in 
student experiences represent areas that are malleable and potentially actionable by policies. 
Conversely, postsecondary institutions and the state of North Carolina cannot alter the immutable 
pre-college characteristics of students as a way of who is assessed the surcharge.  
 6. How do the early college experiences of Surcharge students differ from their peers? 
 My second research question looks beyond static student characteristics to time-varying 
student behaviors and performance measures, particularly early on in students’ college experiences 
(mostly within the first four terms). It is important to reiterate that the groups that I am looking at 
are defined by their cumulative attempted-credit and time-on-campus behavior at the end of their 
college experience – or at the end of six years. Therefore, the following sections take each group and 
look back, retrospectively, at the decisions and experiences of students in earlier, “pre-surcharge” 
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terms to identify patterns that may further explain what distinguishes Surcharge students from their 
peers. Section seven then takes the findings presented in this broad section to develop a more 
comprehensive predictive model of surcharge incidence.   
6.1 Enrollment patterns, stopping out, and sample attrition 
 Before discussing these patterns, it is important to provide context for the following figures 
and tables, particularly when it comes to enrollment patterns. For presentation purposes, I split all 
four groups by students’ initial enrollment status, (i) first-time freshmen and (ii) transfer students, in 
order to provide a descriptive picture of each separately. Though transfer students are no more likely 
(and depending on model specification, are actually less likely) to be assessed the surcharge, the 
enrollment patterns and experiences of freshmen and transfer students across all groups are likely to 
vary. Stratifying groups in this manner does have limitations, though, when it comes to sample sizes. 
As Figure 4 shows, only 3.4 percent of Delayed students are considered transfers (N=305) and only 
3 percent of Accumulator students are considered first-time freshmen (N=74). Nearly all of the 
results and discussion surrounding early college experiences focuses exclusively on freshmen for 
economy and because freshmen in all groups are enrolled for a longer time horizon.  Still, one 
should keep in mind these small sample sizes when interpreting descriptive analyses that parse 
students apart based on initial enrollment status.  
 For presentation purposes, because only regular (fall/spring) terms count towards the 
surcharge threshold, I also focus on diagramming student behavior exhibited within these terms – 
and cumulative up to these terms – only. This means that any student experiences occurring in a 
summer term would be captured in cumulative measures for the following regular term in which a 
student enrolls (most often the fall). In the aggregated full sample, 75 percent of students take at 
least one summer course, with this percentage varying by group. Both Delayed and Surcharge 
students have the highest number of students taking summer courses at 81 percent and 80 percent, 
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respectively. Meanwhile, 74 percent of Accumulator students and 68 percent of Typical students 
take summer courses. Of those enrolled in summer terms, the mean total number of summer 
courses taken ranges from 2.07 for Typical students to 2.97 for Surcharge students. Though I do 
capture student experiences in these summer terms, I do not uniquely focus on them in order to 
ensure that I track all students along the same term timeline relevant to surcharge incidence.74 This 
means that I diagram student behavior up to twelve regular – fall and spring – terms, or six years.  
It is similarly important to note that these regular terms refer only to those for which a 
student is enrolled and do not include any terms that a student may have temporarily stopped out of 
enrollment. Though not all students are continuously enrolled in college over the period for which 
they are tracked, 90 percent of freshmen and 87 percent of transfers in my analytic sample do not 
stop out during their postsecondary tenure. A student is considered to have “stopped out” if they 
enroll in a non-consecutive term. For example, if a student is enrolled in spring 2009 and then again 
in spring 2010, this student is considered to have stopped out in the fall 2010 term.75 Moreover, if 
spring 2009 was considered a student’s regular term 3, then spring 2010 is considered a student’s 
regular term 4 (as opposed to regular term 5).  
Similar to summer terms, I do not focus on diagramming these “missed” terms because I am 
focused on understanding how the early college experiences of enrolled Surcharge students differ 
from their enrolled peers; and all students are defined by how many regular terms they spend on 
campus, whether they are consecutive or not. A term in which a student is not enrolled does not 
count towards the eight regular terms limit. This means that not all odd-numbered regular terms 
                                               
74 The frequency and timing of summer course-taking is much more variable between students. In addition, because 
there are two summer terms, session I and session II, the number of total terms a student could be tracked inclusive of 
summer terms is 23 in my analytic sample. Diagramming all of these terms adds unnecessary complexity, especially if 
measures of cumulative term behavior still capture actions and performances made by students in summer terms. 
 
75 Students are not considered to stop out if they do not enroll in a summer session term. 
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represent fall semesters and not all even-numbered regular terms refer to spring semesters, though 
the vast majority follow this pattern.76 In fact, 97 percent of all odd-numbered terms denote fall 
semesters and 96 percent of all even-numbered terms denote spring semesters. These high 
percentages reflect the fact that so few students in my sample do temporarily stop out; and of those 
who do, they stop out an average of 1.07 total times.  
Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative number of times that students in each group stop out by 
term, stratified by freshmen and transfer students. The x-axis demarcates each regular term that a 
student is enrolled, while the y-axis marks the total number of times a student has stopped out by 
each term. Both Typical and Accumulator students are defined by only being enrolled for up to eight 
total regular terms, and only appear in the figure as such. Figure 5 shows Delayed students average a 
higher mean stop out total than all other groups in both the sample of freshmen and the sample of 
transfer students. Delayed freshmen have stopped out an average of 0.05 times by the end of term 
four and an average of 0.16 times by the end of term eleven. Surcharge students average the second 
highest cumulative mean stop outs per term, though the gap between them and Delayed student 
begins to widen after term five. Desjardins et al. (2006) have found that stopping out reduces 
students’ likelihood of completing college and extends time-to-degree. As we observed in Table 5, 
both Delayed and Surcharge students are less likely to graduate than their peers, and to take longer 
to graduate (by definition). Though the mean number of times that students across all groups stop 
out is low, this figure does illustrate that the enrollment patterns of students are not identical across 
                                               
76 The majority of students, especially first-time freshmen, begin their college tenures in the fall (term 1), enroll in the 
subsequent spring (term 2), and subsequent fall (term 3), and so forth. Transfer students, however, may not necessarily 
begin at a UNC campus until spring semester. If so, this spring semester would be their term 1 and the subsequent fall 
their term 2. 
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groups. I consider how the timing and frequency of stopping out may relate to a student’s likelihood 
of being assessed the surcharge in Section seven below.77 
 A final point to clarify before proceeding with the rest of the analyses regards sample 
attrition. Though I restricted my analytic sample to those students who appear for at least their first 
four regular terms (whether consecutive or not), students in both the Typical and Accumulator 
groups may leave the sample in any term thereafter. Meanwhile, a defining feature of the latter two 
groups is that they remain enrolled for more than eight terms – meaning Delayed and Surcharge 
students may leave the sample only after their eighth regular term. Attrition differs from stopping 
out in that students who leave the sample via attrition do so permanently. Students exit the sample 
because (i) they graduate, or (ii) they drop out to not return again, or (iii) they leave after completing 
coursework though officially “walk” for graduation at a later date.  
Once a student leaves – even if they graduate formally later – they no longer have course- or 
term-level records for proceeding terms. In the descriptive analyses to follow, I focus on how the 
behavior and experience of enrolled students varies and how the extent to which these varying 
features may help explain how Surcharge students end up where they do relative to their peers. That 
means that the sample size and composition of each group may change over time, especially in later 
regular terms, in ways that I must account for. 
 Figure 6 illustrates how attrition looks across the sample of initial freshmen enrollees and 
initial transfers, separately. Panel A shows that nearly all freshmen are enrolled up through the first 
eight regular terms, including 99.3 percent of Typical and 100 percent of Accumulator students. 
After this point, only Delayed and Surcharge students remain enrolled, though Delayed freshmen 
begin leaving the sample at a greater rate. By the tenth term, 41.4 percent of Delayed freshmen 
                                               
77 Importantly, Surcharge students appear to continue stopping out after crossing the eight regular terms threshold. 
Continuous enrollment, may therefore, be endogenous. Early stopping out may be predictive of a student experiencing 
the surcharge, though experiencing the surcharge may also affect students’ decisions to stay continuously enrolled. 
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remain enrolled while 90.2 percent of Surcharge freshmen remain enrolled. By the twelfth term, 1.5 
percent of Delayed freshmen and 18.9 percent of Surcharge freshmen are enrolled. Panel B shows 
that, of the students who leave the sample across all groups, the vast majority do so because they 
graduate; though, both Delayed and Surcharge students are more likely than their peers to drop out. 
The “Post” time period captures Delayed and Surcharge freshmen who do not officially walk for 
graduation until after their twelfth term. 
Panels C and D show analogous panels for transfer students. In this case, both Typical and 
Accumulator students start leaving the sample after the fourth term, with only 12.5 and 28.5 percent 
of each group remaining by term eight, respectively. After term eight, Surcharge and Delayed 
transfer students appear to leave the sample at about the same rate. Like before, the vast majority of 
attrition is due to students graduating. By term twelve, 91 percent of Typical and Accumulator 
transfers have graduated, while approximately 75 percent of Delayed and Surcharges students have 
graduated. However, by the end of the six-year period (and post period), a higher proportion of 
transfer students across all groups fail to earn a credential compared to first-time freshmen. 
The purpose of Figure 6 is to show how the size and composition of the sample in each 
group changes over time as students graduate or permanently stop out. To account for these 
temporal compositional shifts in the analyses to follow, I do several things. First, I often focus my 
attention on the first four terms, of which all students are present in both the freshmen and transfer 
student subsamples. Second, I focus exclusively on freshmen in most analyses, as 100 percent of 
freshmen in all groups are present up through term seven. Last, alongside unadjusted means for 
course-taking and performance dimensions, I show how mean data points between groups change 
once adjusting for baseline student demographics. This last step allows me to observe how much of 
the differences between Surcharge students and their peers are due to demographic characteristics 
that are associated with being in each group.  
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6.2 Attempted credit accumulation 
The first measure of temporal student behavior I examine concerns the number of credits 
students attempt per regular term. Research has shown that pace at which students accrue credits is 
predictive of on-time graduation and overall completion (Kurlaender et al., 2014; Adelman, 2006). In 
order to earn credits, students must attempt them. Though students are placed into a group based 
on the total number of surcharge-relevant credit hours that they pursue over their college tenure, 
this section explores the rate at which students attempt credits. Surcharge students eventually accrue 
an excess of surcharge-relevant hours relative to their peers; however, I find that for the first six to 
eight terms, they actually lag behind their Typical and Accumulator peers in total credits attempted. 
6.2.1 Cumulative surcharge-relevant hours  
 Figure 7 shows four panels illustrating the accumulation patterns of surcharge-relevant 
attempted hours by term and group. Panels A and B show the cumulative number of attempted 
credit hours that students acquire by the end of each regular term, separately for initial freshmen and 
transfer students. Panel A indicates that freshmen across all four groups attempt about the same 
number of credits in their first term on campus (ranging from 14.97 for Delayed to 16.78 for 
Accumulator).78 However, the mean rate at which groups accumulate credits starts to differ as early 
as the second regular term, and the gaps between groups expand each additional term. By the sixth 
term, Typical freshmen have attempted 94.77 surcharge-relevant credit hours, followed by Surcharge 
freshmen at 89.45 and Delayed freshmen at 86.31. Panel A also shows that the average Surcharge 
freshmen exceeds the eight regular terms-limit before exceeding the 140-credit hours-limit. By 
regular term nine, Surcharge freshmen have attempted an average of 132.52 surcharge-relevant 
hours; by term ten, the remaining 90.2 percent of Surcharge students in the sample attempt an 
                                               
78 As a reminder, there are only 74 Accumulator students who are first-time freshmen. Discussion of freshmen findings 
will not discuss Accumulator students as thoroughly.   
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average of 144.60 hours. Together, these data points suggest that the average Surcharge freshmen is 
assessed the 50 percent fee on tuition for the first time in term ten. In term nine and onwards, 
Surcharge freshmen attempt a greater number of surcharge-relevant credit hours per term relative to 
their Delayed counterparts who remain enrolled. 
Panel B shows the analogous experience of transfer students. Surcharge transfers lag behind 
their Typical and Accumulator peers in initial surcharge-relevant credits – due to differences in the 
mean number of transfer credits at entry – and remain behind both of these groups for the first six 
regular terms. Though, for the first four terms, all four groups appear to attempt additional credit 
hours at approximately the same rate (slope). By term five, the accumulation rates of all groups, 
except for Surcharge, begin to flatten out somewhat. Instead, Surcharge transfers continue 
attempting about the same number of credits each subsequent semester. Panel B also suggests that 
the average Surcharge transfer student exceeds the eight regular terms-limit and the 140-credit 
hours-limit at about the same point. By term eight, the mean Surcharge transfer attempts 139.34 
surcharge-relevant hours and attempts 150.41 hours by term nine. For the average transfer student, 
the surcharge would take effect in their ninth regular term. 
While panels A and B show unadjusted means for cumulative surcharge-relevant credits 
attempted by term, panels C and D adjust for baseline student characteristics. This adjustment 
accomplishes two things: first, it accounts for shifts in sample composition over time as students 
leave the sample; second, it accounts for the extent to which the temporal variation between groups 
can be explained by underlying student demographic characteristics that are correlated with each 
group. Panel C shows the difference in cumulative surcharge-relevant hours compared to Delayed 
freshmen students, the referent group, in each term. The unadjusted lines align with the differences 
between Typical/Accumulator/Surcharge freshmen and Delayed freshmen depicted in panel A 
above. For example, by term six, the mean unadjusted difference between Surcharge students and 
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Delayed students is 3.14 credits (89.45 minus 86.31). The adjusted differences account for gender, 
race and ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, high school 
GPA, pre-college credits earned, and transfer credits entry (if the student is a transfer). They also 
account for institution-by-cohort differences.  
For freshmen in panel C, the adjusted differences between students in the Typical, 
Accumulator, or Surcharge groups and Delayed students do not differ substantively from the 
unadjusted differences. This suggests that the differences in attempted credit accumulation between 
Surcharge freshmen and their peers are not due to differences in the demographic compositions of 
these groups. However, panel D suggests a different story for transfer students. Adjusting for 
baseline student characteristics, the gaps between students in each group and their Delayed peers 
narrows in each term, and in some cases substantially. This narrowing is depicted by the shifting of 
the difference lines for each group towards zero. For example, while the unadjusted difference 
between Surcharge and Delayed students at term six is 18.29 credits, the adjusted difference is 12.91 
credits. Nearly all of the disparity between the unadjusted and adjusted differences for transfer 
students is because of differences in initial transfer credits at entry. Still, both the unadjusted and 
adjusted differences for Surcharge freshmen and transfer students remain statistically significant.   
The accumulation behaviors depicted in Figure 7 are interesting because in order to be 
assessed the surcharge students must attempt an excessive number of surcharge-relevant credit 
hours. However, during the first eight terms on campus for freshmen (and the first six terms for 
transfers), Surcharge students lag behind both their Typical and Accumulator peers in accumulating 
attempted credits. Moreover, the mean Surcharge freshman appears to exceed the 140-credit-hour 
limit – and thus is assessed the surcharge – only after being enrolled for nine terms or more. Even 
after term eight when Surcharge students are vulnerable to the additional fee, they attempt credit 
hours at the same general rate as before up through term ten. Meanwhile, their Delayed peers 
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accumulate fewer credit hours by term nine and onwards, and attempt fewer additional credits in 
each subsequent term. By not continuing to attempt surcharge-relevant hours at the same rate that 
they were previously, Delayed students are able to avoid being assessed the surcharge.79  
6.2.2 Cumulative summer and extension attempted credit hours 
Delayed students can avoid being assessed the surcharge by shifting their course-taking away 
from regular session terms in residence towards either summer and/or extension course options. 
Figures 8 and 9 explore accumulation patterns by term and group for each of these course types, 
respectively. Both figures are analogous in layout to Figure 7 above, with panels A and B illustrating 
the cumulative number of attempted credits by term, and panels C and D illustrating the unadjusted 
and adjusted differences in per-term means between each group and Delayed students. 
 Figure 8, panel A shows that all four groups pursue about the same number of cumulative 
summer credit hours per term, though Delayed and Surcharge freshmen exceed their peers slightly 
across all terms.80 Both Delayed and Surcharge freshmen continue to take summer courses after 
term eight, when they are vulnerable to the surcharge. Panel C below shows that accounting for the 
baseline demographic characteristics of students in the sample does shift the difference lines towards 
zero for Typical and Accumulator students, but slightly expands the difference between Surcharge 
students and their otherwise similar Delayed peers in certain terms. Panel B, on the other hand, 
shows that both Delayed and Surcharge transfer students accumulate fewer total summer credit 
hours per regular term than students in other groups. Adjusting for demographic characteristics does 
narrow the gaps between groups slightly, as shown in Panel D. For both freshmen and transfer 
                                               
79 For economy, I do not show the accumulation patterns of all attempted credits (including non-surcharge-relevant 
credits), though these figures mirror those in Figure 7 in general group trends and patterns. 
 
80 The stair-step nature of the figure for all groups is indicative of the fact that most students’ fall terms are odd-
numbered terms and their spring terms are even-numbered terms. The larger jumps in cumulative summer attempted 
credit hours occurs between even and odd regular terms because any additional summer hours are accounted for in the 
following (odd-numbered) fall term.  
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students, the difference between Delayed and Surcharge students remains small, even after term 
eight. This suggests that Delayed students are not disproportionately turning to summer coursework 
as a means of avoiding the surcharge. 
Figure 9, however, does seem to suggest that Delayed students, both initial freshmen and 
initial transfers, may shift their course loads to extension credit hours instead. Recall that extension 
hours refer to courses offered via distance education (“online”) or in venues open to both college 
students and the general public.  In both panels A and B, the gap between Delayed and Surcharge 
students starts expanding as early as term four, even though the mean number of extension hours 
taken overall is small. In term four, the mean Delayed freshman (transfer) attempts 0.85 (1.83) 
cumulative extension hours, while the mean Surcharge freshman (transfer) attempts 0.54 (1.06) 
cumulative hours. By term eleven, the mean Delayed freshman (transfer) attempts 11.23 (9.44) 
cumulative extension hours, while the mean Surcharge freshmen attempts 5.36 (4.95) hours. Panel C 
shows that adjusting for demographic characteristics does not significantly narrow the gap between 
Surcharge and Delayed freshmen; though, Panel D shows that demographic adjustments may 
slightly expand the gap between the two groups for transfers. However, once again, disparities in 
unadjusted and adjusted differences for transfers are mostly due to the inclusion of the number of 
transfer credits at entry in the adjusted models. 
The growing negative difference in cumulative extension hours between Surcharge and 
Delayed students after term eight could represent a partial mechanism through which the latter 
avoid the surcharge. By shifting their course load to extension credit hours, they can take courses 
that do not count towards the 140-limit. By term eleven, when the mean Delayed student attempts 
11.23 extension credit hours, their cumulative surcharge-relevant hours total 131.10. If these 
extension credits were taken as regular session, in-residence hours, then these Delayed students 
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would be considered Surcharge students instead.81 To be sure, not all courses or majors can be 
delivered via distance education or at extension offices open to the general public.  Depending on 
the major students are pursuing, they may not be able to take advantage of extension course 
opportunities as a means of avoiding – or even reducing – their surcharge fee. Perhaps, given their 
later course-taking patterns, Surcharge students are particularly unable to find extension courses as a 
viable substitute for regular term coursework.  
Altogether, the patterns presented in this section show several key ways in which Surcharge 
students are distinguished from their peers. Early on, they appear to accumulate attempted credits at 
a slower pace than their peers (with the exception of Delayed students), despite eventually 
surpassing them in terms nine and ten. The fact that, on average, Surcharge students exceed the time 
limit criteria before the credit limit criteria suggests that they are not accumulating necessary credits 
at an appropriate clip early on in their college tenures. As a result, Surcharge students must stay 
longer to pursue and obtain these credits. As they remain on campus past term eight and attempt 
more surcharge-relevant hours, they become vulnerable to the surcharge fee. Finally, Surcharge 
students do not appear to engage in extension coursework at the rate of their Delayed peers after 
term eight. For Delayed students, extension coursework may represent a viable means of obtaining 
credits while avoiding the surcharge. For Surcharge students, extension opportunities aligned with 
their major and scheduling preferences may scarcer. I consider the relationship between students’ 
major choice and surcharge incidence in section 6.4 below. 
 
 
                                               
81 To be sure, the share of Delayed freshmen who are in the sample in term eleven and beyond is 6.7 percent of the 
original sample of Delayed students. In term ten, when 41.4 percent of Delayed students remain enrolled, the mean 
Delayed student attempts 7.51 extension hours and 130.88 surcharge-relevant hours. If these extension hours were 
instead taken as regular session hours in-residence, the mean Delayed student would be close to hitting the surcharge at 
138.39 attempted credits. 
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6.3 Earned credit accumulation 
Patterns of attempted credit accumulation only reveal how many credits students are 
pursuing per term. To understand how many of these credits are obtained, I next examine students’ 
credit earning behavior over time. I find that Surcharge students fall meaningfully below their peers 
in terms of relative credits earned to credits attempted in each term, and that these relative gaps 
translate into sizeable absolute gaps in credits earned. 
Unlike students’ attempted credit behavior which is identified at the term level, students’ 
earned credits can only be identified from their course-level data. At the course level, I use 
information about how a student performs in the course to verify whether they received credit.82 I 
then aggregate this course performance information up to the term-level for each term a student is 
enrolled. Course-level records allow me to calculate the number of earned credits inclusive of all 
courses and of just summer courses individually. I am not able to distinguish surcharge-relevant 
earned hours nor extension hours at the course level.83 In this section, I focus on the relationship 
between earned credits and attempted credits in all courses, inclusive of summer, extension, and in-
residence hours (excluding transfer credits). 
Figure 10 shows the ratio of cumulative credits earned to cumulative credits attempted by 
term and credit term group. Panel A shows ratios for freshmen while panel B shows ratios for 
transfer students. Both panels indicate that Delayed and Surcharge students earn a lower cumulative 
share of the credits they attempt compared to Typical and Accumulator students in each term. Not 
                                               
82 For each course-level record, student course performance is encapsulated in a “quality points earned” variable equal to 
a student’s earned letter grade multiplied by the number of credits the course is worth. Students earn the number of 
credit hours listed for each course as long as the quality points earned variable exceeds zero.  
 
83 Because earned and attempted credits come from different files, there is a small percentage of students who have 
earned credit values that do not align with their attempted credit values for each term. More specifically, for a very small 
subset of students (1.5 percent of the full sample), they appear to earn more credits than they attempt in at least one 
term or more. For these students, the mean number of terms where credits earned exceed credits attempted is about 
3.85. Despite this issue, the UNC-GA recommended using the attempted credits information in the term-level data as 
these records are more heavily vetted and are used for reporting purposes (C. Zomberg, 1/2019). 
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only do Surcharge students attempt fewer credits per term than their Typical peers as Figure 7 
indicated, but they also earn a lower proportion of the credits they do take. In absolute terms, 
Surcharge students fall increasingly behind their Typical peers in credit accumulation in each 
subsequent term before term nine. 
However, even more remarkable is the difference between Surcharge and Delayed students 
in terms of earned credit accumulation patterns – particularly for freshmen. Despite that fact that 
Surcharge freshmen attempt slightly more cumulative credit hours per term than Delayed freshmen, 
they earn a lower proportion of their attempted credits. In fact, Surcharge freshmen earn an 
increasingly lower proportion of their cumulative attempted credits compared to their Delayed peers 
in each subsequent term between one and nine. In the first eight terms, the average Delayed 
freshmen earns a cumulative 90.3 percent of the total credits they attempt, while the average 
Surcharge freshmen earns a cumulative 87.0 percent. As panel C indicates, this mean unadjusted 
difference fluctuates in magnitude over those first eight terms, reaching a maximum at term eight of 
4.3 percentage points. These differences may appear small, but are statistically and substantively 
meaningful.  
Despite attempting about 2.04 fewer absolute credits per term than their Surcharge peers, 
Delayed freshmen earn about 1.24 more absolute credits per term from terms one through nine. 
Inclusion of baseline demographic covariates in the adjusted models only narrows the gap between 
Surcharge and Delayed students very slightly. Meanwhile, panels B and D tell a similar story for the 
experience of transfer students. In the first eight terms, Delayed transfers earn a mean 85 percent of 
total credits attempted compared to Surcharge transfers’ 82 percent. Delayed transfers also exceed 
Surcharge transfers in absolute credits earned.84  
                                               
84 The cumulative ratio of earned summer credits to cumulative attempted summer credit hours follows the same 
patterns shown in Figure 10, with Delayed students earning a greater share of their attempted summer hours than their 
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The credit earning patterns of students in each group provide some additional suggestive 
evidence of what may distinguish Surcharge students from their peers early on the college 
experience. Surcharge students earn a lower proportion of the credits they attempt, despite falling 
behind both their Typical and Accumulator peers in the number of credits they take within the first 
six to eight years in college. Surcharge students have lighter relative course loads and are more likely 
to fail to earn credit in the courses they do take. Moreover, despite attempting more per-term credits 
than their Delayed peers, Surcharge freshmen end up earning fewer absolute credits per term. 
Surcharge students perform worse in the courses, failing to earn credit. These gaps between 
Surcharge students and their peers may help explain why, in Figure 7, Surcharge students do not 
seem to slow down the rate at which they attempt additional credit hours after term eight, despite 
being in jeopardy of facing the steep 50 percent fee. At this point, they may not have earned enough 
credit hours to graduate and must continue to pursue additional coursework. Surcharge students’ 
relative underperformance in each term likely relates to the types of courses they are taking and how 
they align with students’ choice of major.  
6.4 Choice of major 
 Before looking at measures of student performance and how they align with students’ choice 
of major, I first exclusively examine the types of majors that students pursue over time to provide 
initial context. For economy, I focus the discussion around the findings for initially enrolled 
freshmen, though most of the general patterns and differences between groups persist in the 
transfers-only sample as well. Freshmen comprise 74 percent of the full sample, and 99.8 percent of 
them remain enrolled up through eight regular terms, minimizing my concerns about the 
composition of the sample changing after term four. A noted limitation of focusing on freshmen is 
                                               
Surcharge peers. When it comes to attempting summer hours, Delayed and Surcharge students attempt approximately 
the same amount per term.  
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the small sample size of Accumulators (N=74). I include these students in the descriptive analyses 
looking at how students start and end their major choice, though my attention is on how Surcharge 
students compare to their Typical and Delayed peers. In later analyses looking at major switching, I 
drop Accumulator freshmen from key figures for presentation purposes. 
 Altogether, I find that Surcharge students appear to declare both a first major and a last 
major later than their peers and to select majors in STEM, especially engineering, when they first do 
declare a major. However, the gaps in major choice between Surcharge freshmen and others narrow 
by the end of year six, as Surcharge students are less likely to graduate at all. Like their peers, a 
majority of Surcharge freshmen do not switch their major, and of those that do, they switch only 
about one time. However, surcharge students are also more likely than their peers to formally 
commit to a major later in college, after term four. From term five onwards, the cumulative share of 
Surcharge freshmen who have migrated into a STEM major exceeds that of their Delayed peers both 
in substantive and statistically significant magnitudes. Meanwhile, the share of Surcharge students 
migrating out of STEM majors in term five and afterwards also exceeds that of their peers, but is 
smaller in magnitude. Both of these migration patterns are mostly explained by the movement of 
undeclared Surcharge students into declared majors after year four. Considering that late major 
movement into both non-STEM and STEM majors is predictive of delayed time-to-degree and 
lower likelihood of graduating, these late major commitments may be problematic for Surcharge 
students. Finally, I observe that the initial differences between groups in terms of major selection by 
field mostly intensify as students progress into later terms.  
6.4.1 First declared major, last declared major, and degree 
 Before examining the temporal aspect of major choice as students progress through college, 
I first look at how students’ first and final majors align. Table 8 provides unadjusted means (and 
standard deviations for continuous variables) that summarize students’ major choice by group. 
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Column 1 summarizes means for the full sample of freshmen while columns 2 through 5 summarize 
means for each group. Column 6 indicates the p-value of the unadjusted difference in means 
between Surcharge and Delayed students, while column 7 indicates the p-value of the adjusted 
difference in means between Surcharge and Delayed students accounting for baseline student 
demographic characteristics and institution-by-cohort effects.85  
Only 0.2 percent of the sample (N=44) never formally declares a major at any point.86 This 
very miniscule share of never declarers is even across all four groups. In the full sample, 44.6 percent 
of freshmen enter college as undeclared majors in their first term, though both Surcharge (45.7 
percent) and Delayed (48.7 percent) freshmen are more likely to enter college without a declared 
major.  However, prior research has found no evidence that students who initially enter with an 
undeclared major are at a greater risk of not graduating (Spight, 2018; Sklar, 2014). Still, Foraker 
(2012) finds that students who begin as undeclared are more likely to graduate, have a shorter time-
to-degree, and have a higher GPA if they declare a specific major by the end of their second year (or 
fourth regular term). Delaying an initial choice of major until after the fourth term is correlated with 
worse completion outcomes. 
 For students who declare a major at some point, the first panel shows that, on average, 
students in the sample declare a first major well before term four at term 2.62, with both Surcharge 
(2.91) and Delayed (2.85) students declaring a first major slightly later than Typical students (2.20). 
There is, however, more variation in when freshmen declare their last held major. If a student never 
changes their major, the term when they declare their last major is the same term in which they 
declare their first.  On average, Surcharge students declare their last major (term 5.50) two terms 
                                               
85 As before, adjusted differences account for gender, race/ethnicity, residency status, median home county household 
income, SAT score, high school GPA, pre-college credits earned, and institution-by-cohort fixed effects. 
 
86 Thirteen of these students do eventually graduate with a degree, while the other 31 do not. 
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later than Typical students (term 3.40) and three-quarters of a term later than Delayed students (term 
4.72). Column 7 shows that even when adjusting for differences in the demographic compositions 
of each group, the mean terms in which Surcharge students declare both a first and last major are 
statistically later than the mean terms for Delayed students.  
The second panel of Table 8 summarizes how students’ first major aligns with their final 
earned degree in terms of STEM designation and general field.87 The share of Surcharge students 
with a first declared STEM major (49.5 percent) exceeds that of Delayed students (41.6 percent) by 
almost 8 percentage points and that of Typical students (38.2 percent) by about 11 percentage 
points. Furthermore, these large differences remain statistically significant after adjusting for student 
demographic characteristics. Still, these initial between-group differences in STEM major choice 
shrink substantially by the time students earn their degrees. Only 36.6 percent of Surcharge 
freshmen earn a STEM degree, compared to 32.2 percent of Delayed and 33.7 percent of Typical 
freshmen. Much of the reason for why the STEM differences between Surcharge students and their 
peers considerably narrow between students’ first declared major and their earned degree can be 
explained by the fact that Surcharge students are much less likely to graduate at all. Non-graduates 
necessarily do not earn a degree in STEM.88 
The second panel of Table 8 also shows that majority of freshmen in all groups neither 
declare a STEM major first nor graduate with a STEM degree (56.1 percent), followed next by those 
who persist in a STEM major between their first major and their earned degree (32.1 percent). A 
                                               
87 Means are inclusive of all freshmen, including the small subset who never declare a major and those who never earn a 
degree. Students who never declare a major remain in the same major and same field, and are considered to never pursue 
a STEM degree. Those who never earn a degree are not in the same major or same field by the end, and either are never 
in STEM or move out of STEM.  
 
88 If I restrict my focus to only graduates, the unadjusted means of students graduating with a degree in STEM, restricted 
to the sample of freshmen who graduate, includes 34.8 percent for Typical, 38.0 for Accumulator, 35.8 for Delayed, and 
43.2 for Surcharge students. 
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higher share of Surcharge freshmen persists in STEM (34.3 percent) and moves into a STEM major 
(2.3 percent) relative to their peers. A higher share also moves out of a STEM major (15.2 percent) 
relative to their Typical and Delayed counterparts. Again, Surcharge students are less likely to 
graduate, meaning non-completers who begin in STEM necessarily move out of STEM by the end.89  
Finally, compared to their Delayed and Typical peers, Surcharge freshmen are less likely to 
graduate with a degree matching the major they first declare (44.4 percent) by 10 percentage points 
and 22 percentage points, respectively. They are also less likely to earn a degree in a different major 
– though still within the same broad field – by about the same percentage points. Adjusting for 
baseline demographic characteristics does not narrow the gaps between Surcharge students and their 
peers. Once again, because Surcharge students are less likely to graduate generally, they are less likely 
to hold a final degree that matches their first major choice. However, if I do restrict the sample to 
just freshmen graduates, the same general pattern emerges. Surcharge graduates are less likely to 
graduate in the same major, or even the same field, by about 8 percentage points compared to 
Delayed students and 15 percentage points compared to Typical students.   
Figure 11 provides a more detailed picture of the specific types of majors that students first 
pursue and eventually graduate in, by field. Panel A shows the unadjusted share of freshmen whose 
first declared major is one of eight fields (and no declared major), and Panel B shows the unadjusted 
share of freshmen whose earned degree is in one of eight fields (and no degree). The legends in the 
bottom of each panel are be read left-to-right, top-to-bottom. Surcharge freshmen’s large edge in 
first declared STEM majors appears to be driven primarily the large share who first major in 
engineering. While 33.6 percent of Surcharge freshmen declare engineering as their first desired 
major, 26.3 percent of Delayed freshmen and 20.3 percent of Typical freshmen do the same. These 
                                               
89 If I do restrict the sample to only students who graduate, the group means do change in magnitude, but the same 
general differences between groups in measures of STEM persistence remain. 
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large gaps exist despite the fact that engineering majors comprise the largest share of Delayed 
students and the second largest share of Typical students. Outside of engineering, relative to their 
Delayed and Typical peers, the share of Surcharge students first majoring in other fields is lower, 
including in the social sciences and business and communication. 
Panel B shows how these initial major choices hold up over a student’s college tenure. Of 
the total sample of Surcharge students, the largest share does graduate with a degree in engineering, 
(24.1 percent) though the second largest share is comprised of those that do not graduate at all (15.3 
percent). The proportion of Surcharge engineering graduates only exceeds that of Delayed students 
by 3.9 percentage points (20.2 percent) and Typical students by 6.6 percentage points (17.5 percent). 
The final degree compositions of Surcharge and Delayed graduates closely resemble one another 
across several fields, though Delayed graduates have a greater proportion of degrees in the social 
sciences (16.5 percent), business and communication (16.4 percent), and the physical sciences (12.5 
percent). Meanwhile, the composition of Typical degrees earned does not resemble that of 
Surcharge graduates as closely, mostly due to the relative popularity of business and communication 
degrees (21.6 percent) and lower proportion of Typical freshmen who do not graduate at all (3.1 
percent).  
6.4.2 Temporal major choice and switching  
While the last section provided a general picture of the majors that students begin and end 
with, this section captures the intermediate major decisions freshmen make by looking at major 
selection over time. Table 9 provides summative information about freshmen students’ frequency 
and timing of major switching during their enrollment in college. The layout mirrors that of Table 8, 
with columns 1 through 5 summarizing means (and standard deviations for continuous variables). 
Columns 6 and 7 note the p-value of unadjusted and adjusted differences in means between 
Surcharge and Delayed students, respectively.  
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In order to capture the behavior of all freshmen, the means presented in this table include 
the 65 percent of freshmen who do not switch their major at any point. The two exceptions are the 
means for when students first and last switch their major, when only major switchers are included. 
In keeping with prior work (Sklar, 2014; Foraker, 2012), I do not consider a student’s movement 
from an undeclared major to a declared major as a major switch. These undeclared students may 
have been pursuing the necessary courses for a specific intended major, but had simply delayed in 
declaring it formally until later. On the other hand, undeclared students may be exploring a variety 
of courses across major types, waiting to commit to a specific major after surveying their options. In 
either case, I would not consider undeclared students adding a formal major to have switched or 
changed away from a previous major pathway. Likewise, for the 11 percent of freshmen who change 
from a declared to an undeclared status, I also do not consider this a major switch.90 Even though 
their official major status may have changed, students may still be pursuing their previously declared 
major. Or, they could be trying out courses in a variety of majors.  
The top panel of Table 9 summarizes the total aggregate switching behavior of students. 
While 41.9 percent of Surcharge students and 35 percent of Delayed students switch their major at 
least once, only 30.4 percent of Typical students do. Surcharge freshmen also switch their major 
slightly more (0.581 times) than their peers, and the difference between them and Delayed students 
remains intact even when adjusting for differences in baseline student demographics.  However, it is 
important to note that both Surcharge and Delayed students stay enrolled for a greater number of 
regular terms, giving them a longer time horizon over which to switch a major. In fact, as Figure 12 
shows, the share of both Surcharge and Delayed freshmen who switch their major at some point 
                                               
90 Of the freshmen who do switch from declared to undeclared status, 96 percent only abandon a declared major one 
time. Delayed students are more likely to move into undeclared status than their peers, though both Delayed and 
Surcharge students are more likely to do so after year two – in term 4.91 for Delayed students and term 5.46 for 
Surcharge students.  
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only exceeds Typical freshmen by at term eight – the latter’s final term on campus. This longer time 
horizon for major switching also helps explain why Surcharge and Delayed students average a higher 
number of total majors (1.579 and 1.467, respectively) than their Typical peers.91  
The bottom panel in Table 9 summarizes the timing of when major switches occur. For 
those freshmen who engage in major switching, both Surcharge and Delayed students switch their 
first and last held majors in a later term relative to the Typical students. On average, Surcharge 
freshmen first switch their major in term 6.998, while Delayed switchers first change their major in 
term 6.243 and Typical freshmen change their major in term 4.791. Of note, the mean term in which 
freshmen first switch majors across all groups is after term four, or year two. Yue & Fue (2017), 
Foraker (2012), and Sklar (2014) find that major switching later in college (after year two) is 
correlated with a higher risk of not graduating and of extending time-do-degree. The final three rows 
identify if and when students switched their major, inclusive of all freshmen. Typical students are 
slightly more likely to have switched their major at or before term four, while a greater share of 
Surcharge students switch their majors after term four (12 percent) and after term six (7.3 percent). 
Figure 13 illustrates the cumulative number of times freshmen switch majors by term 
(though not including Accumulator students due to their small sample size). Only by term eight do 
Surcharge students surpass their Typical peers in the mean number of times they switch their major 
(0.433 compared to 0.422). However, these differences are statistically significant. For their part, 
Delayed freshmen accumulate a fewer number of major switches relative to both groups up through 
term eight. After term eight, Surcharge and Delayed students continue to switch majors, raising the 
                                               
91 If I restrict the sample to just those freshmen who do switch majors, the differences between Typical, Delayed, and 
Surcharge students do diminish. The number of times students switch majors averages 1.34-1.39, and the mean number 
of total majors held hovers between 2.34 and 2.39. 
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possibility that major switching may also be a response to being assessed the surcharge, or as a 
means of trying to avoid it.  
Cumulatively, the results of Table 8 and Figures 12 and 13 suggest that major switching is 
not pervasive across any groups, including for Surcharge students. This pattern comports with 
previous studies (Yue & Fu, 2017; Sklar, 2014; Foraker’s, 2012). Because major switching does not 
appear to be occurring with great frequency for any group, this suggests that students largely stay 
within their major once they first declare it. However, as we observed in the previous section, when 
students formally declare a major differs by groups. Surcharge and Delayed students, on average, 
declare a first major later than Typical students. Figure 14 shows the share of undeclared students 
per group and term, excluding Accumulator students. By term four, 32 percent of Delayed and 
Surcharge students remain undeclared compared to 17 percent of Typical freshmen. Though after 
this term, Surcharge freshmen exceed their Delayed peers in the share of students who remain 
undeclared. By term six, 17 percent of Surcharge and 12 percent of Delayed students remain 
undeclared while only 2 percent of Typical freshmen hold no declared major. Surcharge students 
may not significantly differ from their peers when it comes to major switching frequency, but they 
do appear to formally commit to their intended major at a later point in their college experience. 
As noted previously, when Surcharge freshmen do eventually commit to a major, they are 
more likely than their peers to select a major in STEM. Figure 15, Panels A and B illustrate how the 
share of freshmen holding STEM majors and non-STEM majors varies over time. From the very 
beginning, the proportion of Surcharge students committed to a STEM major exceeds the 
proportions in both the Delayed and Typical groups, with the gap between Surcharge freshmen and 
their peers expanding after term four. By term eight, the share of STEM Surcharge majors exceeds 
STEM Delayed students by nearly 8 percentage points. Meanwhile, Panel B illustrates that the share 
of non-STEM Surcharge students also increases over time, in fact at a rate exceeding the growth in 
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the share of STEM Surcharge students. Nonetheless, the share of non-STEM Surcharge students 
never exceeds that of Delayed and Typical freshmen in any term. The difference between Surcharge 
freshmen and their peers begins to increase at term three, such that by term eight, the share of 
Surcharge freshmen in non-STEM majors is 11 percentage points less than the share of Delayed 
freshmen and 17 percentage points less than the share of Typical freshmen in non-STEM majors.  
Together, both panels illustrate that while Surcharge freshmen, on average, begin college with a 
different choice of major than their peers, these differences solidify and become more substantive in 
magnitude in each subsequent term. Though not shown here, these unadjusted differences between 
Surcharge/Typical freshmen and their Delayed counterparts do not alter with the inclusion of 
baseline student demographics and remain statistically significantly different. 
The means in Figure 15 include all students, including those who persist within a STEM 
major and those who persist within a non-STEM major (even if they switch majors within these 
categories). Figure 16, however, only focuses on the cumulative movement of freshmen into STEM 
and out of STEM majors. A student can migrate into a STEM major from either a declared non-
STEM major or an undeclared major. Likewise, they can migrate out of a STEM major into either a 
non-STEM major or an undeclared major. Several authors have examined this movement between 
STEM and non-STEM majors. Anderson and Kim (2006) and Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz 
(2016) find that Black and Hispanic students are about as likely as White students to initially pursue 
a STEM degree, but are much less likely to persist in these fields. Underrepresented racial and ethnic 
minorities are more likely to switch out of STEM majors; and Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Spenner 
(2012) attribute nearly all of this switching behavior to differences in academic background. Courses 
in STEM majors are often more difficult, require more study time, and have harsher grade 
distributions than courses in the non-STEM fields. Given that Surcharge students are more likely to 
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be of minority racial/ethnic backgrounds and to have lower high school GPAs, we may anticipate 
these students to be at a higher risk of switching out of a STEM major over time.  
Major switching in and out STEM fields also comes with the risk of not completing a degree 
on time, or at all. Using the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study (2004-09), Sklar 
(2014) finds that early major movement (in year two or before) into a non-STEM major has 
essentially a negligible effect on students’ likelihood of graduating, all else equal. Early migration into 
a STEM major has a minimal effect on graduation prospects. However, late major switching is 
problematic. Late switching to a non-STEM major reduces the likelihood of students graduating, 
and late switching to a STEM major is particularly detrimental to students’ probability of graduating 
and increases their expected time-to-degree. In Sklar’s (2014) analysis, late STEM switchers are 
predicted to have median graduation times between a quarter of a year and almost a year longer than 
the median time for students who persist within the same major. Importantly, he finds that negative 
consequences to late switching exist for both those who switch from an undeclared status and those 
who switch from an initial non-STEM major.   
Figure 16 shows the cumulative share of students who have moved into a STEM major and 
out of a STEM major in Panels A and B, respectively. The cumulative share of Surcharge freshmen 
moving into a STEM major is about the even with Delayed freshmen until around term four or five, 
when the growth in the share of Surcharge freshmen begins to outpace that of their Delayed peers. 
Both the unadjusted and adjusted differences (not shown) between Surcharge and Delayed students 
are statistically significant from term four to term ten. By term four, the share of Surcharge students 
moving into STEM is 11 percent, but by term ten, that share has more than doubled to 25 percent. 
This increase in the number of STEM Surcharge students mostly reflects undeclared students 
committing to a STEM course of study rather than a steady shift of students away from non-STEM 
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majors. Closer inspection also reveals that increased share of freshmen moving into STEM is driven 
primarily by the behavior of Asian, non-Hispanic and White, non-Hispanic students.  
Interestingly, the share of Surcharge freshmen moving out of STEM majors is also slightly 
more than the share in other groups by around term five, when the gap begins to widen even more. 
This share is smaller in magnitude than the share moving into STEM, and the difference between 
Surcharge students and their peers is smaller in magnitude, only weakly statistically significant 
between terms seven through ten. In this period, the share grows from 13 percent to only about 15 
percent. Closer inspection of the student movement by race revealed a similar trend, whereby most 
of the moving is occurring by Asian and White students and not students traditionally 
underrepresented in STEM. This finding conflicts with what we may expect given prior research 
showing underrepresented minorities to leave STEM majors at a greater rate. At least within the 
Surcharge group, I do not observe this pattern.  
These two panels suggest two different strands of Surcharge students may exist when it 
comes to late major switching. For a larger share of students, they decide to commit to a STEM 
major further along into their college experience. These students may have been informally pursuing 
a STEM degree as undeclared majors or may have used their early years in college to test out 
different majors. For the second smaller subset of Surcharge students, these students decide to 
switch out of a declared STEM major the closer they get to approaching eight terms on campus. 
These students may recognize that they are unable to finish a STEM degree with satisfactory 
performance or in an optimal timeframe, leading them to pursue an alternative major. This switch, 
however, is still not ideal considering that students must still work on completing another major’s 
requirements, adding time and additional coursework to their college tenures. And even though, 
Sklar (2014) found late switching to a STEM major to be the most detrimental to students’ 
probability of finishing, late switching to a non-STEM major was nearly as damaging to students’ 
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likelihood of graduating on-time or at all. As Table 5 showed previously, Surcharge students have a 
longer time-to-degree and lower graduation rate than their Delayed peers. It seems reasonable that 
students’ late major selection behavior may play a role. 
The final part of this section shows the share of students majoring in the five most common 
fields by each term. These include the physical sciences, engineering, the social sciences, the 
humanities, and business and communication. Figure 17 shows the share of students majoring in 
each field by group as well as the unadjusted and adjusted differences between Surcharge/Typical 
students and their Delayed peers. As before, the focus on these figures is on initially enrolled 
freshmen who are not Accumulators, due to small sample size. Panels on the left (A, C, E, G, and I) 
illustrate the share in each field over time whereas panels on the left (B, D, F, H, and J) illustrate the 
corresponding unadjusted and adjusted differences in the shares.  
The first takeaway from scanning the panels in Figure 17 is, as previous findings indicated, 
the share of Surcharge freshmen majoring in engineering significantly exceeds that of their peers 
over the course of enrollment, but especially post term four. By term six, the share of Surcharge 
engineering students exceeds the share of Delayed freshmen by 6 percentage points and the share of 
Typical students by 12 percentage points. Adjusting for demographic characteristics correlated with 
students’ group placement only narrows the difference between Surcharge and Delayed freshmen 
slightly. This relatively high share of engineering majors in the Surcharge category may help partially 
explain why, unlike their Delayed peers, they are unable to reliably turn to extension credit hours 
after term eight when students are most vulnerable to hitting the surcharge. Engineering courses are 
less likely to have an appropriate, relevant course that can be taken online or at an extension outfit. 
The second takeaway is that the share of Surcharge freshmen majoring in the other key fields 
is lower than their both Delayed and Typical peers in the first eight terms. The gap is particularly 
large in business and communication, where the deficit experienced by Surcharge freshmen is the 
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inverse of the premium they hold in engineering. By term six, the share of Surcharge students falls 
behind that of Delayed students by 6 percentage points and Typical students by about 11 percentage 
points. Typical students in particular are much more likely to major in business and communication. 
Adjusting for demographic characteristics actually expands the gaps between groups by 1-2 
percentage points. 
A final key observation concerns the share of students majoring in the social sciences and 
the humanities. Surcharge freshmen fall behind their peers in majoring in both fields up through 
term eight, though by term nine, they have surpassed their Typical peers. This shift mostly reflects 
undeclared Surcharge students first declaring a social science or humanities major in their later 
college years, rather a surge of Surcharge students switching into these fields. The gap between 
Delayed and Surcharge students in social science majoring expands slowly after term four and stays 
statistically significantly from term five onward. The gap between Delayed and Surcharge students 
majoring in the humanities stays much more consistently narrow over time, though also statistically 
significant from term five onward. In the case of both fields, adjusting for demographic 
characteristics actually widens the difference between Delayed and Surcharge students further each 
term. 
6.5 Course Performance 
 This section explores how students perform in their courses each term, probing the ways in 
which Surcharge students in particular fail to earn as many of the credits they attempt as their peers 
in other groups. In keeping with the previous section focused on student major, this section focuses 
exclusively on freshmen for continuity. Overall, I find that Surcharge freshmen are more likely than 
their peers to underperform in courses in a variety of ways—from outright failing to withdrawing at 
a late date. Between terms one and eight (the first four years), the difference between Surcharge and 
Delayed students in underperformance expands, helping give context to why Surcharge students 
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earn a lower cumulative share of the total credits they attempt over time. Moreover, Surcharge 
students of all majors (e.g., STEM/non-STEM, engineering, humanities, etc.) are more likely than 
their peers in other groups to fail, repeat, and withdraw from courses, regardless of whether these 
courses are in a STEM/non-STEM field or in the same broad field as a student’s declared major at 
the time. 
6.5.1. Summative course performance 
 Course performance measures are taken from student course-level records and aggregated 
up to the term- and the student-level. All three measures of course performance observed represent 
ways that students add to their cumulative credit hours attempted while simultaneously not adding 
to their cumulative credit hours earned. The first measure is the number of courses that students fail 
either by receiving a failing grade or an “incomplete” in the course. The second measure is the 
number of courses that students withdraw from after the “add/drop” period has ended. Though 
students do not complete these withdrawn courses, the credit hours still count as attempted. The 
third and final measure is the number of courses that students repeat at some point. Technically, 
students can repeat a course they have passed previously, but often students repeat courses they 
have failed to earn credit for the first time around. From a policy perspective, surcharge policies are 
put in place as a means of explicitly trying to reduce the number of courses students fail, withdraw 
from, and repeat because all three are considered “unnecessary or excessive” course-taking that do 
not meaningfully contribute to a degree (Kramer et al., 2018). 
 Table 10 presents summary statistics for freshmen students’ course performance over their 
entire enrollment period. The layout mirrors that of previous tables in columns 1-6. All freshmen are 
included in this table even those who never fail, repeat, or withdraw from a class as a way of 
capturing the aggregate behavior of all students. The first section summarizes students’ total failing 
metrics, and the means presented make sense given what we know about Surcharge students’ lower 
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relative completion rate. Nearly 87 percent of all Surcharge students fail a course at some point, 
more than double the proportion of Typical students who fail a course (42.6 percent) and 11 
percentage points more than the share of Delayed students who fail at some point. Moreover, 
Surcharge students fail more courses on average than their peers at 4.717 total, with Delayed 
students coming in second at 2.685. Again, because both groups are by definition enrolled for more 
terms, they also have a longer time horizon over which to fail courses. The final row in the top 
section puts the total number of courses students fail into perspective by dividing that number by 
the total number of attempted credit hours students accrue over their enrollment. Even with this 
relative metric, Surcharge students differ from their Delayed peers, failing 2.8 percent of their total 
attempted hours to Delayed students’ 2.0 percent. The magnitude is substantively small, but 
statistically significant, even when adjusted for baseline demographics and institution-by-cohort 
fixed effects.  
 The next two sections present the same summary statistics for the number of total courses 
repeated and withdrawn from, respectively. Nearly 94 percent of Surcharge students repeat a course 
at some point, exceeding the number of students who fail at least one course. This suggests that 
some students repeat courses that they previously passed. This is not necessarily surprising, given 
that some majors and courses have higher performance requirements, requiring grades of C or 
better, for example, in order for student to progress. Some students may also choose to repeat a 
course if they do not feel prepared for the next course in the major sequence. Like before, Surcharge 
students also exceed their peers in the total number of courses they repeat (6.309), though 
Accumulator students (4.932) have the next highest number of repeated courses. For Surcharge 
students, these repeated courses equal 3.7 percent of the courses they attempt. Finally, the last 
section shows that students across all four groups are less likely to withdraw from a course than they 
are to fail or repeat one. Nonetheless, Surcharge students are even more likely to withdraw than their 
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peers (64.5 percent). The mean number of courses withdrawn from is only 2.442, equivalent to 1.5 
percent of the total number attempted hours Surcharge students accrue. Along all summative 
metrics of repeating and withdrawing, Surcharge students differ meaningfully from their Delayed 
peers.     
6.5.2 Temporal variation in failing, repeating, and withdrawing from courses  
While these summative means provide a broad overview of the mean experiences of each 
group over their enrollment periods, they obscure time-varying patterns and capture unequal time 
horizons. Figure 18 breaks apart these means by term and group, illustrating the ratio of cumulative 
number of times a freshman student fails, repeats, or withdraws from a course relative to the 
cumulative number of credits they have attempted up to that term. Panel A contains the ratio of 
failed courses, Panel B the ratio of repeated courses, and Panel C the ratio of withdrawn courses. 
Within all eight terms across all panels, freshmen Surcharge students “exceed” their peers in 
underperforming. They consistently fail, repeat, and withdraw from a larger percent of their total 
attempted credits, with the distances between groups generally expanding in each subsequent term. 
The growth rate is particularly striking in the ratio of cumulative number of repeated courses relative 
to attempted credits. By term eight, the difference in cumulative courses repeated to cumulative 
attempted hours between Surcharge and Delayed students reaches its apex at 1.4 percentage points 
(3.5 percent – 2.1 percent). Though the gaps remain smaller in both the failed and withdrawn panels, 
the differences remain statistically significant and of the same size even after adjusting for student 
characteristics and institution-by-cohort effects. 
   To understand more about which courses students are underperforming in, I look at the 
how the failed/repeated/withdrawn courses compare to students’ declared major at the time, both 
in terms of STEM designation and broad field. A central limitation of the course-level data, the 
source of these performance measures, is that each course is only identified at the two-digit CIP 
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level rather than the more detailed four- and six-digit levels. As a consequence, I can only identify 
courses as STEM or non-STEM based on whether they fall into one of four two-digit CIP 
categories that are entirely inclusive of STEM degrees. These categories are Engineering, Biological 
and Biomedical Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics, and the Physical Sciences.92 The STEM label 
for courses is therefore much narrower than has been used previously to label major and degree 
areas. Likewise, I can only use these two-digit CIP codes to identify the broad field a course sits 
within, while previously I was able to use the more detailed four-digit CIP codes to classify majors 
and degrees into one of eight field areas. For consistency in measuring the alignment between 
students’ course performance and major, I use the two-digit CIP codes attached to students’ major 
to generate variables that identify how a failed/repeated/withdrawn course aligns with a student’s 
current choice of major in each term.  
Figure 19 shows the relationship between the cumulative number of STEM courses that 
freshmen fail, repeat, and withdraw from – while STEM majors – relative to the cumulative number 
of credits they attempt by term and group. I focus on the relationship between STEM courses and 
STEM majors given that Surcharge students are more likely than their peers to be enrolled in a 
STEM major in any given term. Panels A through C denote the ratio of the number of courses 
students fail, repeat, and withdraw from, respectively. Once again, across all panels, Surcharge 
freshmen exceed their peers in measures of underperformance in terms one through eight (with the 
exception of term one for repeated courses). The difference in the cumulative ratios of 
underperforming expands over time such that by term eight, Surcharge students cumulatively fail 
0.74 percent, repeat 0.90 percent, and withdraw from 0.30 percent of the STEM courses they take as 
STEM majors, relative to the total number of credits they attempt up to that point.  
                                               
92 In contrast, when identifying students’ major and degree areas as STEM and non-STEM in previous sections, I was to 
include numerous majors that fall outside of these broad two-digit categories, yet based on their six-digit CIP code still 
met the Department of Homeland Security’s definition of a STEM degree.  
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Because most students across all groups do not underperform in the majority of their 
courses, these ratios are small in percentage terms. However, the magnitude of the difference in 
failing, repeating, and withdrawing from STEM courses as a STEM majors between Surcharge and 
Delayed students is statistically significant in the first eight terms, even when the means are adjusted. 
In other words, Surcharge freshmen underperform in STEM noticeably more than their Delayed 
peers, even as declared STEM majors. I also look at the cumulative ratio of failing, repeating, and 
withdrawing from courses in other scenarios including: (1) non-STEM courses as non-STEM major, 
(2) STEM courses as non-STEM major, and (3) non-STEM courses as STEM major. In all of these 
conditions, Surcharge students perform worse than their Delayed peers. Under any scenario, they 
are more likely to fail, repeat, or withdraw from a course that either aligns or does not align with 
their major in terms of STEM designation.  
Figure 20 explores the relationship between course underperformance and students’ declared 
major at the time they fail, repeat, or withdraw from a course. Panels A through C look at students’ 
performance when the course is in the same broad field as their major, while Panels D through F 
show students’ performance when the course is in a different broad field from their major. No 
matter the scenario, Surcharge freshmen fail, repeat, and withdraw from more courses than their 
peers, even when adjusted for the total number of credits they attempt. As an example, by term 
eight, Surcharge freshmen fail 0.90 percent of the courses they take that are aligned with their major 
field relative to the cumulative number of attempted credits they have taken up to that point. They 
also fail 0.18 percent of the courses they take that are in a different broad field than their major, 
relative to the cumulative number of attempted credits they have taken up to that point. Once again, 
Surcharge freshmen underperform at a rate exceeding even their Delayed peers in a variety of ways, 
whether the courses they fail/repeat/withdraw from are in the same or different broad major field. 
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The gaps in underperformance between the two groups stays statistically significant, even with the 
inclusion of demographic characteristics and institution-by-cohort effects.    
This section demonstrates that in multiple ways, Surcharge students are much more likely to 
underperform relative to their peers in the courses they do attempt. Even with a lighter course load 
compared to their Typical and Accumulator peers, they fail, repeat, and withdraw from a larger 
percentage of their total attempted hours. Moreover, these patterns of underperforming do not 
appear to relate to the fact that Surcharge students are more likely to be STEM majors or to seek 
engineering degrees broadly. Across all majors (STEM/non-STEM) and fields, Surcharge students 
fail, repeat, and withdraw from courses of all types at a rate exceeding even their Delayed 
counterparts. In general, the gaps in underperforming expand between terms one and eight, and 
especially in term five and beyond. These terms coincide with when an increased share of Surcharge 
students formally declares both STEM and non-STEM majors and also when students are more 
likely to be taking upper division courses which are often more specialized and challenging 
academically. Altogether, we can see why the cumulative share of earned to attempted hours for 
Surcharge students diminishes as students progress further into their college experiences. Course 
failures, repetitions, and withdrawals occur with more frequency after term four (year two). 
6.6 Financial aid 
 The final time-varying aspect of students’ college experiences that I examine as a way of 
understanding how Surcharge students differ from their peers is the use of financial aid. In addition 
to whether students fill out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) in a given term, I 
am only able to observe the amount of grant aid students receive each term from federal, state, 
institutional, and private sources. I cannot observe other sources of financial assistance such as 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans. I also cannot observe how aid received compares to students’ 
Expected Family Contribution or to their household income, in order to know the relative value of 
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the aid. Regardless of these limitations, the data I do have still provide an important view into the 
ways different groups of students fund their college degrees.  
 I find that Surcharge students appear more financially needy than their peers in other groups 
given the frequency with which they apply for federal aid, the share of Surcharge students who do 
receive federal aid, and the cumulative amount of aid per credit hour that they receive in any given 
term. Surcharge students, however, are less likely to utilize funding from institutional and private aid 
sources compared to Typical students. Yet, they consistently earn more aid than their Delayed peers 
across all terms and in nearly all aid categories. The substantial amount of aid that Surcharge 
students receive is interesting in light of their relatively worse completion-related outcomes. 
However, it is impossible to directly link aid receipt to surcharge incidence. Rather, it seems more 
likely that aid receipt signifies the financial need and income situation of Surcharge students.  
 Table 11 shows summative financial aid statistics for all students, broken apart by freshmen 
and transfer students separately. Columns 6 and 13 denote the p-value of the unadjusted differences 
in means between Surcharge and Delayed students, while columns 7 and 14 denote the p-value of 
the adjusted differences in means between these groups. Columns 13 and 14 reveal that there is little 
substantive or statistical difference between Surcharge and Delayed transfers along a host of 
financial aid dimensions. Therefore, for economy and consistency, I focus the rest of the discussion 
in this section on the sample of initial freshmen enrollees only, exclusive of Accumulator students. 
The first section of Table 11 summarizes students’ engagement with the FAFSA. A higher 
proportion of Surcharge students ever fill out the FAFSA (73.3 percent) compared to their Delayed 
(65.3 percent) and Typical peers (65.2 percent). Yet, the share of enrolled terms that Surcharge 
students fill out the FAFSA (40.8 percent) only exceeds that of their Delayed peers (36.0 percent) in 
a statistically meaningful way.  
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 Though certainly an imperfect measure, FAFSA filing represents the best indication of 
student financial need available to me, and initial summary statistics seem to indicate that Surcharge 
students are in more need of aid than their otherwise similar counterparts. Figure 21 shows the 
temporal variation in the share of FAFSA applicants by term and group for freshmen in Panels A 
and B. Panel A illustrates that in each term, Typical students fall only slightly below their Surcharge 
peers in the share filling out the FAFSA; however, the share of Delayed FAFSA filers is consistently 
3 to 5 percentage points lower than that of Surcharge filers in the first eight terms. Panel B does 
show that the gap between Surcharge and Delayed students in FAFSA filing does narrow 1-2 
percentage points once the demographic composition of each group and institution-by-cohort 
effects are considered. Still, the difference remains statistically significant. Of final note, the gap in 
the share of FAFSA applicants between both groups actually expands after term eight. This seems 
reasonable as these would be the terms in which Surcharge students would be billed an additional 50 
percent fee on their tuition. Financial aid may become even more important. 
 The next sections detail the share of students receiving aid from each broad category, when 
they first receive aid, and how the total amount of aid students receive compares to the number of 
credit hours they attempt overall. All aid numbers are in real 2015 dollars, and with the exception of 
the section summarizing when students first receive aid, all students are included – even those who 
never receive aid from a specific funding source. Within each unique aid category, the share of 
Surcharge students receiving aid at some is point is greater than the share of Delayed students 
receiving aid. Nearly 80 percent of Surcharge freshmen receive aid from the federal government, 
followed by 66.4 percent who receive institutional aid, and 57.7 percent who receive state aid. With 
the exception of private aid, Surcharge students appear to first receive aid from each source at about 
the same point in their college experiences as their peers.  
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The last section puts the amount of aid students receive into further context, relative to the 
number credits students attempt. After adjusting for differences in demographic composition as well 
as institutional and cohort effects between groups, the differences between Surcharge and Delayed 
students persist for all aid categories except institutional aid. For every attempted credit that students 
take, the dollar amounts in aid that Surcharge freshmen receive from federal, state, and private 
sources exceed that of all other groups. For example, for each credit hour attempted, Surcharge 
freshmen receive $205.81 in federal aid, while Delayed freshmen receive the second most at $177.51. 
The financial premium experienced by Surcharge students is remarkable because these figures adjust 
for the fact that Surcharge students take more total credit hours than their peers in other groups. 
When it comes to institutional aid, Surcharge students lag behind the three other groups in the 
relative dollar amount received per credit hour attempted. This may reflect the fact that Surcharge 
students are less likely to apply for aid from institutional sources, and/or because they are less 
successful in obtaining this aid, either by not meeting certain academic requirements or by not 
pursuing specific majors.  
 Figure 22 shows the temporal variation in the share of students receiving aid from each 
funding sources as well as the ratio of cumulative aid received from each funding source to the 
cumulative number of credits a student attempts by that term. As before, Accumulator (N=74) 
students are not diagrammed for ease of interpretation. Panels A and B shows trends for total aid 
received by students over time, though both obscure the nuance in aid receipt within categories. 
This is observed most clearly when one compares the share of students receiving aid from federal 
and state sources (Panels C and E, respectively) with the share of students receiving aid from 
institutional and private sources (Panels G and I, respectively).  
Between terms one and eight, the share of Surcharge freshmen receiving federal and state aid 
consistently exceeds the share of students receiving these sources of aid in the Delayed and Typical 
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groups. The gap between Surcharge students and their peers is particularly large when it comes to 
federal aid, and that gap stays about the same size in magnitude over the first eight terms. Even after 
adjusting for demographic and institution-by-cohort fixed effects, the difference between Surcharge 
and Delayed students remains large and statistically significant. Panel D shows the cumulative 
amount of federal aid received per cumulative attempted credits per term. Once again, the gap 
between Surcharge and Delayed students stay steadily large and statistically significant over time.  
The largest source of federal grant aid comes in the form of Pell Grants, and while there is 
no explicit household income limit on Pell receipt, Pell Grants are targeted towards lower- and 
middle- income students (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Together, the fact that Surcharge 
students are more likely than their peers to apply for they FAFSA in any given term, and the fact 
that they receive more federal aid (Pell grants) in any given term, suggest that Surcharge students 
may be of lower socioeconomic status than their peers in other groups. Many of the other defining 
demographic features of Surcharge students (e.g., male, Black, Hispanic, low entering high school 
GPA, etc.) are correlated with low income status as well. Though to be sure, I cannot verify this for 
certain in my data.  
 The trend lines for the share of students receiving state aid and the ratio of cumulative state 
aid received to credits attempted mirror those of federal aid in many ways, though the share of 
students relying on state aid precipitously drops after term eight, causing the ratio of cumulative aid 
to attempted hours to decrease as well. Meanwhile, the trends for institutional and private aid tell a 
slightly different story. Though the share of Surcharge students exceeds the share of Typical 
students receiving institutional aid from terms one through four, from term five onward, the share 
of Typical students earning institutional aid gradually starts outpacing Surcharge students. As Panel 
H highlights, Typical students receive significantly more institutional aid per attempted credit than 
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both Surcharge and Delayed students. For all terms, Surcharge students do not differ statistically 
from their Delayed peers in terms of total institutional aid received.  
 Finally, Panels I and J show the progression of private aid receipt over time, and once again, 
Typical students are more likely than their peers in other two groups to receive private aid over the 
first eight terms. However, the stay roughly even with Surcharge students when it comes to the 
cumulative amount of aid received per cumulative attempted credits by term. Still, students in all 
three groups come to rely less on private aid as they progress further along in college.  
 Without loan data, I do not have a comprehensive picture of the financial aid sources 
students rely on to complete college, though I do find that a substantial number of students come to 
rely on some form of grant over their college tenures. Some previous studies suggest that students 
receiving grants are less likely to graduate on time than those using loans, controlling for other 
student characteristics (Kurlaender, 2012). Others show positive, yet inconclusive effects of grant aid 
receipt on completion (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). In my analytic sample, Surcharge students 
not only appear more likely to receive aid – especially from federal and state sources – but to receive 
more aid dollars per credit attempted than students in other groups, including their Delayed peers 
who also do not graduate on time.  
Aid receipt may perhaps directly relate to students’ likelihood of being assessed the 
surcharge by reducing students’ personal financial burden and removing them from the “true cost” 
of their college education. By being emotionally removed from the costs, these students may have 
less of an incentive to graduate within four years or to refrain from taking an excessive number of 
credits. However, given the findings in Kramer et al. (2017), this direct effect seems likely to occur 
on only a small scale, if at all. As they have found, excess credit hour policies like North Carolina’s 
surcharge policy displace the financial burden of higher education even more onto the shoulders of 
undergraduates who experience dramatic increases in student loan debt as a result. Though 
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Surcharge students may receive a substantial amount of grant aid, they may also be taking out a 
sizeable number of loans as well.  It seems more reasonable to think that the patterns and trends in 
this section reveal more about the financial situation of Surcharge students, in lieu of other 
socioeconomic measures in the data.  
7. What predicts surcharge incidence? Putting the pieces together 
Section seven gathers the descriptive findings from sections five and six to create a new, 
adjusted predictive framework for the factors that may increase students’ likelihoods of being 
assessed the surcharge. It expands upon the initial OLS multivariate regression presented in Table 7, 
adding in covariates that aggregate time-varying student behaviors that appear to relate to surcharge 
incidence. The purpose of this exercise is to build a more comprehensive predictive model, and also 
to observe how the estimated coefficients on static, student-level demographic and achievement 
measures may change once early college behavior and performance measures are accounted for as 
well. Table 12 presents the expanded regression for the full sample of students, while Table 13 
presents the expanded regression for just the sample of initial freshmen enrollees. The columns are 
laid out in the same manner in each table, with the first column containing only the regressors from 
the base model of static student-level demographic and achievement measures. Each subsequent 
column adds in covariates that coincide with the time-varying dimensions explored in section six 
(e.g., stop out rates, credits earned, financial aid, etc.).  
For discussion purposes, I focus on Table 12, referring to the original full sample of 
students.93 One of the first key takeaways from Table 12 is that, though inclusion of students’ college 
behaviors and performance does not reduce the statistical significance of most demographic and 
achievement characteristics, it does reduce the magnitude of their estimated coefficients. For 
                                               
93 Appendix Table 1 shows the results of Table 12 separately for each of the four institutions, showing the baseline 
(column 1) model alongside the full model (column 8) for comparison.  
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example, from columns one through eight, the predicted likelihood of being assessed the surcharge 
for male students shrinks by about 64 percent, from 7.1 percentage points to 2.6 percentage points. 
Likewise, the predicted likelihood of hitting the surcharge for Black, Non-Hispanic students shrinks 
by 45 percent, from 7.4 percentage points to 4.1 percentage points. Even the association between 
students’ high school GPA diminishes by nearly a two-thirds from -0.029 percentage points to -0.01 
percentage points. Meanwhile, being a transfer student still does not increase students’ likelihood of 
surcharge incidence, though the amount of transfer credits at entry appears to slightly matter. Male 
students from underrepresented racial and minority groups and with lower high school GPAs are 
still at a greater baseline risk of being assessed the surcharge, but these immutable features matter 
less than many aspects of the college experience that students have the power to manipulate (and 
institutions have the power to affect). 
Holding all else constant, the pace at which students attempt credits affects their likelihood 
of being assessed the surcharge, such that students who have attempted more credit hours – 
whether as regular session hours, summer hours, or extension hours – in any given term within the 
first four years are at a lower risk of hitting the surcharge. Having a heavier course load matters even 
in the first two years of college. For each additional attempted surcharge-relevant credit that 
students have accrued by term four, their likelihood of being assessed the surcharge decreases by 0.2 
percentage points. For each additional summer (extension) credit attempted by term four, students 
are less likely to experience the surcharge by 0.4 (0.5) percentage points. Neither summer nor 
extension hours count towards the 140-credit limit and represent viable alternative course pathways. 
Just as students’ early per-term course loads matter in predicting surcharge incidence, the 
number of credits students ultimately earn each term matters even more. By the end of term four, 
each additional percentage point increase in share of cumulative attempted credit hours that a 
student earns is associated with a reduced surcharge likelihood of 0.7 percentage points. Together, 
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the relationship between credits attempted, credits earned, and surcharge incidence coincides with 
findings from previous research. Students who make substantial progress towards their degree 
within the first one to two years of college are at a greater likelihood of completing in general, and at 
a faster rate than their otherwise similar peers. In order to earn credits, students have to attempt 
them. And in order to earn credits, students have to give a satisfactory performance in the courses 
they do take. Though neither the cumulative number of failed or withdrawn course as a share of 
cumulative attempted hours by term four appear to affect surcharge likelihood, holding all else 
constant, the cumulative number of repeated courses does appear to matter (estimated effect: 1.8 
percentage points). It is important to note, however, that many students repeat courses because they 
failed them the first time around or they withdrew late. Models that only include cumulative failed 
and withdrawn courses show positive, statistically significant estimates for both variables.    
Patterns of credit accumulation relate to students’ choice of major. As Table 12 shows, initial 
major decisions are associated with students’ probability of experiencing the surcharge. Holding all 
else constant, declaring a first major at or before term four reduces the likelihood of surcharge 
incidence by 6.0 percentage points. Meanwhile, declaring a STEM major as their first major increases 
the likelihood a student is assessed the surcharge by 1.8 percentage points, and declaring an 
engineering major specifically increases the likelihood of surcharge incidence by 8.3 percentage 
points, ceteris paribus. The negative estimate of declaring a major by the end of year two and the 
positive estimate of declaring an engineering major initially are both noteworthy because they are 
larger in magnitude than the predicted association between being male or of being Black, Non-
Hispanic and of being assessed the tuition surcharge. 
The importance of major decisions is also apparent when we observe the relationship 
between major switching behaviors and likelihood of surcharge incidence. Students who switch their 
major late, after term four, are 9.5 percentage points more likely to experience the surcharge than 
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their otherwise similar peers – even if they switched their major at some point earlier. Movement 
into and out of majors after year two has been found to delay students’ time-to-degree further. This 
includes switching between declared majors and formally declaring a major at a later point. Table 12 
shows that students who formally migrate into STEM majors after year two are a 14.6 percentage 
points more likely to be assessed the surcharge than their peers. This sizeable coefficient is nearly 
four times larger than the estimated coefficient of migrating out of a STEM major after year two (2.3 
percentage points). Late commitment to any major is problematic, but late commitment to a STEM 
major, appears to greatly increase the odds that a student eventually finds themselves paying a 
surcharge on their tuition. 
Finally measures of financial aid are also predictive of surcharge incidence when it comes to 
the per-credit attempted dollar amount of real aid that students receive from federal and state 
sources by term four. However, as discussed previously, the amount of aid received may serve more 
appropriately as an indication of students’ general socioeconomic status and overall financial need. 
In other words, though each per-credit attempted real dollar received does increase the likelihood a 
student is assessed the surcharge slightly, the fact that a student requires a substantial amount of 
federal and state aid in the first place may be the primary reason they are likely to be assessed the 
surcharge. These students are more likely to come from low-income households and to be first-
generation college students – two things that may put students at a disadvantage in navigating course 
loads and major selection, among other things. Relative to their otherwise similar peers, these 
students may be more likely to face the tuition surcharge by requiring more financial assistance. 
8. Limitations  
Though this study, to my knowledge, provides the first comprehensive examination of the 
types of students most likely to be affected by tuition surcharge policies, it does have several 
important limitations. First and foremost, the data I utilize from the UNC-GA do not identify which 
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students are assessed the surcharge and in which terms. Instead, I must use the publicized 
parameters of the policy and the student-level records that I do have access to in order to flag 
“surcharge eligible” students. Though a small 3 to 4 percent of students who appeal their surcharge 
fee successfully have it waived, I likely overestimate the total number of students assessed the tuition 
surcharge in my analytic sample. 
Another important limitation to note is my inability to examine a host of other student-level 
demographic characteristics that have either been found to matter in on-time degree completion 
(income status, federal loan debt, etc.) or have been anecdotally considered to relate to surcharge 
incidence (veteran students, older students, etc.). I attempt to account for students’ financial need by 
examining the amount of grant aid they receive from different sources, though these aid data do not 
reflect most students’ total financial packages or economic circumstances.  
Finally, unlike Kramer et al. (2017), I am not able to really explore how facing the surcharge 
affects students and the ways they may respond to being assessed the fee. In a side analysis, I do 
attempt to explore how measures of course performance and selection change after the surcharge 
goes into effect. However, there are several analytic challenges in probing this causal effect. First, 
though Surcharge students may change their behavior in response to the surcharge after it goes into 
effect, they may also be likely to change in response to the fee before it goes into effect as they are 
approaching the threshold. For example, a student may know they will pay the 50 percent fee in the 
following spring, and therefore decide to switch to a less demanding major in that current fall. The 
less demanding major may cost less per credit-hour in tuition/fees, or the student may feel more 
confident that they can successfully complete a degree in this major in a shorter timeframe. When 
the “effects” of the surcharge take place is temporally difficult to nail down.94 
                                               
94 Still, I did attempt to measure the effect of the surcharge by constructing a pseudo difference-in-differences (DD) 
model using Delayed students as a control group. Though both Surcharge and Delayed students stay on campus for 
more than eight terms, only the former are assessed the 50 percent fee; and theoretically, the differences in behaviors 
 174 
9. Discussion 
 This paper set out to understand what distinguishes Surcharge students from their peers 
along both static, baseline characteristics and even more so along early course performance and 
decision-making measures. Though Surcharge students similarly experience a longer time-to-degree 
as their Delayed peers, they face an additional financial tuition burden by exceeding 140 attempted 
credit hours. In investigating how the early college experiences of students may predict surcharge 
incidence, much of this paper was focused on distinguishing between simply Delayed students and 
their Surcharge peers.  
Surcharge students are more male and likely to be of underrepresented minority 
backgrounds (Black, non-Hispanic, and Hispanic) than their peers, controlling for a host of baseline 
and time-varying college characteristics. The financial aid data also suggest that these students may 
require more financial assistance and come from lower-income households than their peers. They 
also are more likely to enter college with lower high school GPAs and to be in-state, North Carolina 
residents. Contrary to the arguments made by state legislators, they do not appear more likely to be 
transfer students. Demographically, Surcharge students appear to represent an even more extreme 
subset of generally delayed students found in prior literature. 
Surcharge students also fall behind their peers early on, even before year two, in the number 
of credit hours they attempt. And even with a comparatively smaller per-term course load, they earn 
a smaller share of the credits they do attempt. Surcharge students fail to earn credits at the rate of 
                                               
post term eight between the two groups may represent the effect of the paying the surcharge. I refer to this as a pseudo 
DD because assignment to “treatment” (i.e., Surcharge status) in my case is not exogenously determined.  Students are 
assessed the surcharge based on the number of credits they attempt and the number of terms they remain enrolled, two 
facets that are manipulatable by the students themselves. In addition to this issue of endogeneity, this approach was 
limited by two other important aspects of the data that are central to maintaining the internal validity of DD studies. 
First, across a variety of metrics, the parallel trends assumption for the pre-period did not hold up between groups. This 
can be observed by the suite of figures presented in section six above. Second, because Delayed students are much more 
likely to leave the sample after term nine, I did not have a sufficient number of control students to observe in the “post” 
period. Altogether, this pseudo DD approach did not provide meaningful estimates that held up to analytic scrutiny.  
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even their Delayed peers, and are more likely to fail, repeat, and withdraw from courses in any given 
term. These courses still count towards students’ surcharge limit. Moreover, it does not seem to 
matter what major students are pursuing in terms of course failures, repetitions, or withdrawals. 
STEM Surcharge majors underperform in STEM and non-STEM courses at a rate exceeding that of 
their peers as much as non-STEM Surcharge majors underperform in non-STEM and STEM 
courses relative to their peers. 
Overall, Surcharge students are more likely to be STEM majors, especially within the field of 
engineering, and have a higher likelihood of switching a major after year two than their peers. They 
are also later in formally declaring a major, and higher proportion of Surcharge students migrate into 
STEM majors between terms five and eight than do students in other groups, including the Delayed 
group. A smaller, though statistically significant share also migrates out of STEM majors in term five 
and onward. Not only do Surcharge students commit to more intensive and rigorous majors, but 
they are more likely to do so later in their college experience – even as they have fallen behind their 
peers in the number of credits they have accumulated.  
The picture that emerges of the average Surcharge student – a male, minority STEM 
(engineering) major who receives substantial federal aid and who struggles to earn credits in a timely 
manner – is one that should be seriously considered by policymakers and administrators in 
evaluating the purpose and efficacy of tuition surcharge policies. Ironically, the students most likely 
to be burdened with the surcharge are the same ones that institutions, governments, and federal 
agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health explicitly 
aim to support in completing college in a timely manner (Arcidiacono et al., 2016). Though Kramer 
et al. (2018) were able to show that implementation of these policies shifts the steep financial cost of 
college onto students in the form of student loan debt, this paper identifies specifically the students 
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straddled by this debt. Compared to their peers, these students hold lower levels of both educational 
and financial capital. 
In Table 14, I assess the extent of the surcharge burden that students in my analytic sample 
face. Column 1 summarizes figures for all four schools combined, while columns 2 through 5 
diagram student experiences by each institution separately. The top section counts the total number 
of Surcharge students identified in each institution, and broken apart by whether the student would 
pay in-state or out-of-state tuition. The second section shows the per-credit tuition cost students 
experience before the 50 percent fee is levied.95 These per-credit charges range from $259 per credit 
hour for in-state NCA&T students to $1,642 per credit for out-of-state NCSU students. The mean 
number of credits attempted beyond 140 averages 12.40 for the full sample, with little difference 
between in-state and out-of-state students. Still, there is slightly more between-institution variation. 
In total, the Surcharge students in my analytic sample accrue an excess of 72,879.48 credit hours; 
and because the majority of Surcharge students are in-state students, 78 percent of these excess 
credits come from them.  
I also calculate the real total aid (in $1000s) that Surcharge students receive in the terms 
when they meet both surcharge criteria and thus face the additional fee. Across the board, the aid 
totals $41.5 million. For nearly all Surcharge students, 70 percent of this aid comes from federal 
grants followed by state aid (7 – 10 percent). However, at NCSU, federal aid comprises 57 percent 
of students’ total aid followed by institutional aid at 23 percent. This pattern aligns with what 
Kramer et al. found regarding differences in aid based on institutional selectively. As a very active 
                                               
95 For the purposes of classifying students for in-state or out-of-state tuition, I use students' NC residency status. Per-
credit tuition costs before the 50% fee are calculated using the published in-state and out-of-state tuition amounts in 
Table 1 divided by 12, as that is typically the minimum number of credit hours required for full enrollment. Total aid 
includes funding from federal, state, institutional, and private sources. All dollar amounts are in real 2015 dollars. 
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research institution with more available resources, NCSU can provide more institutional aid to 
students, even those facing the surcharge. 
This grant aid, however, is not enough to make up for the total costs Surcharge students 
bear. Once the surcharge is in place, the total cost (excess tuition + 50% of that tuition) totals 
$55.48 million. The excess surcharge cost just by itself totals $18.5 million. This figure is only 
calculated for the students in my analytic sample, but represents a substantial source of revenue for 
these institutions (and a substantial burden placed on students). Though students do not receive 
enough grant aid to cover the full cost of tuition plus the surcharge fee and are likely to turn to loans 
as a funding mechanism, the fact that so much aid is used for the surcharge is striking in and of 
itself. State and federal funding agencies should be made aware of how many of their dollars are 
being used to pay a fee on tuition and not just the tuition itself. 
Table 14 shows that the costs of the surcharge at the individual student-level are large in 
magnitude and provide further details about the extent of the burden Surcharge students face. Given 
the characteristics of the average Surcharge student, it is perhaps unsurprising that Kramer et al. find 
no effect of excess credit hour policies on achieving their primary policy aims – reducing time-to-
degree, encouraging timely completion, and reducing excessive course-taking. Other studies show 
that these students are already an increased risk of not completing, and the additional financial 
burden they take on in the face of the surcharge may represent an additional hurdle standing 
between them and a college degree, whether in a STEM field or not.  
The findings of this paper carry several implications that policymakers and college 
administrators should consider. For one, they may want to consider the blanket nature of the 
surcharge policy. In North Carolina, the policy is applied to students of all backgrounds and major 
selections equally, once they have surpassed both the credit- and time-limits. However, as we 
observe, this policy disproportionately affects the types of students that institutions are 
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simultaneously trying to support whether because they are of minority status, low-income status, or 
because they are pursuing a STEM degree – or all of the above. The fact that engineering students in 
particular are especially likely to be assessed the surcharge is noteworthy, and upon reflection makes 
sense. Compared to other degree areas, engineering degrees not only entail more rigorous 
coursework, but are highly sequenced such that students cannot progress to another course without 
satisfactory performance in a prerequisite or corequisite course. Surcharge students are more likely 
to fail and withdraw from courses than their peers, including ones within their same broad field. 
The highly sequenced and specific nature of engineering degrees may also explain why 
Surcharge students do not turn to extension coursework at the rate of their Delayed peers. An 
equivalent online or distance version of an engineering course is much less likely to exist compared 
to an online writing or history course. This is especially true once students enter upper division 
courses, in terms five and onward, when the rate of course failures, repetitions, and withdrawals 
increases for Surcharge students. Stakeholders should consider how to deal with the limited 
alternative course options that engineers face when their regular term progress has stalled. This may 
involve creating more summer and/or extension opportunities for engineering majors. Or, perhaps, 
engineering departments can do a better job of explicitly shifting students’ required non-engineering 
coursework to summer months or online versions. Institutions may even go a step further and 
reconsider whether some majors, like engineering, should have different surcharge criteria. 
Institutions should also reconsider the methods they employ to inform students of their 
surcharge risk. As the 2012 Fiscal Research brief noted, there is wide variation in how institutions 
educate students about the surcharge policy, and often the most intensive notification comes in the 
form of an email sent to students automatically once they register for courses in excess of 90 credit 
hours. For most students, information about the surcharge comes too late or is easily forgotten due 
to its brevity (Kramer et al., 2018). Colleges would do well do develop methods of identifying at-risk 
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students earlier and notifying them more robustly at important junctures. This seems particularly 
important for students who have not formally declared a major by the end of their second year, and 
for those students who continue pursuing a STEM major despite continuously failing, repeating, or 
withdrawing from coursework in this field. Institutions should also be willing to have honest 
conversations with students struggling to progress in a degree about the consequences of pursuing 
certain degree pathways – even at the risk of losing some additional engineering majors to other 
fields. Underrepresented minorities and low-income students – two groups likely to be assessed the 
Surcharge – are more likely to be first-generation students and to not possess the same educational 
capital as their more advantaged peers. The costs of the surcharge should be communicated much 
more explicitly to these at-risk students, as institutions also develop ways to support their continued 
degree progress.  
When the North Carolina legislature considers whether to fully eliminate the tuition 
surcharge policy, it should debate the costs and benefits of the policy with an informed idea of the 
types of students affected. The policy may not necessarily need to be replaced, but perhaps reformed 
in a way that helps it better achieve its primary aims. This begins with informing students most at-
risk of the facing the surcharge about the policy at a point in which they can still avoid the charge. It 
also begins with institutions reconsidering the blanket nature of the policy and how the lack of 
nuance may be increasing inequality in higher education inadvertently. Though this paper looks only 
at four institutions within the UNC system and cannot necessarily be generalized to other states in 
all ways, it seems reasonable that the same general patterns distinguishing Surcharge students from 
their peers would hold up in these other contexts. Future research should look at affected students 





Institutional comparison along key dimensions 






















Institutional Characteristics in Entering Yearsb       













Percent admitted 68 71 77 68 62 76 
Endowment per FTE 10090 4483 4316 2020 6363 5234 
Total fall enrollment 14100 23113 26418 10650 32406 22977 
Total fall undergraduate enrollment 11154 17972 20197 9130 24468 18095 
Percent undergraduate transfers 8 7 8 4 4 12 
Real In-State semester tuitionc 3629 4016 3706 3112 5765 3480 
Real Out-of-State semester tuitionc 16277 16945 17749 14193 19706 16134 
        
Percent of Total Enrollment that is…b       
White, non-Hispanic 54 57 76 7 75 71 
Black, non-Hispanic 34 31 15 87 9 15 
Hispanic 2 2 2 1 2 4 
Asian, Alaskan, Native Hawaiian 2 3 2 1 5 5 
Other (Two or more races, unknown) 7 6 6 4 10 7 
        
Student Test Scores: 25th - 75th percentileb       
SAT Critical Reading 457-550 459-554 453-548 390-488 523-618 473-563 
SAT Math  471-563 482-580 475-568 403-503 558-658 493-593 
ACT Composite 19-23 19-24 19-23 16-21 22-27 19-24 
        
Student Aid: Full-time, First-Time Undergraduatesd       
Percent awarded any aid 79 75 70 94 67 71 
Percent awarded federal aid 43 36 29 62 21 32 
Real mean federal aid awarded 4867 4878 4780 5208 4901 4625 
Percent awarded state aid 49 41 34 62 28 38 
Real mean state aid awarded 3306 3388 3177 3071 3993 3311 
Percent awarded institutional aid 44 42 33 53 46 37 
Real mean institutional aid awarded 3363 3756 3790 2478 5904 2853 
Percent taking out loans 59 60 59 80 44 56 
Real mean loan amount 5670 6129 6566 6206 5679 6064 
Percent awarded Pell Grants 44 36 30 63 20 33 
Real mean Pell Grant awarded 4391 4305 4266 4662 4119 4172 
        
Graduationd       
Number of Bachelor Degrees 2232 3525 3892 1311 5082 3817 
Percent receiving BA within 4 years 30 29 31 17 41 26 
Percent receiving BA within 6 years 54 56 57 41 73 53 
Notes: Data comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). All financial variables (tuition, financial aid) are in Real 
2015 dollars.  aIncludes 15 of the 16 schools in the UNC System; The UNC School of the Arts is omitted given its specialized curriculum. bFigures 
here represent institutional means for the years 2006-2009, the years my cohorts of interest enter an UNC institution. cTuition means are taken for 
the years 2010-2014 because these represent the years that students in my analysis would first be assessed the tuition surcharge. dMeans for financial 
aid and graduation are taken for years 2006-2014, encapsulating all six years that the four entering cohorts would be tracked in the UNC-GA data.  
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Table 2 
Original student counts by institution and entering cohort in UNC-GA data 
  Entering Cohort Fall 
Institution 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total % of Total 
ECU 5,348 5,745 6,061 5,260 22,414 30.5 
NCA&T 2,582 1,865 1,853 2,226 8,526 11.6 
NCSU 5,490 5,679 5,610 5,577 22,356 30.5 
UNC-C 4,648 4,876 5,137 5,429 20,090 27.4 






Analytic sample student counts by institution and entering cohort in UNC-GA data 
  Entering Cohort Fall 
Institution 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total % of Total 
ECU 1,982 2,038 2,155 2,026 8,201 27.7 
NCA&T 994 836 782 868 3,480 11.8 
NCSU 2,402 2,575 2,557 2,633 10,167 34.4 
UNC-C 1,737 1,894 1,979 2,098 7,708 26.1 






Total hours attempted and total terms by credit-term group 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  Full Sample  Typical Accumulator Delayed Surcharge 
N 29,556 12,256 2,464 8,957 5,879 
% of Full   41.5 8.3 30.3 19.9 
        
Attempted Credit Hours       
Total surcharge-relevant credit hours 135.182 126.427 153.137 130.922 152.397 
  (13.141) (5.268) (10.218) (5.690) (9.919) 
        
Total credits hours, all 146.582 134.758 162.477 145.430 166.326 
  (17.588) (9.814) (13.770) (12.692) (15.502) 
        
Total summer credit hours 8.528 6.460 7.418 10.080 10.940 
  (8.370) (6.742) (7.168) (8.922) (9.783) 
        
Total extension credit hours 4.347 3.176 3.282 6.113 4.543 
  (6.524) (5.159) (6.326) (7.804) (6.388) 
        
Total pre-college credit hours 0.266 0.214 0.002 0.429 0.238 
  (1.948) (1.706) (0.085) (2.529) (1.785) 
        
Total transfer credit hours 13.947 18.162 62.894 0.998 4.376 
  (26.033) (27.016) (23.655) (6.811) (13.871) 
        
Terms in Residence       
Total number of regular terms 8.496 7.227 6.540 9.502 10.428 
  (1.778) (1.283) (1.250) (0.676) (0.934) 
        
Total number of terms, all 10.372 8.638 8.194 11.750 12.799 
  (2.727) (1.848) (2.086) (2.016) (2.281) 
Notes: All credit and term variables in this table are summarized over a six-year period for each student. Standard 
deviations are presented in parentheses below group means. Students are classified into one of the four Credit-Term 
groups based on the number of "Total surcharge-relevant credit hours" they attempt over this period, as well as the 
"Total number regular terms" they are enrolled at a UNC institution. "Total credit hours, all" includes all credit hour 
types that students pursue including those that do not count towards the tuition surcharge credit limit such as 
summer hours, extension hours, and pre-college hours -- meaning college hours that students earn while in high 
school. Note that summer credit hours can also be considered extension hours and vice versa.  The "Total number of 
terms, all" includes any summer session I and summer session II terms a student is enrolled as well, though these 




Summary statistics of static student-level measures, by credit-term group 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Full Sample  Typical Accumulator Delayed Surcharge S-D 
N 29,556 12,256 2,464 8,957 5,879  
Institution Information         
ECU 0.277 0.285 0.295 0.287 0.241 *** 
NCA&T 0.118 0.087 0.050 0.117 0.212 *** 
NCSU 0.344 0.358 0.306 0.368 0.295 *** 
UNCC 0.261 0.271 0.349 0.229 0.252 *** 
Entering cohort year 
2007.528 2007.547 2007.592 2007.515 2007.483 
* 
(1.117) (1.118) (1.131) (1.110) (1.117) 
Demographics & Achievement         
Male 0.515 0.443 0.553 0.550 0.598 *** 
White, non-Hispanic 0.658 0.707 0.709 0.654 0.542 *** 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.217 0.170 0.131 0.231 0.331 *** 
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.040 0.038 0.043 0.040 0.042  
Hispanic 0.030 0.028 0.040 0.027 0.033 * 
Other, non-Hispanica 0.055 0.056 0.077 0.049 0.053  
Out-of-state 0.148 0.179 0.150 0.108 0.142 *** 
Non-US citizenb 0.029 0.033 0.052 0.019 0.027 *** 
NC resident 0.830 0.800 0.830 0.869 0.834 *** 
Real NC County median household (HH) income 
($1000s)  
45.08 45.06 45.06 45.02 45.27 
* 
(74.64) (72.88) (76.45) (73.9) (78.44) 
Standardizedc SAT score 
-0.002 0.100 0.155 -0.106 -0.048 
*** 
(0.979) (0.996) (1.015) (0.952) (0.965) 
Missing SAT score 0.151 0.200 0.598 0.024 0.056 *** 
Standardized High school GPA 
0.003 0.185 0.044 -0.127 -0.130  
(0.971) (0.961) (1.031) (0.961) (0.934) 
Missing high school GPA 0.140 0.186 0.480 0.029 0.069 *** 
Has pre-college credit 0.030 0.025 0.001 0.045 0.028 *** 
Transfer student 0.260 0.352 0.970 0.034 0.113 *** 
Out-of-state transfer (if transfer) 0.260 0.259 0.258 0.328 0.238 *** 
Graduation Informationd         
Student earns a degree 0.909 0.949 0.907 0.898 0.845 *** 
Earned hours at graduation (if graduated) 
137.000 131.986 149.491 135.887 144.925 *** 
(19.161) (18.478) (29.201) (14.592) (16.280) *** 
Graduation rate 
3.962 3.542 3.106 4.388 4.547 
*** 
(1.566) (1.075) (1.261) (1.574) (2.045) 
Graduated in 4 years 0.412 0.832 0.804 - - - 
Graduated in 6 years 0.878 0.944 0.897 0.865 0.756 *** 
Degree Information (if graduated…)         
1st degree is STEMe 0.358 0.315 0.443 0.355 0.427 *** 
1st degree in plant & earth sciences 0.049 0.045 0.056 0.050 0.056  
1st degree in physical sciences 0.143 0.153 0.167 0.137 0.121 ** 
1st degree in computer science & math 0.041 0.034 0.052 0.041 0.056 *** 
1st degree in engineering 0.211 0.161 0.266 0.223 0.283 *** 
1st degree in social science 0.172 0.172 0.132 0.184 0.169 ** 
1st degree in humanities 0.117 0.110 0.115 0.122 0.129  
1st degree in business & communication 0.187 0.231 0.120 0.183 0.121 *** 
1st degree in education 0.079 0.094 0.093 0.061 0.065   
Notes: Group means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses if the variable is continuous. Column 6 indicates the p-value of the unadjusted 
difference in means between Surcharge and Delayed students, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. aOther, non-Hispanic refers to Native 
American/Hawaiian, Multi-racial, and students of unknown race/ethnicity. bNon-US citizens can be considered out-of-state or in-state. A small subset of 
out-of-state and/or non-US citizens do qualify as NC residents, while a small set of in-state students are not granted NC residency status. cBoth student 
SAT scores and high school GPAs are standardized within each institution and cohort-year, inclusive of all students in the raw data. dUnless noted, all 
graduation-related summary statistics are unconditional, inclusive of students who do not graduate. eA degree is defined as STEM if its six-digit CIP code 
is listed in the STEM Designated Degree Program List maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security.  
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Table 6 
How does Surcharge status predict completion and time-to-degree? 
  1 2 3 
  
4 5 6 
  
7 8 9 
  Graduate ever 
Graduate 










Degree Time to degree 
           
Surcharge student  -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.035*** -0.142*** -0.135*** -0.088*** 1.235*** 0.972*** 0.482*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.036) (0.028) (0.015) 
           
Baseline demographic and 
achievement covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Conditional on graduating No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 








Groups All 4 Groups 
Surcharge & 
Delayed 
           
Observations 29,556 29,556 14,836 29,556 29,556 14,836 26,869 26,869 13,005 
R-squared 0.024 0.038 0.039 0.046 0.061 0.052 0.256 0.544 0.164 
Notes: All regressions include institution-by-cohort fixed effects with standard errors clustered by institution-by-cohort as well. Baseline demographic and 
achievement covariates include those for gender, race and ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, high school GPA, pre-
college credits earned, transfer status, and transfer credits at entry. Columns 7-9 measure the relationship between Surcharge status and student's time-to-degree for 







What baseline demographic characteristics predict Surcharge status? 
  1 
  
2 3 4 5 
 All Schools ECU NCA&T NCSU UNCC 
           
Male 0.071***   0.036** 0.163*** 0.085*** 0.053** 
  (0.009)   (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.074***   0.035 0.161** 0.106*** 0.073** 
  (0.011)   (0.019) (0.049) (0.007) (0.021) 
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.038**   0.083 0.066 0.007 0.066 
  (0.017)   (0.035) (0.153) (0.014) (0.031) 
Hispanic 0.053***   0.013 0.115 0.083* 0.049* 
  (0.015)   (0.038) (0.074) (0.034) (0.015) 
Other, non-Hispanic 0.035***   0.040* 0.217** 0.019 0.007 
  (0.008)   (0.013) (0.067) (0.009) (0.012) 
Out-of-state -0.048**   -0.087 -0.078 0.005 -0.052 
  (0.018)   (0.050) (0.055) (0.021) (0.047) 
Non-US citizen 0.002   0.020 -0.023 0.003 -0.006 
  (0.015)   (0.073) (0.108) (0.020) (0.019) 
NC Resident -0.072***   -0.083 -0.185** -0.029 -0.074 
  (0.024)   (0.060) (0.052) (0.016) (0.072) 
Real NC County Median HH income ($1000s) 0.001***   0.001* 0.003 0.001 0.001 
  (0.000)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Standardized SAT score -0.000   0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.006 
  (0.003)   (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Missing SAT score -0.005   -0.002 -0.062 -0.017 -0.003 
  (0.006)   (0.017) (0.053) (0.015) (0.003) 
Standardized HS GPA -0.029***   -0.024** -0.047** -0.027*** -0.025** 
  (0.003)   (0.006) (0.009) (0.001) (0.007) 
Missing HS GPA -0.002   0.018 -0.031 0.005 0.001 
  (0.008)   (0.018) (0.027) (0.003) (0.011) 
Has pre-college credit -0.028*   -0.052** -0.003 - -0.006 
  (0.014)   (0.013) (0.077) - (0.026) 
Pre-college credits earned -0.001   0.002 -0.011 - -0.005* 
  (0.002)   (0.003) (0.006) - (0.002) 
Transfer student -0.029   -0.047 -0.088 -0.054* 0.046** 
  (0.019)   (0.025) (0.060) (0.017) (0.010) 
Transfer credits at entry -0.002***   -0.002*** -0.002 -0.001*** -0.004*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.190***   0.225** 0.255*** 0.129*** 0.240*** 
  (0.016)   (0.053) (0.032) (0.013) (0.033) 
           
Observations 29,556   8,201 3,480 10,167 7,708 
R-squared 0.071   0.044 0.078 0.050 0.062 
Notes: The omitted referent categories are first-time freshmen, female, White, non-Hispanic, in-state students who are US citizens. 
The "All Schools" regression includes institution-by-cohort fixed effects and clusters standard errors at the institution-cohort level. 
The institution-specific regressions in columns 2 through 5 include cohort fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the cohort 
level. Other, non-Hispanic refers to Native American/Hawaiian, Multi-racial, and students of unknown race/ethnicity. Non-US 
citizens can be considered out-of-state or in-state. A small subset of out-of-state and/or non-US citizens do qualify as NC 
residents, while a small set of in-state students are not granted NC residency status. Both student SAT scores and high school 





Summary of first major, last major, and earned degree, Freshmen 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Full Sample Typical Accumulator Delayed Surcharge Unadjusted S-D 
Adjusted 
 S-D 
N 21,877 7,937 74 8,652 5,214   
Declaring a first major  
      
Student never declares a major 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002   
Student is undeclared major in first term 0.446 0.396 0.311 0.487 0.457 ***  
Term number when first major declareda 2.623 2.197 1.568 2.852 2.907  *** 
  (2.149) (1.672) (0.994) (2.248) (2.503) 
Term number when last major declared 4.421 3.400 2.993 4.718 5.502 
*** *** 
  (2.699) (2.106) (2.033) (2.640) (3.045) 
   
      
How first major and degree align  
      
In terms of STEM….  
      
Student's first major is in STEMb 0.422 0.382 0.419 0.416 0.495 *** *** 
Student's earned degree is in STEM 0.338 0.337 0.365 0.322 0.366 *** *** 
From first major to earned degree…        
Student persists in STEM 0.321 0.326 0.351 0.304 0.343 *** *** 
Student moves into STEM 0.017 0.011 0.014 0.018 0.023 ** *** 
Student moves out of STEM 0.101 0.056 0.068 0.112 0.152 *** *** 
Student never is in STEM 0.561 0.607 0.568 0.566 0.482 *** *** 
In terms of field…        
Student's first major and degree are the same 0.561 0.660 0.595 0.540 0.444 *** *** 
Student's first major and degree are in the same field 0.709 0.817 0.743 0.682 0.587 *** *** 
Notes: Group means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses if the variable is continuous. Column 6 indicates the p-value of the unadjusted difference in means 
between Surcharge and Delayed students, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 7 indicates the p-value of the adjusted differences in means between Surcharge and 
Delayed students, controlling for baseline student demographic characteristics and institution-by-cohort effects. This table includes means for all first-time freshmen, including those 
who never declare a major and never earn a degree, except for the timing of when students first and last declare a major. aThese term means are presented only for the students in 
each group who at some point declare a major, otherwise the term is missing (for 44 students). bA major/degree is defined as STEM if its six-digit CIP code is listed in the STEM 






Summary of major switching behavior, Freshmen 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





N 21,877 7,937 74 8,652 5,214    
Total switching behavior  
       
Student switches major 0.350 0.304 0.378 0.350 0.419 *** *** 
Total number of switches 0.480 0.424 0.622 0.470 0.581 *** *** 
  (0.779) (0.752) (1.003) (0.762) (0.831) 
Total number of majors held 1.478 1.422 1.622 1.467 1.579 *** *** 
  (0.781) (0.754) (1.003) (0.766) (0.834) 
Total number of unique majors held 1.413 1.346 1.459 1.413 1.514 *** *** 
  (0.629) (0.568) (0.686) (0.634) (0.692) 
   
       
Timing of major switches  
       
Term of first major switcha 5.993 4.791 4.321 6.243 6.998 *** *** 
  (3.000) (2.050) (1.906) (2.970) (3.448) 
Term of last major switch 6.175 4.788 4.214 6.517 7.260 *** *** 
  (3.525) (2.630) (3.224) (3.429) (3.995) 
Student switched in term 4 or before 0.134 0.155 0.243 0.122 0.120    
Student switched after term 4 0.067 0.068 0.054 0.063 0.073 ** ** 
Student switched after term 6 0.045 0.033 0.041 0.052 0.054    
Notes: Group means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses if the variable is continuous. Column 6 indicates the p-value of the 
unadjusted difference in means between Surcharge and Delayed students, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 7 indicates the p-value of 
the adjusted differences in means between Surcharge and Delayed students, controlling for baseline student demographic characteristics and 
institution-by-cohort effects. This table includes means for all first-time freshmen, including those who never switch major, except for the timing 
of when students first switch their major and last switch their major. aThese term means are presented only for the students in each group who do 






Summary of course performance, Freshmen 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





N 21,877 7,937 74 8,652 5,214    
Total Failing         
Student fails at some point 0.661 0.426 0.473 0.756 0.866 *** *** 
Number of times student fails 2.624 0.925 0.784 2.938 4.717 *** *** 
  (3.601) (1.847) (1.101) (3.506) (4.452) 
Number of unique courses student fails 2.378 0.877 0.770 2.685 4.179 *** *** 
  (3.088) (1.654) (1.080) (3.028) (3.708) 
Ratio of total fails to total attempted credits 0.017 0.007 0.005 0.020 0.028 *** *** 
  (0.022) (0.013) (0.007) (0.023) (0.025) 
          
Total Repeating         
Student repeats at some point 0.769 0.590 0.851 0.830 0.937 *** *** 
Number of times student repeats 3.443 1.641 4.932 3.356 6.309 *** *** 
  (4.255) (2.732) (6.590) (3.478) (5.545) 
Number of unique courses student repeats 2.771 1.287 2.635 2.843 4.913 *** *** 
  (2.867) (1.679) (2.237) (2.507) (3.427) 
Ratio of total repeats to total attempted credits 0.022 0.012 0.032 0.022 0.037 *** *** 
  (0.026) (0.020) (0.043) (0.022) (0.031) 
          
Total Withdrawing         
Student withdraws at some point 0.459 0.312 0.432 0.482 0.645 *** *** 
Number of times student withdraws 1.325 0.603 0.959 1.317 2.442 *** *** 
  (2.203) (1.265) (1.457) (2.021) (3.011) 
Number of unique courses student withdraws from 1.263 0.586 0.959 1.265 2.292 *** *** 
  (2.022) (1.167) (1.457) (1.890) (2.714) 
Ratio of total withdraws to total attempted credits 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.015 *** *** 
  (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) 
Notes: Group means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses if the variable is continuous. Column 6 indicates the p-value of the unadjusted differences in means 
between Surcharge and Delayed students, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 7 indicates the p-value of the adjusted differences in means between Surcharge and 
Delayed students, controlling for baseline student demographic characteristics and institution-by-cohort-year effects. This table includes means for all first-time freshmen, 




Summary of financial aid, Freshmen and Transfers  
  Freshmen Transfers 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
  Full Sample Typical Accum. Delayed Surcharge Unadj. D 
Ajd. 
 S-D Full Sample Typical Accum. Delayed Surcharge Unadj. D 
Ajd. 
 S-D 
N 21,877 7,937 74 8,652 5,214     7,679 4,319 2,390 305 665    
FAFSA behavior                  
Student applies ever 0.672 0.652 0.635 0.653 0.733 *** *** 0.566 0.528 0.597 0.639 0.668    
First term student appliesa  
2.133 1.815 1.596 2.287 2.342 
    
2.780 2.627 2.743 3.559 3.345 
   (2.344) (1.817) (1.455) (2.562) (2.590) (2.414) (2.209) (2.337) (3.027) (3.124) 
Share of enrolled terms student applies 
0.385 0.399 0.381 0.360 0.408 
*** *** 
0.313 0.299 0.335 0.323 0.325 
   (0.358) (0.374) (0.373) (0.348) (0.345) (0.343) (0.344) (0.350) (0.319) (0.314) 
                   
Financial Aid          
 
       
…Student ever receives…                  
Any aid 0.821 0.809 0.959 0.805 0.863 *** *** 0.815 0.787 0.844 0.862 0.877    
Federal aid 0.708 0.642 0.608 0.714 0.799 *** *** 0.758 0.724 0.787 0.820 0.847    
State aid 0.493 0.422 0.419 0.509 0.577 *** *** 0.572 0.526 0.605 0.666 0.704   * 
Institutional aid 0.611 0.594 0.892 0.591 0.664 *** *** 0.574 0.520 0.630 0.672 0.678    
Private aid 0.342 0.359 0.459 0.309 0.370 *** *** 0.166 0.156 0.179 0.174 0.182    
                   
…First term student receives…a                  
Any aid 1.681 1.539 1.718 1.793 1.710 *   
1.572 1.531 1.545 1.848 1.779 
   
  (2.081) (1.629) (1.725) (2.310) (2.266) (1.658) (1.542) (1.591) (2.310) (2.110) 
Federal aid 1.737 1.542 1.622 1.842 1.819     
1.577 1.535 1.560 1.792 1.767 
*  
  (2.110) (1.545) (1.451) (2.313) (2.366) (1.630) (1.529) (1.552) (2.116) (2.097) 
State aid 2.212 1.927 2.419 2.309 2.384     
2.495 2.332 2.442 3.241 3.124 
   
  (2.559) (1.936) (2.110) (2.709) (2.900) (2.441) (2.160) (2.354) (3.122) (3.344) 
Institutional aid 3.107 2.773 3.182 3.270 3.319   * 
3.270 3.006 3.224 4.156 4.335 
   
  (3.095) (2.525) (2.795) (3.309) (3.422) (2.677) (2.400) (2.552) (3.369) (3.560) 
Private aid 2.546 1.941 2.265 2.718 3.205 *** *** 
3.013 2.696 2.974 4.283 4.355 
   
  (2.967) (2.017) (2.247) (3.156) (3.640) (2.736) (2.353) (2.593) (4.021) (3.794) 
                   
Ratio of total …. to total attempted hours                  
Any aid 283.887 268.463 284.391 277.547 317.880 *** *** 
203.862 185.782 203.317 299.022 279.600 
   
  (230.750) (233.057) (210.199) (229.645) (225.908) (162.041) (157.381) (150.438) (198.182) (176.372) 
Federal aid 173.067 147.262 114.221 177.513 205.807 *** *** 
148.103 132.361 146.325 234.728 217.005 
   
  (162.531) (158.873) (126.433) (163.210) (160.724) (127.703) (121.597) (116.401) (170.097) (143.532) 
State aid 40.942 38.808 32.265 40.817 44.521   ** 
24.029 22.251 24.220 29.266 32.490 
   
  (57.103) (62.203) (51.747) (54.563) (52.861) (31.989) (31.544) (31.502) (35.197) (33.457) 
Institutional aid 44.352 54.867 110.185 38.062 37.847 ***   
18.269 17.188 20.211 19.787 17.614 
   
  (96.371) (112.821) (155.923) (85.691) (82.052) (40.157) (41.638) (38.672) (39.306) (35.520) 
Private aid 25.527 27.527 27.720 21.155 29.704 *** *** 13.461 13.982 12.562 15.241 12.491    
  (73.725) (77.278) (73.835) (64.481) (81.771) (52.706) (56.373) (46.602) (60.129) (44.501) 
Notes: Group means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses if the variable is continuous. Columns 6 and 13 indicate the p-value of the unadjusted differences in means between Surcharge and Delayed 
students, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 7 and 14 indicate the p-value of the adjusted differences in means between Surcharge and Delayed students, controlling for baseline student demographic 
characteristics. This table includes means for all students, including those who do not fill out the FAFSA and/or don’t receive aid, except for the timing of when students first receive aid. aThese term means are presented 
only for the students in each group who do apply for the FAFSA or receive aid, otherwise the term is missing (.). 
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Table 12 
What predicts surcharge incidence? Full Sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  Base Model Stopping out Att. Credits Earned Credits First major Major Switch 
Course 
Performance Financial Aid 
                  
Male 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.041*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.038** 0.038** 0.041** 0.027* 0.024 0.016 0.015 0.012 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Hispanic 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.041** 0.041** 0.035** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Other, non-Hispanic 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.025** 0.024** 0.023** 0.022** 0.021** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Out-of-state -0.048** -0.048** -0.042** -0.033 -0.035* -0.033 -0.033 -0.031 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
NC Resident -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.072** -0.069** -0.067** -0.060** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Real NC County Median HH income ($1000s) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Standardized SAT score -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Missing SAT score -0.005 -0.005 -0.013** -0.010* -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Standardized HS GPA -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.005* -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Missing HS GPA -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Has pre-college credit -0.028* -0.028* -0.031** -0.024* -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Pre-college credits earned -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Transfer student -0.029 -0.029 -0.026 -0.041* -0.027 -0.024 -0.018 -0.016 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Transfer credits at entry -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stops out at or before term 4  -0.005 -0.017 -0.081*** -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
   (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Cumulative surcharge-relevant credits attempted by term 4   -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 12 continued… 
Cumulative summer credits attempted by term 4   0.002 -0.002** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cumulative extension credits attempted by term 4   -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ratio of cumulative earned to attempted credits by term 4    -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student declares first major at or before term 4     -0.069*** -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
First declared major is in STEM     0.039*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
      (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
First declared major is in engineering     0.074*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 
      (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Student switches major after term 4      0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
       (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Student moves into a STEM major after term 4      0.155*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 
       (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Student moves out of a STEM major after term 4      0.026* 0.024* 0.023* 
       (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Cumulative failed credits as share of att. credits by term 4       -0.002 -0.002 
        (0.002) (0.002) 
Cumulative repeated credits as share of att. credits by term 4       0.018*** 0.018*** 
        (0.001) (0.001) 
Cumulative withdrawn credits as share of att. credits by term 4       0.000 0.001 
        (0.002) (0.002) 
Student fills out FAFSA at or before term 4        0.003 
         (0.006) 
Cumulative federal aid received per att. credit by term 4        0.000*** 
         (0.000) 
Cumulative state aid received per att. credit by term 4        0.000*** 
         (0.000) 
Cumulative institutional aid received per att. credit by term 4        -0.000 
         (0.000) 
Cumulative private aid received per att. credit by term 4        0.000 
         (0.000) 
Constant 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.507*** 1.363*** 1.323*** 1.187*** 1.027*** 1.000*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.040) (0.056) (0.059) (0.066) (0.071) (0.069) 
          
Observations 29,556 29,556 29,556 29,556 29,556 29,556 29,556 29,556 
R-squared 0.071 0.071 0.075 0.117 0.130 0.149 0.157 0.159 
MSE 0.385 0.385 0.384 0.375 0.373 0.368 0.367 0.366 
Mean VIF 2.76 2.71 3.72 3.66 3.54 3.39 3.54 3.35 
Notes: All regressions include institution-by-cohort fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the institution-cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 
What predicts surcharge incidence? Freshmen 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  Base Model Stopping out Att. Credits Earned Credits First major Major Switch Performance Financial Aid 
                  
Male 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.036*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.053** 0.035* 0.031* 0.021 0.021 0.017 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Hispanic 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.056** 0.047** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Other, non-Hispanic 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.023* 0.025* 0.023* 0.023* 0.020 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Out-of-state -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.039** -0.046** -0.042** -0.041** -0.041** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
NC Resident -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.079*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Real NC County Median HH income ($1000s) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Standardized SAT score -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Missing SAT score -0.020 -0.020 -0.024 -0.038 -0.031 -0.027 -0.027 -0.024 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) 
Standardized HS GPA -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.008** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Missing HS GPA 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.028 0.035 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) 
Has pre-college credit -0.026* -0.026* -0.028* -0.021 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Pre-college credits earned -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Stops out at or before term 4  -0.035* -0.047** -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
Cumulative surcharge-relevant credits attempted by 
term 4 
  -0.003*** 0.000 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cumulative summer credits attempted by term 4   0.005*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cumulative extension credits attempted by term 4   -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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Ratio of cumulative earned to attempted credits by 
term 4    -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Student declares first major at or before term 4     -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 
      (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
First declared major is in STEM     0.058*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
      (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
First declared major is in engineering     0.080*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 
      (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Student switches major after term 4      0.097*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 
       (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Student moves into a STEM major after term 4      0.160*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
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       (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Student moves out of a STEM major after term 4      0.025 0.023 0.021 
       (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Cumulative failed credits as share of att. credits by 
term 4  
      -0.002 -0.002 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
Cumulative repeated credits as share of att. credits 
by term 4       0.019*** 0.019*** 
        (0.001) (0.001) 
Cumulative withdrawn credits as share of att. credits 
by term 4       0.001 0.001 
        (0.003) (0.003) 
Student fills out FAFSA at or before term 4        -0.002 
         (0.007) 
Cumulative federal aid received per att. credit by 
term 4        0.000*** 
         (0.000) 
 Cumulative state aid received per att. credit by term 
4        0.000*** 
         (0.000) 
Cumulative institutional aid received per att. credit 
by term 4        -0.000 
         (0.000) 
Cumulative private aid received per att. credit by 
term 4        0.000** 
         (0.000) 
Constant 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.396*** 1.231*** 1.144*** 0.983*** 0.832*** 0.782*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.049) (0.064) (0.061) (0.069) (0.111) (0.106) 
Observations 21,877 21,877 21,877 21,877 21,877 21,877 21,877 21,877 
R-squared 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.097 0.113 0.134 0.142 0.145 
MSE 0.417 0.417 0.416 0.405 0.402 0.397 0.395 0.394 
Mean VIF 2.49 2.44 2.34 2.31 2.3 2.23 2.43 2.34 




Surcharge student finances: Excess credit hours, financial aid, and the surcharge burden 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  All 4 Schools ECU NCA&T NCSU UNCC 
Counts of Surcharge studentsa       
Total students 5,879 1,415 1,247 1,736 1,481 
Total facing in-state tuition 4,902 1,196 915 1,511 1,280 
Total facing out-of-state tuition 977 219 332 225 201 
        
Per-credit tuition cost before 50% feeb       
In-state cost - $390 $259 $480 $290 
Out-of-state cost - $1,149 $1,183 $1,642 $1,345 
        
Excess surcharge-relevant hours       
...Mean in excess of 140       
For all students 12.40 11.41 13.74 11.72 13.00 
  (9.92) (9.53) (10.20) (9.70) (10.13) 
For in-state students 12.50 11.71 13.81 11.70 13.22 
  (10.03) (9.76) (10.22) (9.76) (10.30) 
For out-of-state students 11.90 9.78 13.55 11.80 11.61 
  (9.35) (8.00) (10.18) (9.31) (8.87) 
…Total in excess of 140       
For all students 72,879.48 16,145.48 17,138.00 20,340.00 19,256.00 
For in-state students 61,251.48 14,004.48 12,640.00 17,684.00 16,923.00 
For out-of-state students 11,628.00 21,41.00 4,498.00 26,56.00 2,333.00 
        
Total aid received by Surcharge students when they are assessed the chargec      
For all students $41,457.73 $9,070.53 $12,447.46 $10,814.24 $9,125.50 
For in-state students $32,204.26 $7,447.67 $8,385.24 $8,552.56 $7,818.79 
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Real excess tuition + surcharge payment       
...Mean payment in $1000s       
For all students $9.44  $7.94  $10.34  $11.10  $8.15  
  (11.53) (10.02) (12.90) (12.61) (9.86) 
For in-state students $6.43  $5.43  $5.37  $8.43  $5.75  
  (5.49) (4.52) (3.97) (7.03) (4.48) 
For out-of-state students $24.54  $21.69  $24.04  $29.07  $23.42  
  (19.35) (17.75) (18.07) (22.94) (17.89) 
…Total payment in $1000s       
For all students $55,475.77  $11,240.88  $12,892.34  $19,274.21  $12,068.33  
For in-state students $31,495.70  $6,491.08  $4,910.64  $12,732.48  $7,361.50  
For out-of-state students $23,980.06  $4,749.81  $7,981.70  $6,541.73  $4,706.83  
        
Real excess surcharge payment only           
...Mean payment in $1000s        
For all students $3.15 $2.65 $3.45 $3.70 $2.72 
  (3.84) (3.34) (4.30) (4.20) (3.29) 
For in-state students $2.14 $1.81 $1.79 $2.81 $1.92 
  (1.83) (1.51) (1.32) (2.34) (1.49) 
For out-of-state students $8.18 $7.23 $8.01 $9.69 $7.81 
  (6.45) (5.92) (6.02) (7.65) (5.96) 
…Total payment in $1000s        
For all students $18,491.92 $3,746.96 $4,297.45 $6,424.74 $4,022.78 
For in-state students $10,498.57 $2,163.69 $1,636.88 $4,244.16 $2,453.83 
For out-of-state students $7,993.35 $1,583.27 $2,660.57 $2,180.58 $1,568.94 
Notes: aFor the purposes of classifying students for in-state or out-of-state tuition, I use students' NC residency status. bPer-credit tuition costs before the 50% fee 
are calculated using the published in-state and out-of-state tuition amounts in Table 1 divided by 12, as that is typically the minimum number of credit hours 











Notes: This figure comes from the Fiscal Research Division’s 2012 Legislative Report, Figure 4. Students Assessed a Tuition 






















Notes: This shows the progression of entering cohorts Fall 2006 through Fall 2009 for up to six years and the surcharge 
fee (25% or 50%) imposed in a given academic year. Lightly-shaded boxes indicate years each cohort would not be 
eligible for the surcharge (4 years of less), while darkly-shaded boxes indicate the years each cohort would first be eligible 
for the surcharge (5 year of more), if students also surpass the 140-credit hour limit.  
Entering Cohort Fall 
Academic 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2006-2007 25%    
2007-2008 25% 25%   
2008-2009 25% 25% 25%  
2009-2010 25% 25% 25% 25% 
2010-2011 50% 50% 50% 50% 
2011-2012 50% 50% 50% 50% 
2012-2013  50% 50% 50% 
2013-2014   50% 50% 
2014-2015    50% 
 197 
Figure 3 
Distribution of students, grouped by attempted credit hours and total terms
 
Notes: Moving clockwise, quadrant one (Q1) refers to Surcharge students, Q2 refers to Delayed students, Q3 refers to 
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Figure 5 
Cumulative number of times that students stop out by term and group 
 
A. Freshmen        B. Transfers 
    
 












































Enrollment, graduation, and leaving patterns by term and group 
 
Freshmen 
       
 
Transfers 
    
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. The “Post” time period captures students who do not officially graduate until a date after they appear enrolled on 
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Regular term number
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Graduating - Accumulator Leaving - Accumulator
Graduating - Delayed Leaving - Delayed
Graduating - Surcharge Leaving - Surcharge
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Surcharge-relevant attempted hours and the accumulation patterns by term and group 
 
Cumulative surcharge-relevant attempted hours 
     
 
Difference in cumulative surcharge-relevant credits attempted compared to Delayed students  
    
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Surcharge-relevant hours include regular term hours taken in residence and transfer credit hours. Adjusted differences 
account for gender, race/ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, high school GPA, pre-college credits earned, transfer credits 
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Typical - Unadjusted Typical - Adjusted
Accumulator - Unadjusted Accumulator - Adjusted
Surcharge - Unadjusted Surcharge - Adjusted




Summer attempted hours and the accumulation patterns by term and group 
 
Cumulative summer attempted hours 
    
 
Difference in cumulative summer credits attempted compared to Delayed students 
    
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Summer hours include those taken in residence and as extension. Adjusted differences account for gender, 
race/ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, high school GPA, pre-college credits earned, transfer credits entry (if a transfer 
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Typical - Unadjusted Typical - Adjusted
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Regular term number
Typical - Unadjusted Typical - Adjusted
Accumulator - Unadjusted Accumulator - Adjusted
Surcharge - Unadjusted Surcharge - Adjusted




Extension attempted hours and the accumulation patterns by term and group 
 
Cumulative extension attempted hours 
   
 
Difference in cumulative extension credits attempted compared to Delayed students 
   
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Extension hours are those taken not in residence (e.g., distance, online) and can also include summer credit hours. 
Adjusted differences account for gender, race/ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, high school GPA, pre-college credits 
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Ratio of cumulative credits earned to cumulative credits attempted accumulation patterns by term and group 
 
Ratio of cumulative credits earned to attempted 
   
 
Difference in ratio of cumulative credits earned to attempted compared to Delayed students 
   
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Cumulative hours include summer, extension, and credit hours taken in residence, though not transfer credit hours. 
Adjusted differences account for gender, race/ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, high school GPA, pre-college credits 
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Share of freshmen whose ____ is in the field of ____ 
 
    
 
Notes: This figure includes all students, including those who never declare a major and those who never earn a degree. 
 
4.4 17.9 3.2 20.3 13.5 9.0 21.9 9.6
5.4 12.2 1.4 24.3 6.8 28.4 10.8 10.8
4.6 15.3 3.9 26.3 14.1 9.8 19.1 6.5
4.4 14.3 4.7 33.6 12.7 9.1 13.8 7.2





A. first declared major ... ____
Plant Science Physical Science Comp. Sci & Math
Engineering Social Science Humanities
Bus. & Comm Education No Declard Major
4.5 16.6 3.2 17.5 14.7 9.4 21.6 9.5 3.1
2.7 14.9 1.4 20.3 10.8 31.1 8.1 6.8 4.1
4.5 12.5 3.6 20.2 16.5 10.8 16.4 5.5 10.0
4.9 10.4 4.5 24.1 14.2 10.7 10.0 5.7 15.3





B. earned degree ... ____
Plant Science Physical Science Comp. Sci & Math
Engineering Social Science Humanities





Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not 





Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not 
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Share of freshmen majoring in STEM and non-STEM by term and group 
   
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not included in this figure. A major is defined as STEM if its six-digit CIP code is listed in the STEM Designated Degree 
Program List maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security. 
Figure 16 
Cumulative share of freshmen moving into and out of STEM majors by term and group 
   
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not included in this figure. A major is defined as STEM if its six-digit CIP code is listed in the STEM Designated Degree 
Program List maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security. Students move into a STEM major from either a declared non-STEM major or an undeclared major. Students move out of a STEM 
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Share of freshmen majoring in key fields with unadjusted and adjusted differences in shares 
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F. Unadjusted and adjusted differences in the social sciences
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Business & Communication 
  
 
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not included in this figure.  Adjusted 
differences account for gender, race/ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, 
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Figure 18 
Ratio of cumulative number of times freshmen fail, repeat, or withdraw from a course relative to the cumulative number of credits 
 they have attempted by term and group 
   
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not included in this figure. Ratios are presented as a percent. I.e., the percent of 




Ratio of cumulative number of times freshmen fail, repeat, or withdraw from a course in STEM, while a STEM major,  
relative to the cumulative number of credits they have attempted by term and group 
   
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not included in this figure. Ratios are presented as a percent. I.e., the percent of 
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Regular term number
Typical Delayed Surcharge
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Regular term number
Typical Delayed Surcharge
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Regular term number
Typical Delayed Surcharge





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Regular term number
Typical Delayed Surcharge





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Regular term number
Typical Delayed Surcharge





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Regular term number
Typical Delayed Surcharge




Ratio of cumulative number of times freshmen fail, repeat, or withdraw from a course as it aligns with their declared major 
relative to the cumulative number of credits they have attempted by term and group 
 
Courses that are in the same broad field as students’ major 
    
 
 
Courses that are in different broad field from students’ major 
   
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not included in this figure. Ratios are presented as a percent. I.e., the percent of 
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Share of freshmen applying for FAFSA by term and group along with unadjusted and adjusted 
differences 
  
Notes: Regular terms are fall and spring terms. Accumulator students (N=74) are not included in this figure. Adjusted differences 
account for gender, race/ethnicity, residency status, median home county household income, SAT score, high school GPA, pre-
college credits earned, institution, and entering cohort. 
 
Figure 22 
Share of freshmen receiving financial aid and the cumulative aid received to cumulative credits 
attempted by term and group 
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CHAPTER 3: NONRESIDENT ENROLLMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL SPENDING:  




Though chartered with the explicit purpose and mission of serving in-state student residents, 
many public institutions – especially those with increasingly large national and regional profiles – 
have ramped up efforts to recruit out-of-state and foreign students (Hoover & Keller, 2012). Since 
the early 2000s, the number of nonresident (out-of-state or foreign-born) freshmen enrolled in 
public research universities has risen sharply while resident (in-state) freshmen enrollment has 
increased only modestly (Curs & Jaquette, 2017). Nationally, between 2002-03 and 2015-16, the total 
number of nonresident freshmen at research-active public 4-year institutions grew by 76 percent, 
while the total number of resident freshmen only increased by 12 percent.96 Another analysis, 
encompassing more than 400 US public college and universities, found that between 2000 and 2012, 
nearly one-fifth of institutions experienced declines in resident enrollment by at least 10 percentage 
points. Meanwhile, the number of states where more than 40 percent of the entering class was 
comprised of nonresidents grew from 10 to 18 over this same period (Burd, 2015).   
 The growth in nonresident enrollment at public institutions has coincided with the 
substantial decline in state appropriations over this same period of time, especially after the 
recessions of 2001 and 2008. Between 2000 and 2014, inflation-adjusted state appropriations per 
full-time equivalent (FTE) public college student decreased 28 percent (Baum, Ma, Bell, & Elliott, 
2014). Moreover, a couple of recent studies have found a direct link between decreased state 
                                               
96 These are from the author’s calculations using data from the Integrated Education Postsecondary Data System 
(IPEDs) for this analysis. 
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appropriations and a subsequent increase in foreign and out-of-state freshman enrollment (Bound, 
Braga, Khanna, & Turner, 2016; Jaquette & Curs, 2015). Nonresident tuition revenues – often two 
to three times higher than resident tuition – can help fill revenue shortfalls resulting from 
diminished appropriations. 
The relative rise in out-of-state student enrollment has become a growing topic of concern 
among an array of stakeholders from state legislators (Watanabe, 2017), to think tanks (Haycock, 
Lynch, & Engle, 2010) and the national press (Anderson & Douglas-Gabriel, 2016; Goldberg, 2015). 
A central concern is that nonresident enrollment crowds out the enrollment of high quality in-state 
students, particularly low-income and under-represented minorities. A couple of studies suggest this 
effect is borne out to some degree, though exclusively at top-tier public institutions. Curs & Jaquette 
(2017) find that an increase in nonresident enrollment does not affect resident enrollment, except at 
prestigious public institutions where a 1 percent increase in nonresident enrollment led to a small 
0.18 percent decrease in resident enrollment between 1992 and 2013. Similarly, Jaquette, Curs, & 
Posselt (2016) find that between 2003 and 2013, increased numbers of out-of-state students 
disproportionately crowded out low-income and minority students only at selective public colleges, 
and especially in high-poverty states. Though nonresident enrollment may not necessarily result in 
diminished resident enrollment, the composition of the student body may still be altered if the 
growth in nonresident enrollment outpaces resident enrollment.     
A second, emerging concern is that the growing presence of nonresident students on public 
campuses shifts the funding priorities of public institutions away from education- and access-
focused efforts towards ancillary amenities meant to attract and retain these higher-paying students. 
Nonresident students tend to be wealthier, whiter, and more Asian than many of their resident 
peers, which is perhaps unsurprising given that recruitment efforts of many public institutions 
prioritize out-of-state high schools located in high-income, dense metropolitan communities and 
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that have lower proportions of underserved racial and ethnic minority populations (Han, Jaquette, & 
Salazar, 2019; Hoxby & Avery, 2012). Numerous popular press articles (Anderson & Douglas-
Gabriel, 2016; Saul, 2016; Goldberg, 2015; Rubin, 2014) highlight the concern of resident 
stakeholders that the compositional shift of public institutions towards nonresidents of high 
socioeconomic status transforms the campus climate in ways detrimental to the educational 
experiences of all (though especially resident and underrepresented) students.  
The fear is that the programmatic and monetary focus of public institutions will increasingly 
move away from academic inputs and towards quality-of-life amenities as institutions cater to the 
expectations or preferences of nonresident students. Critics cite the race by public universities to 
add luxury dorm options, world-class dining hall experiences, and state-of-the-art recreation facilities 
as evidence of this shift in institutional priorities (Saul, 2016; Burd, 2015; Rubin, 2014). Resort-like 
amenities such as lazy rivers and zip lines may enhance the “health and well-being” of some 
students, critics argue, but at the cost of diverting resources away from supporting the instructional 
and academic needs of students – especially resident students of first generation and low-income 
background with less higher education capital to expend.   
However, others point to the benefits that nonresident students bring to college campuses 
including additional diversity in terms of geography, culture, and life experience (Anderson & 
Douglas-Gabriel, 2016; Saul, 2016). Proponents of increased nonresident enrollment argue that 
these varying perspectives enhance the classroom experiences of resident students, preparing them 
for later life in a globalized economy. More tangibly, university administrators point to the increased 
tuition revenues generated from out-of-state and foreign students that are used to supplement the 
scholastic experiences of in-state students, especially in the face of dwindling state appropriation 
dollars. Moreover, other research has shown that nonresident students have – on the margin – 
higher SAT scores than resident students (Groen & White, 2004). Nonresidents may enroll in 
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greater numbers at out-of-state public institutions because they believe it provides a superior 
educational experience beyond the public options available in their home state. Given the academic 
caliber of nonresident students, institutions may respond to the compositional growth of these 
students by spending more on instructional and academic support measures.  
To my knowledge, no research has causally examined whether increased nonresident 
enrollment affects how institutions spend their money – on instruction, academic support, auxiliary 
enterprises, etc. In contrast, much of the extant literature on institutional spending focuses on how 
variation in expenditures between institutions drives variation in student matriculation and academic 
outcomes (Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013; Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010). Instead, I consider how 
changes in student composition via residency status facilitate or drive changes in institutional 
spending. Due to issues of simultaneity and reverse causality embedded in the relationship between 
nonresident enrollment and expenditure behavior, I employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach 
to isolate exogenous variation in nonresident enrollment.  
Given that other literature has found institutional expenditures to be important determinants 
of students’ academic outcomes like graduation rates and first-year persistence (Webber & 
Ehrenberg, 2010; Webber, 2012), and that different subgroups of students (low-income, high-
scoring, etc.) appear to benefit most from certain types of institutional spending, it is important to 
understand what levers, if any, are responsible for shifting or determining institutional spending. As 
the presence of out-of-state and foreign students on public campuses continues to grow and the 
composition of institution revenues continues to shift towards tuition and away from state 
appropriations, the growth in nonresident enrollment may serve as one relevant, identifiable lever. 
As institutions, policymakers, and taxpayers continue to debate the costs and benefits of out-of-state 
students at in-state institutions, it is important that stakeholders consider the impact of nonresidents, 
if any, on more distal outcomes beyond the enrollment margin. This is particularly important if 
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public universities are to maintain the trust and support of their in-state constituents in an era where 
rising college costs and growing competition for enrollment draw the increased scrutiny of state 
governments, parents, and students.  
Using data from the Integrated Education Postsecondary Database System (IPEDS) 
between 2002 and 2015, I aim to answer the question, what is the effect of the growing share of nonresident 
students at research-focused public four-year institutions on institutional spending behavior?  More specifically, 
how has the growing proportion of nonresident students affected institution spending on “academic 
inputs” – like instruction and academic support? How has it affected institution spending on 
“consumption amenities” – like student support services or auxiliary enterprises? To preview my 
results, I find that, contrary to the robust arguments made by both proponents and opponents of 
the expansion of nonresident enrollment, the share of nonresidents at 4-year, public research-active 
institutions has little practical effect on institutions’ expenditure practices.  
Estimates from IV regressions do suggest a that there is a small local average treatment 
effect on the share of funding that institutions devote towards certain expenditure categories. 
Namely, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of nonresidents increases the share of total 
spending that public universities put towards institutional support and instruction, by 0.13 and 0.43 
percentage points, respectively. Meanwhile, universities decrease their share of spending towards 
research activities and scholarship & fellowship funding by 0.26 and 0.09 percentage points, 
respectively. Though statistically significant, these estimates are economically small in magnitude. As 
an example, an increase in instructional spending – the largest expenditure category for most, if not 
all institutions – by 0.43 percentage points is equivalent to spending $164 more per FTE in the 
2015-16 year. Considering that total spending per FTE for the institutions in my sample is $39,427, 
this change is substantively small (less than 0.43 percent).  
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Upon closer scrutiny and consideration of alternative pathways, I am not able to reject the 
possibility that my preferred instrument meets all of the assumptions of IV required to meaningfully 
infer causal, unbiased effects. Nonetheless, these small, and sometimes null effects that I observe of 
nonresident enrollment on expenditure behavior are robust to different model specifications, 
including those that employ other, potentially more theoretically valid instruments. From what I 
observe, public universities are not responding to the growing presence of nonresidents by 
meaningfully altering their fiscal priorities. Legislators, administrators, and in-state residents should 
consider this essentially null relationship in their debates about the presence of nonresident students 
on public postsecondary campuses. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section two summarizes relevant background 
literature. Section three details my empirical approach and the data I employ, while section four 
describes the instrumental variables strategy I use to carve out exogenous variation in the share of 
nonresidents on public campuses. In section five, I discuss my results and follow up that up with my 
robustness checks in section six. Finally, section seven wraps up the paper as the Discussion.  
2. Background literature 
2.1 Demand for nonresidents 
 Public college and universities have several incentives to pursue out-of-state and foreign 
enrollment. For one, enrolling more nonresidents allows institutions to raise additional revenues 
because nonresidents pay substantially more in tuition and fees than residents. In 2014-15, average 
published tuition and fees at public 4-year institutions was $9,139 for in-state students and $22,958 
for nonresidents (Baum et al., 2014). In the face of diminishing state appropriations, resource 
dependency theory (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) suggests that universities would diversify their sources 
of income, and nonresident tuition and fee revenue may be a fruitful source. Evidence from the 
literature suggests that universities do in fact operate in this way and that nonresident enrollment 
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serves as an important financial buffer. Looking at the period 1996 through 2012, Bound, et al. 
(2016) find that a 10 percent reduction in state appropriations is associated with an increase in 
foreign enrollment of 6.2 percent, with the effect slightly larger at selective, research universities that 
are more resource-intensive. Although, they do not observe an effect of state funding shocks on 
enrollment of domestic, out-of-state students or in-state students. Jaquette and Curs (2015) estimate 
the effect of state appropriations fluctuations between 2002-03 and 2012-13 on enrollment of 
foreign and out-of-state students, combined under the umbrella category of “nonresident”, and find 
a more muted effect. A 10 percent decrease in state appropriations is associated with a 2.7 percent 
increase in nonresident freshmen enrollment, with the effect nearly double at research-extensive and 
research-intensive universities.  
 Figure 1 illustrates the changing trends in the share of nonresident students (solid red line) 
and state appropriations per full-time equivalent (FTE) student (dashed blue line) between 2002 and 
2015 for research-extensive and research-intensive four-year, public universities in my analytic 
sample. As the figure illustrates, state appropriation funding per FTE mostly decreased over this 
time period, especially between 2007 and 2012 in the unfolding and aftermath of the Great 
Recession. In 2007, state appropriations averaged $10,125 real dollars, and by 2012, funding levels 
averaged less than $7,500 real dollars per FTE student (a decrease of 26 percent). Meanwhile, the 
share of nonresident students attending these public institutions steadily rose from 20 percent in 
2007 to 22.25 percent over this same period (representing a 14 percent increase). Even as state 
appropriation levels began to recover slightly in 2013 and onwards, the share of nonresident 
students continued to grow. Nonresident students may offer public research institutions more than 
just an additional financial buffer during economic downturns.     
 Public institutions may value increased nonresident enrollment because they may help 
improve a university’s overall reputation and prestige (Hazelkorn, 2015; Kelchen, 2016). Recruiting 
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from a broader national or international market may diversify the student body, while also drawing 
upon a larger pool of high-ability students (Rothschild & White, 1995; Hoxby, 2009). Some 
institutions may explicitly draw on high-achieving out-of-state students, as exemplified by the 
University of Oklahoma’s overt push to enroll National Merit Scholars; and as a result, it enrolls 
more Scholars than any other public university in the country (Perez-Pena, 2012). Enrollment of 
high achieving, out-of-state students may have a multiplicative effect on a university’s reputation by 
helping it move higher up institutional rankings in well-known outlets such as U.S News & World 
Report, which can further increase a university’s reputation and finances as more high-ability and 
nonresident students demand a spot at the institution and pay higher tuition and fees (Morse, 
Brooks, & Mason, 2016; Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). As the balance of nonresidents-to-residents 
and tuition revenues-to-appropriations changes, public institutions may face new incentives or 
develop new preferences for how they spend their revenues. Still, prior literature has most often 
examined the relationship in reverse: how expenditures appear to affect student composition. 
 2.2 Academic value, consumption value, and institutional resources  
 Recognizing that institutions differ in the compositions of their student bodies and revenues 
as well as in their reputational clout, several scholars have examined the complex, multi-layered 
relationships between institutional expenditures, revenues, and student enrollment. Rothschild and 
White (1993, 1995) have stressed the complementarity between higher ability students and high-
resourced, high-tuition institutions. High ability students are willing to pay more to attend these 
institutions because the rate of return to human capital is considerable compared to lower ability 
students. They find, in turn, that this pattern leads to student-to-college matching that is stratified or 
vertically differentiated, with high aptitude students disproportionately attending high-revenue (and 
relatedly, high-expenditure) colleges and universities. Hoxby (1997, 2009) finds that this stratified 
postsecondary market stays intact, even with broad, secular decreases in the cost of information 
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technology and travel that have nationalized many undergraduate markets. As markets have 
expanded to draw more competitive applicants, prices have increased and variation in resources and 
student quality between institutions has increased (Long, 2004). 
 While these authors have focused on colleges’ “academic value”, emphasizing the 
complementarity of high aptitude students with highly academic institutions, Jacob, McCall, & 
Stange (2013) consider the “consumption value” of the postsecondary experience itself – i.e., the 
enjoyment students receive from being on a college campus in the form of social and academic 
pleasure. The authors examine how students respond (using enrollment as a proxy for demand) to  
academic quality investments (e.g., expenditures on instruction, academic support, and high-SAT-
performing peers) and “consumption amenities” investments (e.g., expenditures on student services 
and auxiliary enterprises).97 They find substantial preference heterogeneity by student type, with 
wealthy students more willing to pay for consumption amenities and high-achieving students more 
willing to pay for academic quality. They note that their findings have different implications for 
different institutions based on their current student bodies and preferences for the types of students 
they may hope to recruit. In light of these findings that illuminate the power of differential 
institutional spending to drive differences in enrollment behavior, it begs the question: what factors 
may be driving this variation in institutional spending behavior over time?98 The simultaneity of 
enrollment and expenditure decisions makes teasing out the causal relationship challenging. Though, 
Jacob et al. note that this is an important avenue for future research.  
   
                                               
97 Please see Table 1 for descriptions of each expenditure category and examples of items within each category.  
 
98 In a working paper, Hemelt (2015) explores how shifting revenue composition away from appropriations towards 
tuition revenue at public 4-years affects the ratio of institutional spending on student services relative to instructional 
activities. He finds that a 1 percent increase in the ratio of real-per-student net tuition revenue to real-per-student state 
appropriation revenue leads to a 2.4-3.4 percent increase in the ratio of real-per-student expenditures on student services 
to expenditures on instruction.  
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2.3 Institutional spending and college outcomes 
Understanding the levers that regulate institutional expenditure decisions is crucial because 
how institutions spend money influences student outcomes along the intensive margin of student 
performance and persistence – beyond just the extensive margin of enrollment. In general, the 
literature shows that total per-student spending matters, with greater spending leading to higher rates 
of persistence and degree attainment (Deming & Walters, 2017; Bound & Turner, 2007). 
Furthermore, the category of spending also appears to matter. Several studies have found a positive 
relationship between increased spending on instructional activities and first-year persistence and 
likelihood of graduating (Ryan, 2004; Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010; Webber, 2012). This finding is 
noteworthy because over the last several decades, median instructional spending per FTE at public 
and private four-year institutions has grown slower than median spending per FTE in other core 
spending categories (student services, academic support, etc.) (Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010).  
Additionally, Webber & Ehrenberg and Webber find instructional spending has the greatest 
effect for high-ability students, STEM majors, and students attending doctoral-granting institutions. 
Both Ryan (2004) and Webber & Ehrenberg (2010) also find that academic support spending 
positively impacts graduation rates and persistence, with the effect largest for students attending 
doctoral-granting institutions. However, while Ryan finds a null effect of student services spending, 
Webber & Ehrenberg and Webber (2012) find spending in this category to have a positive effect on 
persistence and graduation rates. Additionally, they find this association to be strongest for lower-
performing students attending institutions with low mean ACT scores and a relatively high 
proportion of Pell grant recipients.  
2.4 Conceptual framework  
To summarize, prior literature has shown that public colleges and universities face strong 
financial and prestige incentives to enroll nonresident students. This is important because the 
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growth of nonresidents has increasingly outpaced the growth of residents at public institutions over 
the last several decades, particularly at selective institutions and those with broad national or 
international appeal. While, several well-known papers have examined the link between institutional 
spending and student body composition, none of these papers have looked explicitly at student 
residency status. Moreover, these papers focus on how student enrollment demand responds to 
institutional expenditure behavior, rather than how institutions may respond to the changing 
compositions of their student bodies. To be sure, enrollment behavior and expenditure decisions 
may be endogenous and are likely jointly determined, which is why I utilize an instrumental variables 
approach to isolate exogenous variation in nonresident enrollment.  
 Little to no studies have examined the levers that determine institutional spending 
composition, despite several papers documenting the significance of total institutional spending and 
categorical spending on persistence and degree attainment. Conceptually, the a priori effect of 
nonresident enrollment on institutional expenditure composition appears ambiguous and likely to 
vary by institution selectivity level. Relative to their in-state peers, nonresident students tend be both 
wealthier and higher-achieving (Jaquette et al., 2016; Groen & White, 2004). As Jacob, et al. (2013) 
have documented, one on hand, this may mean they demand more consumption amenities (as 
wealthier students). On the other hand, they may demand more academic amenities (as high aptitude 
students). Perhaps an increase in the share of nonresidents may also bring in additional tuition 
revenues to bolster spending all around, and may allow prestigious publics to maintain their 
academic quality by subsidizing academic inputs like instruction and academic support. Conversely, 
less prestigious institutions may cater to nonresident students by allocating more funding towards 
inputs that enhance student social and cultural experiences via student services and auxiliary 
enterprises. Then again, the preferences of nonresidents and residents may not actually differ greatly 
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from another in actuality. As pubic institutions substitute one for another, these student body 
changes may not translate into significant expenditure changes.   
3. Empirical approach and data 
3.1 Empirical framework  
In this study, I seek to identify the effect of nonresident enrollment share on the 
compositional changes in institutional expenditures. Equation 1 shows a general intuition-specific 
linear panel model, where !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ is a measure of the share of nonresidents enrolled 
at university i in time t, with 0 as its associated population coefficient; 1′./ is a matrix of time-
varying institution- and state-level covariates; 3/ is a vector of time (year) fixed effects; 4. is a vector 
of institution-specific fixed effects; and %./ is the unit-varying, time-varying idiosyncratic error. 
Finally, !5%),+)6./ refers to a set of institution expenditure categories.  
 
(1)															!5%),+)6./ = 	0!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ + 1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./	 
 
Inclusion of year and institution fixed effects addresses potential confounding that may 
result do to a relationship between nonresident enrollment and institution-invariant secular trends or 
between nonresident enrollment and time-invariant institutional differences, respectively. However, 
we may still be concerned that after controlling for covariates, a relationship between nonresident 
enrollment and the time-varying, unit-varying error term, %./, persists (Wooldridge, 2002). Bias may 
occur if important covariates related to both !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ and !5%),+)6./ are excluded 
from the set of controls, which is likely to be the case given that !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ is not 
randomly assigned (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Furthermore, we may additionally be concerned that 
nonresident enrollment and expenditure decisions are endogenous. They are likely to be jointly 
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determined, or perhaps the composition of institutional expenditures may change in anticipation of 
increased nonresident enrollment, leading to issues of simultaneity and reverse causality (Jacob et al., 
2013). Therefore, it is preferable to identify a source of variation in nonresident enrollment that is 
exogenous. This paper attempts to isolate exogenous variation in nonresident enrollment by 
employing an instrumental variables approach.  
 By using an instrumental variable =./ to isolate exogenous variation in 
!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ , the instrumental variables estimation strategy calculates a consistent 
estimate of the population parameter 0. In executing this IV analysis, I apply a two-stage least 
squares approach. Equation 2 models the first-stage, the effect of the instrument =./ on 
!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ , controlling for covariates 1′./ and with inclusion of year (3/) and 
institution (4.) fixed effects.  
 
(2)															!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ = 	0=./ + 1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./ 
 
Equation 3 models the effect of the endogenous variable, nonresident enrollment, on different 
institutional spending outcomes, !5%),+)6./ , controlling for the same covariates and fixed effects. 
Here, the values of '()$%*+,%)-./ are replaced with the predicted values from the first stage in 
equation 2 above. The predicted values, !ℎ#$%	'()$%*?,%)-@/A , capture variation in nonresident 
enrollment that is explained by variation in the instrument. This is the local average treatment effect. 
 
(3)														!5%),+)6./ = 	0	!ℎ#$%	'()$%*?,%)-@/A +1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./ 
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In order for an IV framework to estimate a consistent causal effect with heterogeneous potential 
outcomes, several assumptions must be met (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). After describing the data in 
the next subsection section, I will return to describing my candidate instruments and discuss these 
assumptions in greater detail in section four. 
3.2 Data and variables 
 For this analysis, I generate an institution-level panel dataset using data from IPEDS, and I 
supplement with state-level data from various sources. My primary analytic sample consists of public 
four-year institutions defined as research-extensive or research-intensive by the 2000 Carnegie 
Classification. This analytic sample mirrors that of prior research examining the relationship between 
state appropriations and nonresident enrollment (Bound, et al., 2016; Jaquette & Curs, 2017), as 
these selective, research-active institutions are the most responsive to enrolling nonresident students 
due to changing economic conditions. The panel encompasses years 2002-03 through 2015-16. The 
floor of 2002-03 was chosen because the rise in nonresident enrollment at public four-year 
institutions has predominately occurred post the 2001 and 2008 recessions, coinciding with a steep 
decline in state appropriation levels. The 2015-16 ceiling was chosen because it is the latest year for 
which I have expenditure data to generate my dependent variables of interest.  
My key independent variable, the share of enrolled students who are of nonresident status, 
comes from the Residence and Migration subcomponent of the IPEDS Fall Enrollment survey. 
These data identify the number of freshmen enrolled at postsecondary institutions at the fall census 
date from each state, US territory, and foreign country. Like Curs & Jaquette (2017), I define 
nonresident as any first-time student enrolled at an institution whose prior residence was not the 
state in which the institution is located. Therefore, the share nonresident is a fraction whereby the 
numerator is the total number of first-time nonresidents at institution i in year t, and the 
denominator is the total number of all first-time undergraduates at institution i in year t. Prior to 
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2000-01, the residency subcomponent was collected in odd academic years (e.g., 1996-97), and 
starting in 2001-02, institutions could voluntarily submit this information in even academic years – 
i.e. odd fall semesters – (e.g., the 2003-04 year). I include all nonmissing observations from voluntary 
years in my primary analysis, but do not impute any values for missing observations. To improve my 
sample size, I also supplement with nonresident enrollment data from the College Board’s Annual 
Survey of Colleges (ASC) for the years in my sample. From the ASC data, I can fill in the share of 
nonresident students for institution-year observations where IPEDS reporting was not mandatory.  
I consider a comprehensive suite of dependent variables in this analysis, generated from 
expenditure variables collected as part of the spring Finance subcomponent. These expenditure 
categories are commonly used in economics of education analyses and are detailed further in Table 
1. This table describes each of the nine categories I examine, including descriptions and example 
items provided by IPEDS. Categories of particular focus and interest in prior research include 
instruction, academic support, student services, and auxiliary enterprises. Though somewhat 
imperfectly broad, these categories offer the best institution-level data available for probing the 
spending habits of universities towards both scholastic and non-scholastic campus resources. To 
account for differences in institutional spending by enrollment capacity at each institution, I divide 
spending in each category by the number of FTE students per institution-year. Like my independent 
variable, I do not impute any values for institution-year observations that have missing expenditure 
data.  
Time-varying covariates included in the matrix 1′./ were chosen to increase precision and 
reduce omitted variable bias, as well as to minimize threats to the assumptions for the IV estimation 
procedure. Institutional controls from IPEDS include resident tuition and fees, nonresident tuition 
and fees, institutional endowment per FTE, state appropriations per FTE, and total Pell grant aid 
per FTE. To account for changing higher education conditions in other states, like Curs and 
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Jaquette (2017), I include geographically weighted measures of nonresident tuition in public research 
universities in other states as well as the enrollment capacity of these research institutions in other 
states. The latter is denoted as the ratio of the population of 18-year-olds to enrollment in public 
research institutions in other states. Each of these two measures is geographically weighted using the 
same weighting procedure that I employ in construction of my instrumental variables. I discuss this 
procedure in more detail in section 4.2 below. For institution-level covariates, I impute missing 
values using the average of the within panel 1-year lag and 1-year lead observations. 
In addition, I include a suite of state-level variables that plausibly affect institutional 
spending and correlate with nonresident enrollment. These variables and their sources include: 
income per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis), annual unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics), tax revenues per capita (Tax Policy Center), and total state population aged 12-17, aged 
18-24, and aged 25-44 (Census). Finally, I use data from state expenditures on aid from the National 
Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs (NASSGAP) to generate measures of state 
need-based and merit-based (e.g., non-need) aid. All institution- and state-level finance variables 
have been converted to inflation-adjusted 2015 constant dollars.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics (with standard errors in parentheses) for the set of 
dependent, independent, and covariate variables used in the analyses. Column 1 provides summary 
statistics for the full analytic sample, which includes 2,141 institution-year observations for 160 
public, four-year research institutions over a 14-year period. Columns 2 and 3 divide the full sample 
into those publics considered part of the American Association of Universities (AAU) and those 
without that distinction. AAU institutions represent the leading public and private universities in the 
US and Canada – with only US publics identified in this sample here.99 These categories are included 
                                               
99 Table 1A in the Appendix lists the public institutions considered part of the American Association of Universities in 
this analysis.  
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as an additional means of stratifying the sample along quality and mission lines; their inclusion also 
reflects sample restrictions made in Bound et al. (2016)’s recent paper looking at changing state 
appropriations and the influx of foreign undergraduates.  
The first section of Table 2, Institutional Spending, shows total spending per FTE over the 
14-year time period tracked in my study. It also shows the compositional breakdown of total 
spending by each category. For the full sample and both AAU and non-AAU institutions, 
instructional spending comprises the largest share of total spending (at 26 percent and 32 percent, 
respectively), followed by other spending for AAU institutions (20 percent) and research activities 
(14 percent) for non-AAU institutions. Figure 2 shows the mean expenditure patterns for 
institutions in my sample for years 2002-2015. The first y-axis (left-side) documents how spending in 
seven of the nine categories fluctuates over time as a share of total spending per FTE (dashed and 
dotted lines). The mean share of nonresidents is also illustrated (solid red line) as a comparison. The 
second y-axis (right-side) references mean total spending per FTE by each year in real 2015 dollars 
(solid black line). 
Figure 2 shows that, with the exception of the Great Recession, total spending per FTE 
student has generally increased for the research-active public four-years in my sample over time. The 
figure also highlights that the share of spending on instruction has remained notably higher than 
spending in other categories over time, and actually increased noticeably around the Great Recession 
from about 30 percent to 33 percent of total spending per FTE. Like instruction, spending in other 
major categories has remained relatively stable over the 14-year period. With the exception of 
research activities, the share of spending devoted to these other major categories actually increases 
steadily over time, even in the midst of the Great Recession.  
However, as Figure 2 shows, the increased spending in these categories as a share of total 
spending coincides with a dramatic, steep decline in the share of spending devoted to “other 
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expenses”. This decline begins as early as 2006 and accelerates in 2008, such that by 2010 the share 
hovers around 5.5 percent of total where it was previously 18 percent of total in 2006. Though this 
share begins to gently increase in 2010 and beyond, it never exceeds 10 percent of total spending per 
FTE. Other expenses refer to the costs associated with operating and maintenance of buildings and 
facilities as well as independent operations of the university such as hospital services. The figure 
suggests that the Great Recession dramatically shifted the spending priorities of universities away 
building maintenance and operation, and that this shift remained largely in place, even as economic 
conditions improved later.100 
The second section of Table 2, Nonresident Enrollment, summarizes my primary 
endogenous variable of interest – the share nonresident – across the full sample and by AAU 
designation. The other five variables in this section refer to instrumental variables I create in order 
to isolate exogenous variation in the share of students who are nonresidents at each institution. 
Finally, the last two sections summarize institution- and state-level covariate means. A final takeaway 
from Table 2 is that institutional resources vary markedly between AAU and non-AAU institutions; 
these more research-intensive and selective publics hold a greater share of nonresidents, generate 
more revenue from tuition and fees, and have more state appropriations and endowment funds at 
their disposal than non-AAU institutions. 
4. Instrumental variables identification strategy 
As a way of isolating the exogenous variation in the share of students at an institution who 
are of nonresident status, I searched for instruments likely to affect demand of nonresidents for in-
state, public institutions unrelated to the expenditure decisions of in-state publics. I consider a suite 
of instruments, eventually settling on a set that combine features of several. Section 4.1 details the 
                                               
100 The Great Recession may have also caused institutions to change how they classified certain expenditures, moving 
some that traditionally would be considered part of the “other expenses” category into another category such as 
“academic support” or “auxiliary enterprises”.  
231  
construction and logic behind my first set of considered instruments, while section 4.2 explicates the 
addition of other instruments to improve the relevance of the first set of instruments. In the 
Robustness section, I detail consideration of alternative instruments.   
4.1 Initial instruments: Cap on nonresident enrollment 
Initially, as a means of finding a plausible source of exogenous variation in nonresident 
enrollment, I chose to leverage variation in state or system-imposed caps on the share of 
nonresident students enrolled. These caps, or restrictions, on nonresident enrollment levels have 
arisen as concerns about the crowding out of in-state residents have escalated. Typically, these limits 
are instituted by state university systems or governing boards, but several have also been 
implemented via state statute. These caps do not impose a limit on the number of out-of-state and 
foreign students to be enrolled per-se; rather, they restrict the proportion of enrolled students (either 
the percentage of enrolled freshman or the percentage of total enrolled undergraduates) that can be 
of nonresident status. This is why I measure the influence of nonresident students on institutional 
expenditures as a share rather than as a total count of out-of-state and foreign students – in addition 
to the fact that, from a theoretical perspective, I am interested in how the compositional change in 
the student body may drive expenditure decisions.101  
In 2017, the University of California System became the latest entity to institute a cap on 
nonresident enrollment, with the Board of Regents voting to restrict nonresident undergraduate 
enrollment to 18 percent at University of California system schools (Watanabe, 2017).102 The 
California system joins more than a half dozen other systems and states that have established similar 
                                               
101 However, I also use the natural log of the count of nonresident as an endogenous regressor as a sensitivity check. For 
nearly all of my models, the direction and magnitude of the effect on spending outcomes aligns with what I find when 
my endogenous regressor is the share of students who are nonresidents.  
 
102 This 18 percent cap is technically in place at six University of California (UC) institutions. UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC 
San Diego, and UC Irvine already exceed 18 percent but will not be allowed to exceed their current percentage of 
nonresident students.  
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caps on nonresident enrollees over the last several decades. For example, the University of North 
Carolina System has maintained an 18 percent nonresident enrollment cap on entering freshmen 
(through campus-level operating incentives) since 1988, while Colorado state statute has limited the 
total share of FTE nonresidents to 33 percent at all Colorado institutions since 1994. Meanwhile, 
university systems in Arizona and Wisconsin have increased and outright eliminated similar caps in 
the last several years.  
I collected information on university system and statewide nonresident enrollment caps from 
2002-03 to present academic year through communication with system offices, boards of regents, 
and higher education departments for all 50 states.103 I also scanned newspaper articles, institution 
websites, and the Lexis Nexis database to find records of cap adoption. Table 3 documents the 
nonresident enrollment cap values established by state and year from 2002 up through 2017, when I 
stopped collecting data. I model my nonresident share caps off of the tuition cap instruments 
employed by Deming & Walters (2017) in their recent NBER paper, “The Impacts of Price and 
Spending Subsidies on U.S. Postsecondary Attainment.” Similar to them, I construct one 
instrument, =1C/: Nonresident cap, equal to one if state s (in which institution i is located) 
implemented a cap on nonresident enrollment in year t, and zero otherwise. I also construct a 
second instrument, =2C/: Cap value, equal to the cap percentage (share) limit in place in state s in 
year t. For institution-year observations where there is no cap in place (=1C/=0), I code the cap 
percentage value instrument as zero (=2C/=0). I include both of these variables in my estimating 
equations, and the combination allows me to exploit variation in both the existence and intensity of 
nonresident enrollment cap policies. 
                                               
103 Tom Harnisch, Director of State Relations and Policy Analysis at the American Association of State Colleges and 
Universities, has also been an extremely valuable resource in my research process. Dr. Harnisch had begun collecting 
qualitative data on nonresident enrollment caps in 2015, and shared his in-progress findings and data collection efforts 
with me as a way to aid my own research. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the share of nonresidents in each state in both 2005-06 and 2015-16 for 
the research-intensive and research-extensive institutions in my sample. States that impose 
nonresident enrollment caps at some point over the 14-year period of my study are denoted with ** 
asterisks next to their state abbreviations. States are ordered from least to greatest share of 
nonresident students in 2005. As the figure demonstrates, the caps are instituted (and removed) in 
states with both relatively lower shares and relatively higher shares of nonresidents in 2005. 
Moreover, these states also experience variable growth in the share of nonresidents by 2015. Both 
Texas (cap value = 10 percent) and Maryland (cap value = 30 percent) experience a reduction in the 
share of nonresidents between 2005 and 2015, though only Texas added a cap over this time period. 
Meanwhile, Arizona – who increased and eventually dropped their 40 percent cap limit between 
2005 and 2015 – increased the share of nonresidents on public campuses by about 6 percentage 
points. New Hampshire, who maintained their 25 percent cap over this period increased their 
nonresident enrollment share by about 13 percentage points. For all nine states with nonresident 
enrollment caps, however, the relevant counterfactual to consider is what the share would have been 
if the caps were not instituted at all.  
Despite the theoretical validity of using nonresident enrollment caps as an instrument for 
nonresident enrollment patterns by themselves, I may be concerned that I do not have enough 
institution-by-year variation to exploit in my IV models. For example, six of the nine states who 
implement a cap during my periods of study maintain a cap over the full time period (=1C/=1 
always). Six of nine also maintain the same cap value once they institute a cap, meaning =2C/ equals 
a constant value in each time period. An IV strategy using caps and cap values alone only identifies 
the local average treatment effect off of the institutions in the few states that add or remove a cap 
and/or change the share nonresident cap value. Moreover, in the current formulation, these state-
level caps are applied equally to all institutions within the state, which may not be how they function 
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in practice. For example, nonresident enrollment caps may weigh more heavily on the nonresident 
enrollment patterns of state flagship institutions than they do other research-active institutions 
within the state. In order to strengthen my instruments, therefore, I search for another source of 
exogenous variation that holds more institution-year variability to enhance the strength of these 
initial instruments.  
4.2 Additional instruments: Merit aid expenditure in other states 
I consider and test several other exogenous instruments that plausibly identify exogenous 
variation in the share of nonresidents at each institution, eventually employing the same instrument 
used by Curs & Jaquette (2017) in their IV analysis of how nonresident enrollment affects resident 
enrollment. Namely, I incorporate a measure of merit-based aid spending in other states in with my 
initial instruments. To more concretely explicate the formulation of this additional instrument, 
imagine that I am trying to estimate the effect of nonresident enrollment at the University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) on expenditure patterns at UNC-CH. A valid instrument affects 
demand for UNC-CH outside of the state of North Carolina and only affects UNC-CH spending 
behavior through a change in nonresidents enrolled. To construct this instrument, like Curs & 
Jaquette, I exploit state geographical boundaries and the fact that state merit-based aid policy affects 
only students who reside within the state (e.g, Georgia) prior to college enrollment (at UNC-CH). 
An increase in merit-based in other states decreases the relative cost of attending an in-state 
public institution for students who are residents of that state, and thus increases the likelihood a 
student remains in their own state for college rather than attending an out-of-state institution. 
Prior literature consistently finds that state merit-based aid decreased student out-migration for 
postsecondary education (Orsuwan & Heck, 2009; Zhang & Ness, 2010). Moreover, for the majority 
of merit aid programs, only in-state residents who enroll at in-state institutions are eligible to receive 
aid. Hence, the argument I am making is that state merit aid generosity in other states (e.g., Georgia) 
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is unrelated to the expenditure decisions of UNC-CH, except for how that merit aid may affect 
nonresident demand at UNC-CH (my endogenous regressor of interest). 
 I construct this merit-based aid instrument with respect to focal institution i as the weighted 
average of state-level merit-based aid expenditure per 18- to 24-year-olds in other states. My 
approach follows that of Curs & Jaquette (2017) who note that this way of constructing a variable 
uses a gravity model approach employed in interstate migration research (Cooke & Boyle, 2010).104 
In this model, migration from a sending state (e.g., Georgia) to a focal institution (UNC-CH) is 
positively related to the population of the sending state and negatively related to the distance 
between the focal university and the sending state. Distance is defined as the spherical distance from 
focal university i to the population centroid in state s.105 For each combination of focal institution i 
(N=160) and sending state s (49, not including state of focal institution), and academic year t, I 
construct a time-varying weight (D.C/), defined in equation 4 below.   











Higher weights are given to states with larger populations (X(5YZ#-+()C/)	and to those that are 
closer to the focal institution ([+*-#)\%C/). For each institution i in each year t, the sum of all 
weights equals one. After constructing weights for each institution-state-year combination, I then 
construct a weighted average of merit-based aid generosity in other states (]%$+-./) through the 
calculation below: 
                                               
104 For an even more detailed explication of how this instrument is constructed and the theoretical and methodological 
considerations given to this instrument, please refer to Curs & Jaquette (2017), page 10, Instrumental Variable.  
 
105 I use 2000 Census data records that provide the latitude-longitude coordinates of each state’s population centroid in 
that year. The 2010 Census also provides latitude-longitude coordinates of each state’s population centroid, through 
these points do not move dramatically for most states in the decade period between each Census.  
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As a final step, where I break from Curs & Jaquette, I multiply the new weighted average of merit-
based aid in other states by the nonresident enrollment caps and cap values from section 4.1 above, 
such that I generate two interaction instruments: 
 
(6#)																																								=1.C/ = ('()$%*+,%)-	\#5C/ 	×		]%$?-@/__________) 
 
(6e)																																								=2.C/ = ('()$%*+,%)-	\#5	f#ZY%C/ 	×		]%$?-@/__________) 
 
The addition of the weighted mean merit-based aid in other states to my cap instruments provides 
additional institution-year-level variation to the states that hold a cap continuously over the 14-year 
period of my analysis and to those states that maintain the same cap value once they institute a 
restriction on the share of nonresident students allowed. Note that, in the formulation of both of 
these interaction instruments in equations 6a and 6b, institutions that never face a nonresident 
enrollment cap are still given a value of zero for both instruments =1.C/ and =2.C/. 
4.3 Assessing instrument validity 
The extent to which these nonresident cap-merit aid instruments provide consistent, 
unbiased estimates in this analytic framework depends on whether certain conditions are met. 
Angrist & Pischke (2009) note that there are four assumption criteria: the monotonicity assumption, 
relevance assumption, the independence assumption, and the exclusion restriction assumption. I 
discuss each of these in turn.  
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4.3.1 Monotonicity  
First, the monotonicity assumption says that, for all units in which the instrument affects the 
endogenous variable, the instrument has the same directional effect. From a conceptual standpoint, I 
believe that both instruments, =1.C/ and =2.C/, meet this criterion. The imposition of a nonresident 
cap (0à1) is only likely to have a negative relationship with the share of nonresidents. Meanwhile, as 
the severity of the cap increases (by the allowable proportion getting smaller), the share of 
nonresidents is likely to decline further. Moreover, as discussed previously, as the generosity of 
merit-based aid in other states increases (weighted by their relative population and distance from the 
institution), this is likely to reduce the demand by nonresidents to attend a particular public 
institution of interest.   
4.3.2 Relevance 
Next, the relevance assumption states that the instrument strongly affects the endogenous 
regressor. Table 4 presents estimated results from the first-stage, equation (2), on the outcome 
!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ for the full analytic sample representing 2,141 unique observations and 160 
institutions. In it, I show the relevance of seven different instrument constructions, each in its own 
column. All equations include covariates as well as institution- and year-fixed effects. All institution- 
and state-level covariates are logged transformed to reduce heteroskedasticity and so that coefficient 
interpretations take the form of elasticities. In addition, because enrollment cap policies occur at a 
broad state-level, I cluster standard errors by state as well.106 Columns 1 through 3 show estimates 
for both of my preferred instruments, =1.C/ and =2.C/, combine in the same equation and separate. 
                                               
106 Though, some nonresident enrollment cap policies do only apply to universities within a specific system (e.g., 
University of California system as opposed to the California State University system). In addition, some policies only 
appear to directly apply to the flagship institution (e.g., the University of Wisconsin-Madison). These examples may be 
arguments for clustering standard errors at the institution level. However, these system-wide caps are likely to have 
spillover effects on enrollment at all research-extensive or research-intensive publics within the state. Clustering at the 
state-level is more conservative approach.  
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Columns 4 through 6 show estimates for just the nonresident cap and cap value instruments prior to 
their interaction with merit-based aid in other states, =1C/ and =2C/. Finally, column 7 shows a first-
stage regression when the instrument is just weighted merit-based aid expenditure in other states, 
=1./, the sole instrument employed in Curs & Jaquette’s analysis. The final rows in Table 4 show 
results of formal tests for the null hypothesis that the instrument is uncorrelated with the 
endogenous regressor.  
Column 1 shows a negative relationship between the cap-merit aid interaction and the share 
of nonresidents at an institution. More specifically, if a state adds a nonresident enrollment cap –
holding constant merit-based aid in other states – or merit-based aid in other states increases by 1 
percent in a state with an imposed nonresident enrollment cap, the share of nonresidents decreases 
by 0.055 percentage points (p<0.01). Meanwhile the cap value-merit aid interaction instrument is 
positively related to the share of nonresidents at an institution. This positive coefficient of 0.001 
(p<0.05), suggests that as the cap value relaxes by getting larger, the share of nonresident enrollees 
increases, which makes intuitive sense. Despite the statistically significant relationship between each 
instrument and the endogenous regressor in column 1, the formal tests of relevance raise questions 
about the strength of both instruments used jointly. Despite the fact that the joint F-Test of 
excluded instruments (9.126) is statistically significant at the 1-percent level, it is still below the 
conventional preferred test statistic of 10. Similarly, the Kleibergen-Paap weak identification test 
statistic at 9.131 suggests that the maximum size distortion of IV from OLS estimates is likely 
between 15 percent (critical value of 11.59) and 20 percent (critical value of 8.75) (Stock & Yogo, 
2005).107 This distortion is large if I am hoping to reject my null hypothesis that both instruments are 
jointly equal to zero at the 5-percent or 10-percent levels.  
                                               
107 Though I report the Kleibergen-Paap weak instrument test statistics in all of my results, they do not fully inform my 
evaluation of whether an instrument is weak or not. As Andrews and Stock (2018) recommend, I focus my attention on 
the F-Test of excluded instruments.  
239  
Instead, column 2, which shows just the inclusion of the single cap-merit aid interaction 
instrument (=1.C/) has a much higher F-Test of the excluded instruments at 18.16 (p<0.01). The 
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test (gh = 4.882, p<0.05) allows me to reject the null 
hypothesis that the model is not fully identified. The estimated coefficient in this case suggests that 
if a state adds a nonresident enrollment cap –holding constant merit-based aid in other states – or 
merit-based aid in other states increases by 1 percent in a state with an imposed nonresident 
enrollment cap, the share of nonresidents decreases by 0.038 percentage points (p<0.01). 
Conversely, column 3 shows the relative weakness of the first-stage equation where only the cap 
value-merit aid interaction instrument (=2.C/) is employed (F-Test = 7.710, p<0.01). Though it does 
show that as merit aid expenditures in other states increases by 1 percent, the share of nonresidents 
decreases by 0.002 percentage points. Given the results of the first-stage regressions, my preferred 
instrument going forward is the use of just the cap-merit aid interaction, =1.C/. 
Columns 4 through 6 illustrate the relationship between my initial instruments and the share 
of nonresidents to serve a comparison purpose. Despite the seeming strength of these instruments, 
particularly =1C/ (the nonresident cap by itself) – with a F-Test of 20.63 and p<0.01 – from a 
theoretical perspective I do not believe these instruments contain a satisfactory amount of variation 
on their own. Finally, column 7 shows the relationship between merit aid expenditures in other 
states and the share of nonresidents enrolled at a given institution. Using this instrument by itself 
has the advantage of having the instrument affect more institutions across more states because the 
value of the instrument is not dependent on whether the state has a nonresident cap in place or not. 
However, the F-test of excluded instruments is only 8.189 (p<0.01), which falls below the “rule of 




 4.3.3 Independence  
The final two assumptions for valid causal inference using instrumental variables are the 
independence assumption and the exclusion restriction assumption, both of which cannot be 
formally tested directly. The independence assumption requires that, after inclusion of covariates, 
the nonresident cap-merit aid interaction (and the cap value-merit aid interaction) is uncorrelated 
with omitted variables that affect institutional spending patterns. In other words, the instrument is 
plausibly exogenous and as good as randomly assigned.  
I would argue that institutions that spend their revenues in a certain way – for example, 
disproportionately more on instruction, or more on student services – are no more likely to be 
subject to nonresident enrollment caps than institutions that spend money in an alternate manner. 
As the market for higher education institutions becomes nationalized (and even globalized), 
institutions compete with one another across state lines for students. For example, more highly 
selective institutions that spend more on instruction to cater to the preferences of high-achieving 
students (Rothschild and White, 1993 & 1995, Webber & Ehrenberg, 2012) are likely to spend 
money in ways more reflective of their competitor peer institutions in other states than less selective 
institutions housed within their same state. However, one concern may be that institutions within 
the same state that is considering/using a nonresident enrollment cap may face similar pressures to 
spend institutional monies in a certain manner, as mandated by system offices or even state 
legislatures – whether implicitly or explicitly. In this way, if the pressure affects institutional spending 
through nonresident enrollment, the independence assumption is violated if I cannot fully account 
for this state pressure in my model. Instead, if the pressure affects institutional spending through 
another mechanism, I would be concerned that the exclusion restriction assumption is violated. I 
touch on this issue more below, and attempt to mitigate the independence assumption by 
accounting for state-level factors that may influence institutional spending.  
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Overall institutional spending (total expenditures) at public institutions may be correlated 
with total revenues in a way that relates to the economic conditions of the state and, potentially, 
whether states or university systems within the state adopt nonresident enrollment caps. For 
example, states experiencing cyclical downturns or rising costs in other areas (e.g., Medicaid) may be 
less willing or able to maintain appropriation transfers to postsecondary units (Kane, Orszag and 
Apostolov, 2005). Issues of reduced institutional funding may be further exacerbated if states have a 
large cohort of eligible college-aged individuals and institutions are not capacity limited (or choose 
not to limit their capacity) because, as a result, fewer resources will be available per enrolled student 
(Bound & Turner, 2007). Unfavorable (or favorable) economic conditions may influence whether 
state systems adopt policies that restrict nonresident enrollment. I have attempted to address these 
potential relationships by including a broad suite of state-level covariates in my regressions that 
account for the economic conditions of the state and year, as well as the college age population.  
While I may feel like the independence assumption holds with respect to nonresident 
enrollment caps and their cap values with the inclusion of state-level covariates, I also need to 
address the independence assumption as it relates to merit-based expenditures in other states. Given 
that merit-based aid is restricted to residents of a given state, I believe that merit aid in other states is 
a good as randomly assigned to a given institution and its spending patterns in another state. Still, as 
Curs & Jaquette point out, some states adopt merit-based aid programs to compete with other states 
for quality students. A possible concern may be that merit-based aid expenditures in one state drive 
up the merit-based aid expenditures in other states in ways that affect the spending habits of in-state 
institutions. For example, if Georgia increases its merit-based aid, North Carolina may follow suit. If 
North Carolina increases its merit-based aid in ways that draw high-quality North Carolina residents 
to UNC-CH, UNC-CH may shift their expenditures to categories they believe are most valued by 
these high-achieving students (such as instruction or academic support). To mitigate this potential 
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problem, I control for “own” state expenditures on need- and merit-based aid for each focal 
institution.  
4.3.4 Exclusion restriction 
The final criterion, the exclusion restriction assumption, states that the only path through 
which the instrument affects the dependent variable is through the endogenous regressor. In my 
analysis, that means that nonresident enrollment caps and their proportional limit can only affect 
institutional spending via changes in the share of nonresident students enrolled. Likewise, it means 
that merit-based aid expenditures in other states can only affect institutional expenditures via 
changes in the share of nonresidents. I consider alternative pathways that may result in a direct 
connection between nonresident enrollment caps or other-state merit-based aid and expenditures 
patterns at in-state publics. 
Regarding nonresident enrollment caps, one potential pathway may be that these caps affect 
institutional expenditures through the mechanism of resident or nonresident tuition and fees. Facing 
a restriction on the share of high-paying nonresident students they may enroll, institutions may 
attempt to make up for lost revenues by increasing the price of resident, in-state, tuition. This, 
however, seems unlikely, considering that public colleges and universities in most states lack the 
ability to unilaterally determine in-state tuition. Rather, tuition is set by coordinating or governing 
boards with governor- or legislator-appointed members; and, political pressures privilege 
affordability over revenue-maximization (Carlson, 2013). Moreover, information collected from 
states regarding tuition-setting procedures suggests that resident tuition pricing is determined much 
more by state-level factors – especially state appropriation levels – and considerations of 
institutional-level factors like cost of instruction and institution mission (Carlson, 2013).  
A more plausible pathway would be for institutions to respond to a nonresident enrollment 
cap by increasing the price of tuition and fees paid by of out-of-state and foreign students. 
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Institutions are given much more leeway in setting nonresident tuition prices, and in many cases, no 
formal policy governs how the process should work. In addition, in setting nonresident tuition, 
coordinating or governing boards prioritize ensuring that nonresidents cover a substantial portion of 
their costs of attendance over ensuring affordability (Carlson, 2013).  
Still, in both cases mentioned above, nonresident enrollment caps work to possibly influence 
resident and/or nonresident tuition – and therefore institutional spending – first through the lever 
of nonresident enrollment, the endogenous variable of interest. A reduction or compositional shift 
in tuition revenues would trigger a potential tuition price-setting response only because a change in 
nonresident enrollment occurred first. An imposed cap’s influence on tuition levels is only as strong 
as the cap’s effect on the number or share of nonresident students an institution expects to enroll. I 
believe that this same logic applies to most other possible pathways between the cap instruments 
and institutional spending. To cite another example, one may be concerned that nonresident 
enrollment caps affect the generosity of state need-based and merit-based aid, which in turn may 
affect how institutions spend their revenues. However, it is difficult to see how this effect would 
operate without the number or share of nonresidents serving as the mediating effect. Similarly, any 
effect that a nonresident enrollment cap would have on student quality – and therefore institutional 
spending – would operate through fluctuations in nonresident/resident enrollment composition 
first.  
With the respect to how merit-based aid in other states may affect institutional spending 
habits at a focal institution in another state, it is similarly challenging to identify a valid alternative 
pathway other than through the lever of the compositional shift of the student body (via residency 
status). One potential pathway of concern may be that institutions located in states with more 
generous merit-based aid programs may alter how they spend their financial revenues. Competitor 
institutions located in other states may then respond by spending their financial revenues differently; 
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for example, by diverting more funds to scholastic endeavors or to more amenity services as a way 
to attract students who find their competitor institution appealing. In this way, merit-based aid in 
other states would theoretically affect institutional spending at a focal institution not through 
nonresident enrollment status, but through a measure of perceived institutional prestige or similarity.  
To explicate more concretely, one may be concerned that the rise of generous merit aid 
programs like the Georgia HOPE Scholarships may reduce the amount of state appropriations that 
the Georgia legislature sends to public institutions such as the University of Georgia or Georgia 
Tech. With reduced state appropriation levels, these institutions may be forced to alter both their 
revenue sources and how they spend those revenues on students (i.e., decreasing auxiliary enterprise 
spending or student support spending). Noting these changes, institutions like UNC-CH may 
believe they can better compete for students that would typically attend a Georgia public institution 
by shifting spending to the categories that the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech had to cut. 
The merit aid in another state (Georgia) affected the institutional spending decisions of UNC-CH, 
but not through nonresident enrollment. 
While theoretically plausible, it is unclear if this pathway is particularly probable. Most likely, 
there would be a delay between Georgia’s merit aid change, Georgia’s subsequent state 
appropriation cuts, and UNC-CH’s fiscal response. During this time, UNC-CH would have to 
evaluate the feasibility of proposed spending shifts in light of their own student body’s desires, 
revenue constraints, and state mandates. An immediate shift in expenditure patterns is unlikely, and 
may even require additional revenues to be generated, which brings our focus back to the residency 
composition of the student body. As noted previously, the most plausible lever for raising revenues 
involves institutions altering the price of nonresident tuition and fees or admitting more 
nonresidents. In which case, the supply and demand of nonresidents becomes an important factor; 
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and in this way, the changing merit aid in Georgia still comes back around to the share of 
nonresidents enrolling at UNC-CH in some capacity.  
On an additional note, even if this aforementioned pathway between merit-based aid in 
other states (e.g., Georgia) and institutional spending at a focal institution (e.g., UNC-CH) holds up 
without being mediated through the share of nonresidents attending the focal institution, I would 
not necessarily be concerned that this violates the exclusion restriction for my preferred 
instrument(s). Recall that these preferred instrument(s) are interactions between nonresident caps 
that affect institution i in state s in year t and merit-based aid generosity in other states. Therefore, in 
order for the exclusion restriction to be violated, a pathway would have to exist between the joint 
occurrence of a nonresident enrollment cap and merit aid in other states and institutional spending at 
the focal institution. 
That being said, I may still be concerned that the exclusion restriction is violated if I cannot 
fully account for the norms or expectations that institutions within a state that has implemented a 
nonresident enrollment cap face. If these institutions spend their revenues in particular ways due to 
state-imposed expectations that are not related to nonresident enrollment, then these caps do not 
serve as a valid instrument. If this is the case, I should proceed with caution in interpreting my IV 
estimates when using instruments centered around state-imposed nonresident enrollment caps. 
5. Results 
5.1 Reduced form estimates 
 Before discussing the results from the Fixed Effects (FE) and IV Models, I first present 
estimates from reduced form regressions showing the relationship between my instrument(s) of 
focus and my expenditure outcome categories. Table 5 contains these estimates for all nine spending 
categories and total spending per FTE overall. For economy, the table only shows the estimated 
coefficients for =1.C/ (Nonresident cap x Merit aid expenditure in other states) and =2.C/ 
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(Nonresident cap value x Merit aid expenditure in other states). All regressions include institution- 
and state-level covariates, institution- and year-fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the state-
level. Though I noted previously that the models with just =1.C/ as my instrument are preferred 
given the strength of this instrument in the first-stage, I still present reduced form results for both 
=1.C/ and =2.C/ together and =2.C/ separately for additional context. Still, I only discuss results for 
the =1.C/-only estimations (the middle columns) below. 
 Though the exclusion restriction cannot be formally tested, reduced form estimates can 
serve as an initial diagnostic test, showing the relationship between the instrument and the outcome 
of interest without the inclusion of the endogenous regressor in the model. In this manner, I 
observe no statistically significant relationship between =1.C/ and total expenditures per FTE 
overall. I also do not observe a statistically significant association between =1.C/ and the share of 
spending devoted to five of the nine expenditure categories. However, I do observe statistically 
significant relationships between the interaction Nonresident cap x Merit aid expenditure in other states and 
the share of total spending devoted to institutional support (-0.005, p<0.1), instruction (-0.017, 
p<0.01), research activities (0.010, p<0.05), and scholarships & fellowships (0.004, p<0.05).  
 These reduced form estimates suggest that as a state implements a nonresident enrollment 
cap – holding constant merit-based aid in other states as well as all other covariates – the share of 
total spending devoted to institutional support and instruction decreases slightly. Meanwhile, the 
share spent on research activities and scholarships & fellowships increases slightly. The imposition 
of a cap in state s affects the spending behavior of institution i within that state in year t seemingly 
separate from nonresident enrollment. Likewise, within a state that has a nonresident cap, an 
increase in merit-based aid expenditures in other states in the same year t brings about the same 
changes in expenditure patterns. I do not go into further detail interpreting these effects. However, 
it is important to note that they highlight the potential for other pathways to exist between my 
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instrument(s) of choice and the expenditure outcomes I consider. As noted in the exclusion 
restriction discussion above, I will exercise caution in interpreting the validity of my IV estimates 
and whether my instruments satisfy the conditions necessary valid for causal inference.  
5.2 The effect of nonresident enrollment on university expenditure behavior 
 Table 6 shows the local average treatment effect of the !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ on logged 
total expenditures per FTE student. The first four columns show estimates from FE Models varying 
in the lag/lead between the dependent variables and the independent variable of interest. Columns 5 
through 7 show estimates for my IV models. As always, I show specifications that employ both of 
my interaction instruments together and separately, though I focus my discussion on the middle IV 
column that just includes =1.C/ in the first-stage regression in the rest of this section. None of the 
FE models show a statistically significant relationship between the share of nonresident students and 
total spending per FTE, nor do the IV models. This suggests that as the share of nonresidents grows 
at research active public institutions across the country, institutions are not responding by spending 
more money per FTE student. Given that many states have increased nonresident enrollment in 
response to a decline in state appropriations, this finding suggests that public institutions are using 
nonresident tuition funds to replenish their coffers rather than engaging in new spending behavior. 
 Table 7 is laid out similarly to Table 6 and shows the estimated local average treatment effect 
of the !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ on the share of total spending devoted to each of the nine 
expenditure categories. For presentation purposes, the table only includes the estimated effect of the 
!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ and not the suite of covariates and fixed effects included in all of the 
models. Using my preferred instrument (column 6), I find that an increase in the share of 
nonresidents at a public university in my sample increases the share of total expenditures that 
institutions devote to institutional support and instruction, while reducing the share of funds 
devoted to research activities and scholarship & fellowship funding. Still, given concerns about the 
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validity of my instruments, it is important to interpret these coefficients as suggestive local average 
treatment effects. In the Section 6 below I run additional robustness analyses to assess the validity of 
my causal estimates.  
  Though the FE models show a positive, yet nonsignificant association between the share of 
nonresidents and the share of expenditures on institutional support (e.g., administrative service, HR, 
public relations) and instruction (e.g., instructor and faculty salaries), the IV models suggest that a 1 
percentage point increase in the share nonresident leads to a 0.127 percentage point (p<0.05) and a 
0.429 percentage point (p<0.001) increase in the share of spending on each category, respectively. 
These differences in magnitude and statistical significance between the FE and IV results could be 
due to an endogeneity bias in the FE models and/or inefficiency in the IV models.  
 As the share of total spending increases in these two areas, it decreases in the categories of 
research activities and scholarship & fellowships. Of note, the FE models in both instances also 
demonstrate a negative relationship between the share of nonresidents and the share of spending on 
each category, respectively. For research, the estimates from the 2-year lag, 1-year lag, and current 
models predict that a 1 percentage point increase in the share nonresident is associated with a 
decrease in the share of monies devoted to research by 0.051 to 0.059 percentage points (p<0.01). 
However, the preferred IV regression suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of 
nonresidents leads to a decrease in the share research spending by 0.258 percentage points (p<0.05) 
– about a fivefold increase in magnitude.  
 When it comes to scholarships & fellowships funding, the FE models predict a 1 percentage 
point increase in the share nonresident to coincide with a 0.022 to 0.027 percentage point (p<0.1 – 
p<0.01) decrease in the share of expenditures towards this broad category. As a comparison, the IV 
models show a local average treatment effect of -0.095 percentage points (p<0.05). As the share of 
249  
nonresidents gets larger, the share of funding that institutions put towards scholarships & 
fellowships (e.g., payments to students for services such as off-campus housing) diminishes. 
 Altogether, the IV estimates suggest that as the composition of public research campuses 
shifts towards a higher proportion of out-of-state and foreign student enrollees, the effects on 
institutional spending do not cleanly fit within the anecdotal narratives so often conveyed by 
parents, policymakers, or university administrators. On one hand, as the share of nonresidents 
increases, the share of spending on instruction – an “academic” input – increases. Conversely, the 
share of spending devoted to another academic input, research, decreases by about half as much. 
Meanwhile, institutions comprised of a larger share of nonresidents can be expected to spend less on 
scholarship & fellowship funding provided to student enrollees. Though not traditionally referred to 
as an academic input in prior literature, scholarship & fellowship funding represents a way to 
provide both need- and non-need-based funding sources to students to serve as a financial safety net 
or enticement while students pursue their degree.  
The share of nonresidents does not appear to affect the share of total expenditures public 
universities devote towards so-called “consumption” amenities such as student services or auxiliary 
enterprises. However, the IV estimates do suggest that as the share of nonresidents increases, the 
share of spending put towards institutional support, also known colloquially as “administrative 
bloat”, increases as well. As the definitions in Table 1 illustrate, institutional support spending 
captures a diverse set of administrative offices and positions within a university. And while 
“administrative bloat” is not frequently brought up in the policy debates about the expanding 
presence of nonresidents on in-state campuses, it has become a growing topic of concern on its own 
as indicated by articles in the popular press (Hamburger, 2019; Simon, 2017). Stakeholders worry – 
often without evidence – that administrative bloat is the primary driver in tuition and fees. As these 
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stakeholders make a connection between nonresident enrollment and institutional support spending, 
the debate about both topics is likely evolve further. 
Still, despite the statistically significant IV estimates observed for these four expenditure 
categories, it is important to put these effects into practical context. For the last year in the analytic 
sample, 2015-16, the mean share of nonresidents first entering institutions within my sample was 
24.9 percent (about 941 students). Prior to this point, the share of nonresident students was growing 
by about a half percentage point per year, though at about three-quarters of a percentage point in 
the last five years. In this respect, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of nonresidents would 
represent a larger increase than the mean institution in my sample would historically experience.  
At the same time in 2015-16, the mean share of total spending on each of the four categories 
(along with commensurate real spending per FTE in that category in parentheses) was as follows: 
institutional support – 8.33 percent ($3,114.76); instruction – 32.13 percent ($12,289.58); research 
activities – 13.86 percent ($6,387.95); and scholarships & fellowships – 4.11 percent ($1,423.66). If 
these values are considered baseline, a 1 percent increase in the share of nonresidents (equivalent to 
38 nonresidents supplanting the position of residents) changes the share of spending in each 
category to 8.46 percent for institutional support, 32.56 percent for instruction, 13.60 percent for 
research activities, and 4.02 percent for scholarships & fellowships.  
Not only are these shifts substantively small, but they translate into practically small shifts in 
dollar terms as well. From a fiscal perspective, the growth in the share of spending devoted towards 
institutional support and instruction results in a spending increase of $47.49 per FTE and $164.09 
per FTE, respectively. Meanwhile, the decline in the share of expenditures being put towards 
research and scholarship & fellowship funding translates into a spending decrease of $118.93 per 
FTE and $32.87 per FTE, respectively. Considering that total spending per FTE in 2015-16 was 
$43,121.34, these shifts in categorical spending are miniscule in practicality. These calculations 
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suggest that as the share of students on campuses is comprised of more nonresidents, the changes 
on institutional expenditure patterns are small enough to be of little consequence.   
5.3 Heterogeneity by institution type 
 Even though the full sample results suggest a statistically, yet economically, insignificant 
effect of the share of nonresidents on changes in institutional spending patterns, I examine whether 
these effects vary based on the type of institution that a student attends. Though all institutions in 
the full sample are research-extensive and research-intensive public institutions, they also differ 
based on measures of selectivity. These selectivity measures may also affect how institutions respond 
to the increased presence of nonresidents when it comes to expenditure decisions. For this, I utilize 
the AAU designations cited in section three above. Given their high research caliber and 
distinguished status, I consider AAU status to serve as a mark of institutional prestige and selectivity. 
To investigate how this prestige/selectivity may moderate the effect of nonresident enrollment on 
expenditure decisions, I use an interaction model in which the estimated coefficient on 
!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ is allowed to vary by AAU status. I employ an interaction model because 
stratifying the sample into AAU and non-AAU subsamples would severely reduce my statistical 
power.108  
 With an interacted endogenous regressor, my IV model now requires two first-stage 
equations, and two to four instrumental variables, depending on my specification. I model the joint 
and separate effect of  =1.C/ (Nonresident cap x Merit aid expenditure in other states) and =2.C/ (Nonresident 
cap value x Merit aid expenditure in other states) on the endogenous regressor (!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./) 
                                               
108 I use an institution’s AAU status rather than its ranking in the top 50 of U.S. News and World Report National 
University Rankings because a larger share of my sample (31) would be flagged as AAU compared to top 50 in the latter 
(17). However, in robustness analyses, I do use a university’s flagship identification as another marker of selectivity or 
prestige. 
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and the interacted endogenous regressor (!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ 	× 	iij.) (Wooldridge, 2002) in 
the following equations: 
 
(7#)										!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./		
= 0c=1.C/ + 0cllm(=1.C/ ×	iij.) + 0h=2.C/ +	0hllm(=2.C/ × 	iij.) +1′./< +	3/ + 4.
+ %./					 
(7e)													(!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ × iij.)
= 0c=1.C/ + 0cllm(=1.C/ ×	iij.) + 0h=2.C/ +	0hllm(=2.C/ × 	iij.) +1′./< +	3/ + 4.
+ %./					 
 
(7\)																																			!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./		 = 0c=1.C/ + 0cllm(=1.C/ ×	iij.) +1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./					 
(7,)																		(!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ × iij.) = 0c=1.C/ + 0cllm(=1.C/ × 	iij.) +1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./					 
 
(7%)																																				!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./		 = 0h=2.C/ + 0hllm(=2.C/ ×	iij.) +1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./					 
(7n)																		(!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ × iij.) = 0c=2.C/ + 0hllm(=2.C/ × 	iij.) +1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./					 
 
 Equations 7a and 7b refer to first-stage regressions where both =1.C/ and =2.C/ are included, 
while equations 7c and 7d refer to first-stage regressions with just =1.C/, and equations 7e and 7f 
refer to first-stage regressions with just =2.C/. Because an institution’s AAU status is fixed and 
typically included within the institution fixed effect, I argue that this portion of prestige or selectivity 
attributed to AAU status can be considered exogenous and uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error 
term. Therefore, as long as I believe the validity assumptions for my instruments =1.C/ and =1.C/ 
hold from before – and there is some evidence to suggest I should not necessarily – the interacted 
instruments with AAU status are valid.  
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 Table 8 presents first-stage results for equations 7a through 7f in columns 1 through 6. 
Though I present the full set of first-stage results, for economy I will focus my discussion on the 
middle columns 3 and 4 as they hold my preferred instrumental variable set up from the full sample 
analysis. In general, the direction and statistical significance of these estimates adhere to my prior 
expectations. At non-AAU institutions, implementation of an enrollment cap OR an increase in 
merit aid by 1 percent led to a 0.041 percent decrease (p<0.01) in the share of nonresidents. At AAU 
institutions, the same cap or merit aid change led to 0.029 percent decrease in the share of 
nonresidents (equal to the addition of all coefficients: -0.041+ -0.007 + 0.014 + 0.005). Although 
these four coefficients are not jointly significantly different from zero. It is not altogether 
unsurprising that changes in merit aid or a nonresident enrollment cap would have less of an effect 
on the share of nonresidents enrolled at high-caliber AAU institutions. These institutions are likely 
to already attract a high level of nonresident students such that they may already have been hovering 
near a limit where the cap was imposed. Likewise, they are less likely to be sensitive to changes in 
merit aid generosity in other states.  
Still, the formal tests of endogeneity and instrument strength in Table 8 suggest that I may 
have a weak instrument problem. The Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test (gh = 0.129, p>0.1) 
does not allow me to reject the null hypothesis that the model is not fully identified. Moreover, the 
F-Test of excluded instruments in column 4 at 3.512 is well below the “rule of thumb” value of 10. 
Additionally, like before, the reduced form estimates in Table 9 suggest a direct link between my 
instruments and the share of total spending devoted to key expenditure categories. Once again, it is 
important to cautiously interpret my IV estimates as causal unbiased effects on institutional 




= 	0	!ℎ#$%	'()$%*?,%)-@/A +	0(	!ℎ#$%	'()$%*?,%)-@/ ×	iij@)A
+1′./< +	3/ + 4. + %./ 
  
For comparison purposes I also show estimations from lag/lead FE models in columns 1 
through 4. Columns 5 through 7 show estimates from the IV models, with column 6 containing my 
preferred model of interest. Despite some suggestive evidence that the share of nonresidents 
affected the share of total spending given to certain university functions in the full sample, I do not 
observe any statistically significant effect of nonresident enrollment on spending categories that is 
mediated through an institution’s status as an AAU institution. These results suggest that both high-
caliber (more prestigious) research universities respond to increased nonresident enrollment in ways 
similar to those research universities that are not as highly regarded for their research output.  
6. Robustness checks 
6.1 Alternative instruments 
 A concern with any IV design is that the instrument is not correlated strongly enough with 
the endogenous regressor. Though I find the F-Test of excluded instruments for my preferred first 
stage to be well above 10 at 18.16 (p<0.01), I also explore alternative first stage equations using 
different instruments and/or forms of the instrument. Table 11 showcases the most relevant subset 
of substitute instruments. The first panel shows estimations from first-stage regressions where the 
outcome is !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ , while the second panel shows the corresponding second-stage 
regressions where the outcomes are the share of total spending devoted to each of the four focal 
categories above. Column 1 shows the results from my preferred regressions in Tables 4 and 7 
previously. Columns 2 and 3 show first-stage and second-stage equations from the same model as 
column 1, except that in the weighting scheme used to measure merit-based aid in other states, the 
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distance between other states’ population centroids and focal institution i is squared (column 2) or 
square-rooted (column 3). These different treatments of distance allow the influence of distance to 
be both more intense (squared) and less intense (squared root) than the linear treatment in column 
1. The results from both the first-stage and second-stage estimates show that these variable 
treatments of distance produce similar estimates in direction and magnitude to those in the preferred 
specifications.    
 Column 4 adopts a similar instrument to column 1, except instead of enrollment caps 
interacted with merit-based aid expenditure in other states, they are interacted with all aid 
expenditures in other states (inclusive of both need-based and merit-based aid). Though the 
magnitude of the relationship between the instrument =1.C/ and the !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ is less 
negative in the first stage, the overall effect of nonresident enrollment share on expenditures on 
institutional support, instruction, research, and scholarships & fellowships is very similar in 
magnitude. In a separate set of regressions, not shown, I examine the relationship between 
nonresident caps interacted with need-based aid expenditure in other states and the share of 
nonresidents. However, this instrument is only weakly related to my endogenous regressor. 
 The final two columns highlight the use of instruments that differ more significantly from 
the one I employ in my preferred regressions. In column 5, though I utilize the same nonresident 
enrollment caps as before, I interact these caps with a measure of the historical reliance an 
institution has on enrolling nonresidents from other states. The theoretical utility behind this 
historical reliance measure is that the severity of a nonresident enrollment cap at a given institution 
varies depending on an institution’s previous share of nonresidents from each state. Moreover, the 
extent to which merit-based in other states (e.g., Georgia) would affect nonresident enrollment at a 
given institution (UNC-CH) likely depends on the share of nonresidents from this state (Georgia) 
that have historically attended the institution. I create this measure of historical reliance using merit-
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based aid totals in other states; but rather than weighting each by their geographic distance from a 
focal institution, I weight each value by the mean share of students from that state that attended that 
focal institution in the last 1-5 years. However, as the first-stage results show in column 5, this 
instrument is extremely weak. 
 Finally, column 6 replicates the first-stage regression output in Table 4, column 7 showing 
just the relationship between mean weighted merit-based aid expenditure in other states (=1./) and 
!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ . As noted earlier, this instrument holds potentially more theoretical strength 
on its own if we are concerned that the exclusion restriction may not be satisfied with use of the 
nonresident enrollment caps in the instrument. It also has the added benefit of estimating the effect 
of nonresident enrollment off of the full sample of institutions – even those without enrollment 
caps in place. The F-Test of excluded instruments did not yield a test statistic greater than 10 
(8.189), the “rule of thumb” baseline, and therefore this instrument was not considered to be initially 
as strong as the preferred =1.C/ instrument in the first column. Nonetheless, I show the results from 
second-stage equations with the same expenditure outcomes of interest.  
In this model, as the share of nonresidents increases by 1 percentage point, the share of total 
spending devoted to institutional support increases by 0.15 percentage points (p<0.05). This 
magnitude is slightly larger than the predicted magnitude in column 1 and shows the same general 
relationship between nonresidents and institutional support spending. However, the share of 
nonresidents does not statistically significantly cause changes in the other three spending categories. 
Moreover, though not shown here, the share nonresident does not affect total spending per FTE, 
nor spending in any of the other nine categories when the instrument is just merit-based aid 
expenditures in other states. Altogether, evidence from these models supports that from previous 
models showing the share of nonresidents enrolled has an economically insignificant effect on 
institutional spending patterns.  
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6.2 Alternative specifications and samples 
 In addition to testing the validity of other instruments and how local average treatment 
effects compare when each is employed, I also test out alternative specifications and samples using 
my original, preferred instrument of choice in the primary analyses. Table 12 summarizes the 
second-stage estimated effects of the endogenous regressor, !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ , on 
expenditures towards institutional support, instruction, research activities, and scholarships & 
fellowships. Once again, for comparison, column 1 provides estimates from the original models.  
Column 2 shows the effects when total institutional enrollment is an added covariate on the 
right-hand-side (in both the first- and second-stage). This specification examines the relationship 
between nonresident enrollment and spending, assuming that an institution is capacity constrained 
and can only add nonresidents by reducing the number of residents they enroll by the same amount. 
The primary model allows for institutions to add both nonresidents and residents, though assumes 
that institutions add nonresidents at a greater rate such that the compositional change in the student 
body still changes in favor of nonresidents. The estimated effects in column 2 are of the same 
direction and general magnitude as those presented in column 1. Column 3, meanwhile shows 
results from second-stage regressions that omit both state appropriations and per FTE endowment 
dollars from the right-hand side covariate set. Several institutions experience high levels of 
missingness for both of these variables such that meaningful imputation was not feasible and these 
institution-year observations were dropped from the analyses. Two institutions were dropped from 
the model altogether, including the University of Colorado – Boulder, which was affected by a 
nonresident enrollment cap of 33 percent over all 14 years in the study.  Column 3 retains these lost 
observations and institutions, though shows estimated effects on institutional expenditure patterns 
that largely mirror those observed in the primary analyses.  
258  
 In addition to measuring the effect of the share nonresident on the share of funding devoted 
to each expenditure category, I also examine how changes in the share of out-of-state and foreign 
students affects total spending per FTE in each category. Column 4 shows second-stage results for 
these analyses where the outcome is the logged total spending towards the four focal categories of 
interest. With the exception of the form the outcome variable takes, the rest of the model is 
structured identically to the preferred/original model in terms of endogenous regressor, instruments, 
and covariates. The results do look a bit different when presented as total spending rather than as a 
share. Namely, as the share of nonresidents increases by 1 percentage point, institutions do not 
appear to increase their total per FTE spending on institutional support or instruction. Rather, they 
notably decrease their total spending on research activities and scholarships & fellowships by 3.8 
percent (p<0.01) and 2.9 percent (p<0.05), respectively. Functionally, by reducing total spending in 
these categories, the relative share of monies devoted to institutional support and instruction 
increases – even if total spending in these categories did not increase statistically significantly. 
Though only effects on total spending per FTE are presented for four categories in Table 12, I do 
not observe an effect of the share nonresident on total spending in any other expenditure categories.  
 In addition to looking at different forms of the expenditure outcome variables, I also employ 
different forms of the endogenous regressor. That is, instead of using the !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ , I 
use p)	'()$%*+,%)-./, or the logged total number of nonresidents at an institution. Rather than 
measuring the relative share of the student body that nonresidents comprise, this construct measures 
their total volume. Column 5 shows second-stage results from regressions that use this new 
endogenous regressor and where the outcomes are also logged expenditures in each spending 
category. Additionally, the instrument used in both the first- and second-stages is just =1./, the 
mean weighted merit-based aid expenditures in other states (the instrument in Table 11, column 6). 
The estimation approach adopted in column 5 here mirrors that of taken by Curs & Jaquette and 
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serves to evaluate the effect of nonresident enrollment on expenditure patterns using a potentially 
theoretically stronger (though perhaps empirically weaker) instrument and an endogenous regressor 
that treats nonresident enrollment as a count rather than as a proportion.109  
 In this specification, the growth of nonresidents appears to only affect institutional support 
spending in a statistically significant way such that as the number of nonresident students increases 
by 1 percent (about 10 students), the amount of total spending on institutional support increases by 
22.4 percent (p<0.05). In the 2015-16 year, this is equivalent to per FTE spending going up by about 
$698 dollars from a baseline of $3,115 per FTE. Unlike the estimated effects from previous models, 
this effect is economically significant and suggests that increased nonresident enrollment increases 
institutional spending on administrative, personnel management, and public relations and 
development activities, to name a few. Still, given the empirical weaknesses of this instrument, the 
magnitude of this effect should be interpreted as suggestive evidence of an effect of nonresident 
enrollment on institutional support spending. However, the general direction of this effect mirrors 
that reported in Table 11, column 6 when the endogenous regressor was !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ and 
the outcome measure was the share of spending on institutional support. As more nonresidents 
enroll at public institutions, these institutions may respond by shifting funding towards 
“administrative bloat” functions. 
 As a final robustness check, Table 12 shows the predicted effect of the share nonresident, 
allowing the effect to vary based on the flagship status of a school, rather than its AAU status. 
Flagship status applies to a greater number of institutions (50) and reflects the possibility that 
nonresident enrollment operates differently at a state’s most well-known and often most well-
regarded public university. Columns 6 and 7 show the estimated effects of both  
                                               
109 In these regressions, I control for the (logged) total number of residents on the right-hand side in both the first- and 
second-stage equations as well, so that the increase in nonresidents is holding constant the number of residents enrolled.  
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!ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ and the !ℎ#$%	'()$%*+,%)-./ 	×	qZ#6*ℎ+5. interaction on the 
expenditure patterns. However, as the results indicate, nonresident enrollment does not appear to 
differentially affect the spending behaviors of flagship universities. 
7. Discussion 
 As public research universities have increased their nonresident student populations in 
recent years, stakeholders have raised concerns about how this influx has shifted the priorities of 
these taxpayer-subsidized institutions. A particular topic of discussion has been the propensity of 
institutions to substitute higher-paying nonresidents for in-state residents. Curs & Jaquette (2017) 
find that nonresidents do not appear to crowd out resident enrollment at public institutions, except 
at highly-selective publics where the crowd-out effect is still relatively small.  
 Another related, emerging topic of concern has been that the disproportionate growth in the 
representation of nonresidents on public campuses has shifted the programmatic and financial 
priorities of these institutions away from education- and access-focused functions and more towards 
consumption amenities that enhance the college experience, particularly for wealthier out-of-state 
and foreign students. As prior research (Ryan, 2004; Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010) has shown that 
how institutions spend money affects student outcomes, if public universities respond to 
nonresident enrollment by spending more or less in certain areas, this may have important 
downstream effects for college completion outcomes.  
Spending on academic inputs such as instruction and academic support have the greatest 
positive effect on student persistence and graduation for high-ability students and students attending 
more selective institutions (Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010; Webber, 2012; Ryan, 2004). Meanwhile, 
spending on student services – often considered part of the “amenities” aspect of college 
expenditure – appears to have the strongest effect for lower-performing students and those 
attending institutions with a high proportion of Pell grant recipients (Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010; 
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Webber, 2012). In light of the relationships between spending and student outcomes in prior 
research, this paper attempts to understand one potential lever responsible for shifting or 
determining institutional spending, by focusing on the role of nonresidents.  
Altogether, I find that the practical, economic effect that nonresident students have on 
public university spending behavior is extremely small, and often negligible. From a statistical 
perspective, changes in the share of nonresidents attending public universities may slightly shift the 
monetary resources institutions devote towards four main categories; however, total spending per 
FTE does not change. The fact that as public campuses become comprised of more nonresident 
students and total spending per FTE does not change suggests that many of these public institutions 
are in fact using the additional revenues generated form nonresident tuition and fees to fill in 
revenue shortfalls resulting from diminished state appropriations. Universities are not using these 
additional revenues to increase overall spending on students. This finding is significant because it 
supports the arguments often made by university administrators that nonresident enrollment serves 
an important function in an era where state appropriation dollars are not reliably consistent. 
Nonresident tuition revenues help to offset the loss of state dollars. 
 Total spending per FTE does not change in response to a larger share of their student body 
being comprised of nonresidents, though there is some evidence that institutions increase the share 
of total spending they devote towards certain areas. As the share of nonresidents increases by 1 
percentage point, the share of funding puts towards institutional support activities increases by 0.13 
percentage points and towards instruction by 0.43 percentage points. Conversely, the share of 
spending devoted to research activities decreases by 0.28 percentage points and the share devoted to 
scholarships & fellowships declines by 0.095 percentage points. In this manner, it would appear that 
institutions shift some of their funds towards more academic inputs – like instruction – but perhaps 
away from others – research and scholarship & fellowship funding.  
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Nonresident enrollment seems to also increase the relative share of funding public 
universities spend on so-called “administrative bloat” – or the institutional support activities. These 
administrative positions support the day-to-day activities of the university and include everything 
from central executive-level activities involving long-range planning, to legal operations, employee 
management, and public relations and development. It is unclear whether spending in this category 
is considered to add purely academic value, consumption value, neither, or both to a student’s 
experience on campus. It is also unclear which students would benefit the most from increased 
spending in this category. Does more administrative staff help to serve the needs of 
underrepresented and/or lower-performing college students? Or, does increased institutional 
support spending go towards functions that most benefit wealthier and/or high-achieving students? 
Do nonresidents benefit more from these dollars than residents? These are all questions that future 
research should explore. Beyond the traditional categories of instruction, student services, etc., little 
work has examined how institutional support spending affects student persistence and completion.    
Despite the statistical significance of some of the effects, the functional, practical effect of 
nonresident enrollment on institutional spending patterns is extremely small financially. Moreover, it 
is important to interpret all of these estimates with a note of caution, given that I remain somewhat 
concerned that my IV models do not strongly meet all criteria required for unbiased causal 
inference. Though my preferred instrument is empirically relevant to my endogenous regressor of 
choice, I cannot fully reject the possibility that my model violates the independence or the exclusion 
restriction assumptions. This caution mostly stems from the reduced form estimates in Table 5 that 
showed a statistically significant, direct relationship between my instrument and spending in my four 
primary categories of interest. It is possible that some feature of states that adopt nonresident 
enrollment caps is correlated with how institutions within those states direct funds to certain 
expenditure categories, separate from nonresident enrollment.  
263  
I attempt to account for these state-level features using state economic indicators that may 
affect state appropriation levels, which in turn affect spending decisions. I also try to account for 
certain social pressure that states may face to impose nonresident caps at their public institutions. 
For example, we may believe that states with a high population of college-aged students would face 
more demand from residents and taxpayers to restrict the enrollment of out-of-state students at 
public institutions. These states may have legislatures with a fair amount of authority over public 
institutions and may decide to impose a nonresident ban to satisfy their constituents. Simultaneously 
these legislatures with a high degree of influence and control over institutional functioning may 
determine how institutions should spend their revenues. In this scenario, a nonresident enrollment 
cap could be implemented and institution-level spending could change, not as function of changes in 
nonresident enrollment, but as a function of the state’s legislature (and constituents) having a high 
level of authority over the institution’s spending practices.  
I attempt to mitigate some of this social or political pressure by including the populations 
count of 18-24-year-olds and 12-17-year-olds in each state, with the thought that these pressures are 
greatest in states where residents feel the threat of being crowded out the most. Still, this approach 
may not be sufficient. This is especially true if the relationship between nonresident enrollment caps 
and institutional spending works through a measure of state legislative authority or influence. This 
somewhat intangible measure is difficult to account for in a model, and even if I were to include it, 
may still be problematic if my instrument (enrollment caps) has a direct relationship with 
institutional spending patterns, separate from changes in the share of nonresidents enrolled. In light 
of these model limitations, one should cautiously interpret the share of nonresidents affecting 
institutional spending in all four categories, though robustness models more clearly suggest a link 
between nonresident enrollment and increased institutional support spending. 
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On a final note, it is worth discussing the null relationship between the share of nonresidents 
and spending patterns on student services and auxiliary enterprises – consumption amenities – in all 
models whether, FE or IV. Based on the anecdotes conveyed in the popular press about the 
dramatic rise in institutional spending on nonessential, nonacademic goods like recreation centers or 
luxury dorms, one comes away believing that this rise is due at least partly to public institutions’ 
growing reliance on out-of-state students. This is one pivotal way, they say, that nonresidents are 
shaping higher education for the worse. However, I do not observe any statistically significant 
relationship between nonresident share and spending changes in categories devoted to amenity 
goods and services. There are several reasons that this may be the case.  
First, the preference for consumption goods may, in reality, be much more similar between 
residents and nonresidents than conveyed in anecdotes. Residents may prefer lazy rivers and 
climbing gyms in the same propensity as their out-of-state peers, such that even as institutions shift 
towards enrolling more nonresidents, they experience no change in the demand for these goods and 
services. Related to this first reason, a second explanation may lie with the fact that many of these 
“country club” amenities are funded through student fee hikes that students themselves often vote 
to have put in place. These fee hikes are approved by student bodies often through student elections 
or through study body legislatures comprised of both resident and nonresident students. The 
decision to fund these ancillary projects ultimately rests with the students and may have nothing 
whatsoever to do with whether the state imposes a nonresident enrollment cap or the level of merit-
based aid in other states. It is also possible that institutions are less responsive to student preferences 
and demands than stakeholders assume. Future research should continue looking for levers that 








Category Description Example Items 
Academic 
support 
Expenses of activities and services that support 
the institution's primary missions of instruction, 
research, and public service  
libraries; museums; galleries; academic 
computing; information technology expenses 
Auxiliary 
enterprises 
Expenses associated with essentially self-
supporting operations of the institution that exist 
to furnish a service to students, faculty, or staff, 
and that charge a fee that is directly related to, 
although not necessarily equal to, the cost of the 
service  
residence halls; food services; student health  
services; intercollegiate athletics (only if 
essentially self-supporting); college unions; 




Expenses for the day-to-day operational support 
of the institution 
general administrative services; central 
executive-level activities concerned with 
management and long range planning; legal 
and fiscal operations; space management; 
employee personnel and records; logistical 
services such as purchasing and printing; and 
public relations and development  
Instruction 
Expenses of colleges, schools, departments, and 
instructional divisions for the purposes of credit 
and non-credit instructional activities  
general academic instruction; instructor and 
faculty salaries; academic administration (e.g., 
deans) 
Public Service 
Expenses associated with activities established 
primarily to provide non-instructional services 
beneficial to individuals and groups external to 
the institution   
 conferences, institutes, general advisory 
services, reference bureaus, and similar 




Expenses for activities specifically organized to 
produce research outcomes and commissioned 
by an agency either external to the institution or 
separately budgeted by an organizational unit 
within the institution  
institutes; research centers; individual and 
project research; information technology 
expenses related to research 
Student 
services 
Expenses associated with admissions, registrar 
activities, and activities whose primary purpose is 
to contribute to students' emotional and physical 
well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and 
social development outside the context of the 
formal instructional program  
student activities; cultural events; student 
newspapers; intramural athletics; student 
organizations; remedial instruction; career 
guidance; counseling; financial aid 
administration; and student records 
Scholarships & 
fellowships 
Expenses associated with scholarships and 
fellowships treated as expenses because the 
institution incurs an incremental expense in the 
provision of a good or service. Thus, payments, 
made to students or third parties in support of 
the total cost of education are expenses if those 
payments are made for  
goods and services not provided by the 
institution  
payments for services to third parties 
(including students) for off-campus housing 
or for the cost of board provided by 
institutional contract meal plans 
Other 
expenses 
Expenses associated with the operating costs for 
functions other than those listed in the other 
categories  
operations and maintenance of plant, 
depreciation, hospitals, independent 
operations 




  1 2 3 
  Full Sample AAU Institutions Non-AAU Institutions 
Institutional Spending         
Total spending per FTE 39426.9 (24690.2) 65795.1 (28784.6) 32896.3 (18462.4) 
Share academic support 8.4 (3.2) 7.2 (2.8) 8.8 (3.2) 
Share auxiliary enterprises 12.0 (6.1) 11.1 (6.5) 12.2 (6.0) 
Share institutional support 7.7 (3.1) 5.3 (2.3) 8.2 (3.0) 
Share instruction 31.1 (7.7) 26.1 (7.0) 32.3 (7.4) 
Share public service 5.2 (4.2) 4.8 (3.8) 5.3 (4.3) 
Share research activities 14.9 (8.6) 19.3 (8.3) 13.8 (8.3) 
Share scholarships and fellowships 4.1 (2.8) 2.8 (1.7) 4.5 (2.9) 
Share student services 4.9 (2.8) 3.0 (1.6) 5.3 (2.9) 
Share other categories 11.7 (13.2) 20.3 (18.2) 9.6 (10.6) 
        
Nonresident Enrollment       
Share nonresident 20.5 (14.7) 24.6 (13.7) 19.5 (14.8) 
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 16.8 (40.2) 17.0 (38.1) 16.8 (40.7) 
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 369.5 (871.0) 395.0 (890.4) 363.1 (866.3) 
Z1st: Nonresident cap   0.2 (0.4) 0.2 (0.4) 0.2 (0.4) 
Z2st: Nonresident cap value   4.1 (9.5) 4.3 (9.7) 4.1 (9.5) 
Z1it: Merit aid expenditure in other states 95.5 (33.7) 86.6 (25.6) 97.8 (35.1) 
        
Institution-level Covariates       
In-state tuition and fees 8085.4 (2834.0) 9333.6 (2670.7) 7776.2 (2788.6) 
Nonresident tuition and fees 20938.0 (6463.2) 26674.7 (6667.8) 19517.2 (5564.0) 
Endowment per FTE 17391.7 (26571.1) 41073.5 (47566.3) 11526.5 (12174.4) 
State appropriations per FTE 8981.3 (4390.5) 10956.9 (4323.7) 8492.0 (4269.1) 
Pell grant aid per FTE 1045.5 (551.2) 737.8 (343.5) 1121.7 (566.3) 
Nonresident tuition and fees in other 
states 16879.2 (3510.4) 16062.4 (3287.4) 17081.5 (3535.3) 
Ratio of the population of 18-year-olds 
to enrollment in public research 
institutions in other states 
18.4 (3.8) 18.3 (4.4) 18.4 (3.6) 
        
Own State-level Covariates       
Per-capita income 42818.4 (6179.9) 44754.4 (5460.0) 42338.9 (6255.1) 
Unemployment rate 6.5 (2.1) 6.7 (2.2) 6.4 (2.1) 
Population of 12-17-year-olds 858.0 (803.4) 1293.0 (1071.3) 750.3 (680.6) 
Population of 18-24-year-olds 1017.5 (948.7) 1531.9 (1273.4) 890.1 (800.2) 
Population of 25-44-year-olds 2798.8 (2644.0) 4239.4 (3556.3) 2442.1 (2225.8) 
Expenditure on need-based aid 231979.7 (341324.5) 435317.0 (488775.9) 181619.4 (271156.3) 
Expenditure on merit-based aid  83634.7 (141989.2) 66083.3 (135604.6) 87981.7 (143232.7) 
        
Observations 2,141 425 1,716 
Institutions 160 31 129 
Notes: Sample means are reported in standard deviations in parentheses. AAU = American Association of 
Universities; FTE = full-time equivalent student. All financial variables are in real 2015 dollars. 
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Table 3 
Nonresident enrollment caps by state and year 
State Fall 2002 Fall 2003 Fall 2004 Fall 2005 Fall 2006 Fall 2007 Fall 2008 Fall 2009 Fall 2010 Fall 2011 Fall 2012 Fall 2013 Fall 2014 Fall 2015 Fall 2016 Fall 2017 
Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Arizona 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 . . . 
Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.18 
Colorado 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . .    
Hawaii 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Maryland 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New Hampshire 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
North Carolina 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 






Table 3 continued… 
South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Texas . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Virginia . . 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
 Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Wisconsin 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 .  




Relevance of the instrument: First-stage estimates with different instruments 
Share Nonresidentit 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
           
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 
-0.055*** -0.038***      
(0.013) (0.009)        
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x 
Merit aid expenditure in other 
states 
0.001**  -0.002***       
(0.001)  (0.001)       
Z1st: Nonresident cap   
   -6.141*** -4.213***    
   (1.504) (0.928)    
Z2st: Nonresident cap value   
   0.124**  -0.170***  
   (0.057)  (0.057)  
Z1it: Merit aid expenditure in other 
states 
        -0.114*** 
        (0.040) 
In-state tuition and fees 
0.542 0.771 1.223 0.490 0.756 1.236 0.141 
(2.760) (2.714) (2.790) (2.794) (2.759) (2.847) (2.805) 
Nonresident tuition and fees 
-0.830 -0.986 -1.291 -0.637 -0.760 -1.086 -0.948 
(1.719) (1.718) (1.831) (1.686) (1.697) (1.801) (1.726) 
Endowment per FTE 
-0.065 -0.065 -0.060 -0.054 -0.055 -0.054 -0.075 
(0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.114) 
State appropriations per FTE 
-0.540 -0.534 -0.503 -0.531 -0.510 -0.465 -0.336 
(0.643) (0.630) (0.613) (0.653) (0.644) (0.629) (0.604) 
Pell grant aid per FTE 
-1.407 -1.420 -1.480 -1.421 -1.438 -1.500 -1.564 
(1.240) (1.248) (1.284) (1.252) (1.261) (1.295) (1.314) 
Nonresident tuition and fees in 
other states 
1.917 0.118 -4.019 2.001 0.328 -3.546 17.252 
(26.408) (26.545) (27.629) (26.812) (27.018) (28.057) (26.061) 
Ratio of the population of 18-year-
olds to enrollment in public 
research institutions in other states 
2.567 2.829 2.955* 2.365 2.568 2.648 2.453 
(1.801) (1.726) (1.665) (1.833) (1.790) (1.753) (2.107) 
Per-capita income in own state 
7.653 7.182 4.106 6.644 6.061 3.136 4.891 
(9.468) (9.412) (9.403) (9.604) (9.571) (9.549) (8.569) 
Unemployment rate in own state 
-1.806 -1.758 -1.648 -1.830 -1.788 -1.680 -0.987 
(2.357) (2.367) (2.379) (2.339) (2.336) (2.344) (2.239) 
Population of 12-17-year-olds in 
own state 
-19.071 -20.018 -24.892 -21.340 -22.486 -26.835* -15.230 
(15.596) (15.407) (15.626) (15.696) (15.489) (15.737) (15.142) 
Population of 18-24-year-olds in 
own state 
-6.528 -5.976 -6.553 -7.995 -7.948 -8.677 -15.068 
(12.639) (12.488) (12.725) (12.398) (12.434) (12.585) (11.622) 
Population of 25-44-year-olds in 
own state 
11.321 11.378 12.987 12.607 12.854 14.283 4.640 
(12.437) (12.448) (12.507) (12.604) (12.598) (12.642) (11.127) 
Expenditure on need-based aid in 
own state 
-0.047 -0.045 -0.047 -0.053 -0.053 -0.054 -0.055 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.079) 
Expenditure on merit-based aid in 
own state 
0.074 0.072 0.071 0.079 0.077 0.075 0.056 
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) 
           
F-Test of excluded instruments 9.126*** 18.16*** 7.710*** 9.058*** 20.63*** 8.948*** 8.189*** 
Underidentification Test 6.144** 4.882** 6.144** 4.708* 4.172** 4.701** 7.377*** 
Weak Instrument Test 9.131 18.17 7.713 9.062 20.64 8.952 8.193 
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. With the exception 
of the instruments, all right-hand-side variables are logged in the regression framework. FTE = full-time equivalent student. All 




Reduced form estimates with different expenditure outcomes 
  (Ln) Total spending per FTEit Share on academic supportit Share on auxiliary enterprisesit 
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 
-0.000 0.000  0.018*** 0.004  -0.016* 0.002  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) 
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x Merit 
aid expenditure in other states 
0.000  0.000* -0.001***  -0.000 0.001**  0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
                    
  Share on institutional supportit Share on instructionit Share on public serviceit 
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 
-0.013*** -0.005*  -0.009 -0.017***  0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)  
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x Merit 
aid expenditure in other states 
0.001***  -0.000 -0.001  -0.001*** -0.000  -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Share on research activitiesit Share on scholarships & fellowshipsit Share on student servicesit 
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 
0.027*** 0.010**  0.006* 0.004**  0.001 -0.003  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x Merit 
aid expenditure in other states 
-0.001***  0.000 -0.000  0.000 -0.000*  -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Share on other expensesit        
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 
-0.016 0.006       
 
(0.010) (0.007)        
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x Merit 
aid expenditure in other states 
0.001***  0.001**   
     
(0.001) (0.000)        
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. All equations also include institution-level and state-
level covariates including in-state and nonresident tuition and fees, endowment per FTE, state appropriations per FTE, Pell grant aid per FTE, nonresident tuition 
and fees in other states, ratio of the population of 18-year-olds to enrollment in public research institutions in other states, per-capita income in own state, 
unemployment rate in own state, population of 12-17-year-olds in own state, population of 18-24-year-olds in own state, population of 25-44-year-olds in own state, 
expenditure on need-based aid in own state, and expenditure on merit-based aid in own state. With the exception of the instruments, all right-hand-side variables are 
logged. FTE = full-time equivalent student. All financial variables are in real 2015 dollars. Number of observations = 2,141. Number of institutions=160. *** 





The effect of nonresident enrollment on total institution expenditures 
  (Ln) Total expenditures per FTEit 
  FE Models IV Models 









!2#$% !1#$%  !2#$% 
          
Share Nonresidentit 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
In-state tuition and fees 
0.111** 0.130*** 0.110** 0.084 0.115** 0.116** 0.120** 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.053) (0.050) (0.051) (0.055) 
Nonresident tuition and fees 
0.010 0.025 0.023 0.010 0.018 0.016 0.012 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.034) (0.030) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) 
Endowment per FTE 
0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
State appropriations per FTE 
0.016 0.031 0.058 0.037 0.056 0.055 0.053 
(0.014) (0.026) (0.045) (0.025) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) 
Pell grant aid per FTE 
0.016 0.037** 0.121** 0.035** 0.113** 0.111** 0.105** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.059) (0.017) (0.055) (0.053) (0.050) 
Nonresident tuition and fees in 
other states 
-0.283 0.095 0.037 0.094 0.018 0.013 -0.002 
(0.523) (0.470) (0.429) (0.538) (0.450) (0.466) (0.526) 
Ratio of the population of 18-year-
olds to enrollment in public 
research institutions in other states 
0.024 0.006 -0.041* 0.020 -0.031 -0.028 -0.021 
(0.033) (0.023) (0.020) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) 
Per-capita income in own state 
0.115 0.322* 0.406** 0.406*** 0.408** 0.409** 0.410** 
(0.177) (0.180) (0.166) (0.149) (0.165) (0.168) (0.181) 
Unemployment rate in own state 
-0.012 -0.018 -0.006 0.007 -0.014 -0.016 -0.022 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.050) 
Population of 12-17-year-olds in 
own state 
-0.030 -0.032 -0.058 0.031 -0.200 -0.240 -0.354 
(0.219) (0.216) (0.210) (0.202) (0.286) (0.303) (0.364) 
Population of 18-24-year-olds in 
own state 
-0.329** -0.209 -0.233 -0.128 -0.281 -0.295 -0.333 
(0.160) (0.180) (0.190) (0.226) (0.203) (0.210) (0.239) 
Population of 25-44-year-olds in 
own state 
-0.052 -0.116 -0.046 -0.129 0.029 0.050 0.110 
(0.267) (0.271) (0.242) (0.220) (0.275) (0.288) (0.332) 
Expenditure on needs-based aid in 
own state 
0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expenditure on merit-based aid in 
own state 
0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
          
Observations 1,822 1,981 2,141 1,995 2,141 2,141 2,141 
Institutions 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Overidentification Test      1.308   
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. FTE = 
full-time equivalent student. All financial variables are in real 2015 dollars. With the exception of the Share Nonresidentit, 
all right-hand side variables are logged. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 
The effect of nonresident enrollment on expenditures 
  FE Models IV Models 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
2-year Lag 1-year Lag Current 1-year Lead 
!1#$% & 
!2#$% !1#$%  !2#$% 
  Share on academic supportit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.010 0.008 0.004 -0.002 -0.146 -0.106 0.008 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.107) (0.116) (0.127) 
Overidentification Test     3.977**   
  Share on auxiliary enterprisesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.009 -0.001 -0.005 -0.012 0.018 -0.043 -0.219 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.124) (0.135) (0.156) 
Overidentification Test     3.867**   
  Share on institutional supportit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.023* 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.147*** 0.127** 0.069 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.056) (0.062) (0.076) 
Overidentification Test     2.729*   
  Share on instructionit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.032 0.017 0.011 0.005 0.380*** 0.429*** 0.569*** 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.113) (0.133) (0.196) 
Overidentification Test     2.130   
  Share on public serviceit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.029 -0.023 -0.019 -0.013 0.019 0.032 0.069 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.076) (0.084) (0.119) 
Overidentification Test     0.651   
  Share on research activitiesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.051*** -0.059*** -0.052*** -0.028 -0.300*** -0.258** -0.137 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.099) (0.114) (0.143) 
Overidentification Test     2.774*   
  Share on scholarships & fellowshipsit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.022* -0.024** -0.027*** -0.024** -0.097** -0.095** -0.088 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.045) (0.047) (0.061) 
Overidentification Test     0.0551   
  Share on student servicesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.016 0.061 0.079 0.131* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.050) (0.056) (0.070) 
Overidentification Test     2.528   
  Share on other expensesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.029 0.069 0.085 0.075 -0.082 -0.165 -0.403* 
(0.047) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.154) (0.179) (0.239) 
Overidentification Test     3.045*   
         
Observations 1,822 1,981 2,141 2,005 2,141 2,141 2,141 
Institutions 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. All 
equations also include institution-level and state-level covariates. FTE = full-time equivalent student.  p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 
Interaction Model: Relevance of the instrument, First-stage estimates with different instruments, by AAU status 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Share Nonresidentit Share Nonresidentit x AAUi Share Nonresidentit 
Share Nonresidentit 
x AAUi Share Nonresidentit 
Share Nonresidentit 
x AAUi 
          
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 
-0.064*** 0.002 -0.041*** -0.007**   
(0.016) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003)  
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states x AAUi 
0.051*** 0.016** 0.014** 0.005   
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)   
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states 
0.002** -0.001   -0.002** -0.001** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Z2ist: Nonresident cap value x Merit aid 
expenditure in other states x AAUi 
-0.003*** -0.001   0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
        
F-Test of excluded instruments 4.751*** 4.355*** 17.19*** 3.512** 4.008** 2.752* 
Underidentification Test 4.638 0.129 4.44e-05 
Weak Instrument Test 3.430 0.0763 2.15e-05 
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. All equations also include institution-level and state-





Interaction Model: Reduced form estimates with different expenditure outcomes and !1#$% instrument only, by AAU status 
  Share of total spending on … 



















           
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit 
aid expenditure in other states 
0.004 0.004 -0.005* -0.017*** -0.002 0.010** 0.005** -0.002 0.004 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Z1ist: Nonresident cap x Merit 
aid expenditure in other states 
x AAUi 
0.001 -0.014*** 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.000 -0.007** -0.004 0.013 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) 
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. All equations also include institution-level and state-




Interaction Model: The effect of nonresident enrollment on expenditures, by AAU status 
  FE Models IV Models 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 






!2#$% !1#$%  !2#$% 
  (Ln) Total expenditures per FTEit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.012 0.080 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.277) (0.125) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.037 -0.218 -0.015 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.028) (0.716) (0.245) 
Overidentification Test     2.167   
  Share on academic supportit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.002 -0.007 -0.014 -0.023* -0.241* -0.291 -26.964 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.132) (0.588) (4,014.018) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi 0.037 0.046* 0.058** 0.063** 0.941* 1.065 88.048 (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.494) (3.032) (13,121.124) 
Overidentification Test     1.679   
  Share on auxiliary enterprisesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.012 0.016 0.021 0.015 0.199 0.840 -59.785 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.212) (2.298) (8,939.797) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi -0.010 -0.053 -0.079 -0.075 -1.460* -5.080 194.449 (0.038) (0.053) (0.061) (0.062) (0.880) (12.181) (29,223.118) 
Overidentification Test     1.094   
  Share on institutional supportit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.036** 0.033** 0.028** 0.029** 0.208*** 0.141 -5.008 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.059) (0.130) (765.267) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi -0.041** -0.048*** -0.044** -0.041** -0.398*** -0.082 16.573 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.150) (0.669) (2,501.580) 
Overidentification Test     2.875   
  Share on instructionit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.054** 0.041 0.034 0.026 0.241** 0.472 -4.031 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.121) (0.642) (694.499) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi -0.066 -0.075* -0.074* -0.071* 0.970 -0.248 15.017 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.742) (3.609) (2,270.606) 
Overidentification Test 
    
0.544 
  
  Share on public serviceit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.025 -0.020 -0.016 -0.014 -0.031 -0.157 34.440 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.077) (0.772) (5,138.806) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.001 0.257 1.088 -112.202 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.377) (4.348) (16,798.203) 





Table 10 continued… 
  
  FE Models IV Models 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  




!2#$% !1#$%  !2#$% 
  Share on research activitiesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.031* -0.044** -0.041* -0.019 -0.406*** -0.521 -13.589 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.121) (1.101) (2,029.829) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi -0.062** -0.045 -0.033 -0.023 0.990** 1.517 43.913 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.401) (6.025) (6,635.010) 
Overidentification Test     1.477   
  Share on scholarships and fellowshipsit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.029* -0.028** -0.029*** -0.020 -0.091** 0.264 -41.967 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.046) (1.080) (6,274.408) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi 0.022 0.015 0.007 -0.012 -0.010 -2.061 136.709 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.193) (5.598) (20,510.267) 
Overidentification Test     4.424   
  Share on student servicesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.012 0.009 0.005 -0.000 0.007 0.431 -17.673 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.051) (0.917) (2,671.371) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.047*** 0.256 -2.021 58.120 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.224) (4.685) (8,732.468) 
Overidentification Test     1.544   
  Share on other expensesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.027 -0.000 0.014 0.006 0.114 -1.178 134.577 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.044) (0.045) (0.179) (3.414) (20,245.830) 
Share Nonresidentit x AAUi 0.174** 0.216** 0.222** 0.207** -1.547* 5.822 -440.627 (0.076) (0.095) (0.103) (0.101) (0.843) (17.629) (66,181.136) 
Overidentification Test     1.040   
          
Observations 1,822 1,981 2,141 1,995 2,141 2,141 2,141 
Institutions 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. All 
equations also include institution-level and state-level covariates. FTE = full-time equivalent student.  p<0.01, ** 








Robustness of findings to alternative instruments, First-stage and Second-stage 
First-stage results 




square root All aid in other states 
Historical reliance on nonresident 
enrollment Merit aid expenditure in other states 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Z1ist: Nonresident 
cap x Merit aid 
expenditure in other 
states 
-0.038*** -0.035*** -0.036*** Z1ist: Nonresident cap x All 
aid expenditure in other 
states 
-0.017*** Z1ist: Nonresident cap x 
Historical reliance on 
nonresidents in other states 
-0.029 Z1it: Merit aid 
expenditure in other 
states 
-0.114*** 
-0.009 (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.059) -0.04 
F-Test of excluded 
instruments 18.16*** 17.36*** 17.36*** 
F-Test of excluded 
instruments 16.88*** 
F-Test of excluded 
instruments 0.245 
F-Test of excluded 
instruments 8.189*** 
Underidentification 
Test 4.882** 4.859** 4.913** Underidentification Test 4.761** Underidentification Test 0.276 Underidentification Test 7.377*** 
Weak Instrument 
Test 18.17 17.37 17.37 Weak Instrument Test 16.89 Weak Instrument Test 0.245 Weak Instrument Test 8.193 
Share of spending on …. 
  Institutional supportit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.127** 0.125* 0.125*  0.119*  -0.087  0.150** 
(0.062) (0.066) (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.366)  (0.073) 
  Instructionit 
Share Nonresidentit 
0.429*** 0.423*** 0.423***  0.421***  0.885  0.030 
(0.133) (0.147) (0.144)  (0.141)  (2.175)  (0.165) 
  Research activitiesit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.258** -0.240* -0.247*  -0.267**  0.885  -0.040 
(0.114) (0.133) (0.130)  (0.124)  (2.175)  (0.154) 
  Scholarships and fellowshipsit 
Share Nonresidentit 
-0.095** -0.075 -0.081*  -0.081*  0.496  -0.029 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046)  (0.046)  (1.067)  (0.060) 
              
Observations 2,141 2,141 2,141  2,141  2,039  2,141 
Institutions 160 160 160   160   160   160 
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12 
Robustness of findings to alternative specifications and samples, Second-stage 
Share of spending on …. Ln per FTE spending on... Share of spending on …. 











regressor & Just merit aid 
instrument^ 
Preferred (Original) but with Flagship interaction instead of 
AAU 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Institutional supportit Institutional supportit 
Share 
Nonresidentit 








(0.062) (0.059) (0.071) (0.011) (0.112) (1.174) (2.991) 
 Instructionit Instructionit 
Share 
Nonresidentit 








(0.133) (0.138) (0.151) (0.004) (0.060) (4.523) (11.815) 
 Research activitiesit Research activitiesit 
Share 
Nonresidentit 








(0.114) (0.106) (0.143) (0.012) (0.153) (6.917) (17.742) 
 Scholarships and fellowshipsit Scholarships and fellowshipsit 
Share 
Nonresidentit 








(0.047) (0.046) (0.050) (0.015) (0.244) (3.416) (8.819) 
             
Observations 2,141 2,041 2,198 2,141 Observations 2,005 Observations 2,141 Observations 2,141 
Institutions 160 160 162 160 Institutions 160 Institutions 160 Institutions 160 
Notes: All equations include institution- and year-fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the state-level. ^Just merit aid instrument refers to the instrument that 








Notes: State appropriations per FTE are in real 2015 dollars. FTE = full-time equivalent student. Calculations come from 




Notes: FTE = full-time equivalent student. The first y-axis shows the share (%) of total per FTE spending devoted to 
instruction, research, auxiliary enterprises, academic support, institutional support, student services, and other expenses. 
It also shows the share of nonresidents in each year. The second y-axis shows per FTE total spending each year. 
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Instruction Research Auxiliary Enterprises
Academic Support Institutional Support Student Services
Other Expenses Share Nonresident Per FTE Total Spending





Notes: Calculations come from public research institutions in my analytic sample (N=160 institutions). ** denote the 






















































































SDC challenge exam pass rates overall and by year, Full Sample 
Course  Exam Cut Score 
Year N with 
Null 
Scores Overall 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16  2016-17 
All Courses – 0.184 0.197 0.301 0.105 0.159 788 
N=15,560 N=3,069 N=4,310 N=6,468 N=1,713 
         
Math Courses – 0.188 0.164 0.375 0.105 0.152 293 
N=8,794 N=2,027 N=2,078 N=3,723 N=966 
College Algebra 75% 0.271 0.164 0.375 . . 293 
N=4,105 N=2,027 N=2,078 
Pre-Calculus 75% 0.107 . . 0.097 0.156 0 
N=2,853 N=2,398 N=455 
Statistics 75% 0.128 . . 0.120 0.149 0 
N=1,836 N=1,325 N=511 
CTE Courses – 0.184 0.260 0.248 0.085 0.238 467 
N=5,099 N=1,042 N=1,747 N=2,058 N=252 
Criminal Justice I 80% 0.029 . 0.015 0.026 0.169 82 
N=1,778 N=585 N=1,110 N=83 
Health Information 
Technology 75% 
0.000 . . 0.000 . 0 
N=64 N=64 
Introduction to 
Agricultural Business 70% 
0.375 0.500 0.343 0.338 0.390 5 
N=547 N=92 N=221 N=157 N=77 
Introduction to Plant 
Science 70% 
0.252 0.237 0.371 0.127 0.174 380 
N=2,710 N=950 N=941 N=727 N=92 
Social Science Courses – 0.160 . 0.178 0.167 0.133 28 
N=1,667 N=485 N=687 N=495 
Psychology 70% 0.018 . . . 0.018 0 
N=163 N=163 
Introduction to Sociology 70% 0.181 . 0.178 0.167 0.223 28 
N=1,455 N=485 N=687 N=283 
World History 80% 0.000 . . . 0.000 0 
N=49 N=49 
Notes: This table contains information on 16,348 unique student-exam instances. 1,003 students have more than one exam record, 
either in different years and/or different courses. Boxes with (.) indicate that the statewide challenge exam was not administered in 
that course and year to students. Students with null scores (last column) are students who enrolled in the course, but did not sit for 
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Table 1A 
What predicts surcharge incidence? Full Sample, broken out by institution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  ECU ECU NCA&T NCA&T NCSU NCSU UNCC UNCC 
                  
Male 0.036** 0.004 0.163*** 0.103*** 0.085*** 0.043*** 0.053** 0.004 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.035 0.015 0.161** 0.164* 0.106*** 0.065*** 0.073** 0.032 
  (0.019) (0.016) (0.050) (0.059) (0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.022) 
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.084* 0.058 0.065 0.030 0.007 -0.009 0.064 0.019 
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.151) (0.163) (0.015) (0.011) (0.028) (0.018) 
Hispanic 0.014 0.012 0.115 0.134 0.083* 0.064 0.048* 0.014 
  (0.035) (0.030) (0.073) (0.098) (0.034) (0.028) (0.015) (0.020) 
Other, non-Hispanic 0.042** 0.030** 0.210** 0.182** 0.020 0.012 0.006 0.002 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.038) (0.039) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) 
Out-of-state -0.086 -0.088 -0.080 -0.104 0.005 0.028 -0.053 -0.038 
  (0.049) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.020) (0.015) (0.048) (0.044) 
NC Resident -0.084 -0.085 -0.187** -0.181** -0.028 -0.011 -0.072 -0.051 
  (0.061) (0.063) (0.053) (0.037) (0.016) (0.015) (0.072) (0.071) 
Real NC County Median HH income ($1000s) 0.001* 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Standardized SAT score 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.009 -0.003 -0.006 0.006 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Missing SAT score -0.002 0.005 -0.062 -0.091 -0.017 -0.002 -0.004 -0.020** 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.049) (0.051) (0.015) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) 
Standardized HS GPA -0.024** -0.005 -0.047** -0.026* -0.027*** -0.011*** -0.025** -0.007 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) 
Missing HS GPA 0.019 0.013 -0.033 0.013 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.034) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) 
Has pre-college credit -0.053** -0.043** -0.006 0.045   -0.006 -0.004 
  (0.013) (0.008) (0.076) (0.027)   (0.026) (0.032) 
Pre-college credits earned 0.002 0.002 -0.011 -0.012***   -0.005* -0.005* 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Transfer student -0.047 -0.017 -0.089 -0.081 -0.054** -0.011 0.047** 0.031** 
  (0.025) (0.022) (0.059) (0.086) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
Transfer credits at entry -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002 0.006* -0.001*** -0.001 -0.004*** 0.002** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Stops out at or before term 4  -0.074**  -0.179**  -0.031  -0.080** 
   (0.019)  (0.044)  (0.020)  (0.016) 
283  
Cumulative surcharge-relevant credits attempted by term 4  -0.001  -0.005*  0.000  -0.004***                                                                      283 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Cumulative summer credits attempted by term 4  -0.007**  -0.005*  -0.002  -0.005 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Cumulative extension credits attempted by term 4  -0.000  -0.027*  -0.007***  -0.002 
   (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Ratio of cumulative earned to attempted credits by term 4  -0.006  -0.010***  -0.008***  -0.002* 
   (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Student declares first major at or before term 4  -0.056**  -0.037  -0.024***  -0.074*** 
   (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.002)  (0.009) 
First declared major is in STEM  0.001  0.070*  0.015  0.020* 
   (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
First declared major is in engineering  0.064**  0.069**  0.065***  0.126*** 
   (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.014) 
Student switches major after term 4  0.086***  0.095**  0.112***  0.088*** 
   (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.009) 
Student moves into a STEM major after term 4  0.091**  0.234**  0.182***  0.131** 
   (0.024)  (0.049)  (0.013)  (0.034) 
Student moves out of a STEM major after term 4  0.101*  -0.047  0.020  -0.021 
   (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.009)  (0.026) 
Cumulative failed credits as share of att. credits by term 4  0.003  -0.014***  -0.004  0.023** 
   (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Cumulative repeated credits as share of att. credits by term 4  0.014***  0.019***  0.023***  0.016*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Cumulative withdrawn credits as share of att. credits by term 4  -0.001  0.004  -0.007  0.015*** 
   (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
Student fills out FAFSA at or before term 4  -0.012  0.031  0.008  0.007 
   (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.006) 
Cumulative federal aid received per att. credit by term 4  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cumulative state aid received per att. credit by term 4  0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000* 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cumulative institutional aid received per att. credit by term 4  -0.000  -0.000***  0.000  -0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cumulative private aid received per att. credit by term 4  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 12.346* 14.290*** 65.479*** 52.554** -7.624*** -6.066 1.667 9.141 
  (4.373) (2.419) (6.368) (11.433) (0.243) (3.094) (4.206) (4.562) 
Observations 8,201 8,201 3,480 3,480 10,167 10,167 7,708 7,708 
R-squared 0.044 0.107 0.078 0.192 0.050 0.157 0.062 0.168 
MSE 0.370 0.358 0.462 0.433 0.367 0.346 0.382 0.360 
Mean VIF 3.9 4.88 4.16 3.68 3.35 3.77 3.31 4.84 





List of public AAU institutions 
Georgia Tech 
Indiana University 
Iowa State University 
Michigan State University 




Stony Brook University 
Texas A&M University 
University at Buffalo 
University of Arizona 
University of California - Berkeley 
University of California - Davis 
University of California - Irvine 
University of California - Los Angeles 
University of California - San Diego 
University of California - Santa Barbara 
University of Colorado - Boulder* 
University of Florida 
University of Illinois - Urbana-Champagne 
University of Iowa 
University of Kansas 
University of Maryland 
University of Michigan 
University of Minnesota 
University of Missouri 
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill 
University of Washington 
University of Oregon 
University of Pittsburgh* 
University of Texas - Austin 
University of Virginia 
University of Wisconsin 
Notes: * identifies the institutions that are not included in the primary analyses because they 
are missing state appropriation and/or endowment data to the extent that it cannot be 
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